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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Joshua H. Lind 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
December 2013 
 
Title: Desire and Subjectivity in Twentieth Century American Poetry 
 
 
 Many studies of American poetry view modernism as an eruption of formal and 
technical innovations that respond to momentous cultural and political changes, but few 
attempt to consider the flow and restriction of desire among these changes. This 
dissertation argues that American modernist poets construct models of desire based on 
the rejection of sensual objects and a subsequent redirection of desire toward the self and 
the creative mind. In addition, these models of desire result in a conception of subjects as 
whole, discrete, and isolated. 
 In the first chapter, I distinguish between Walt Whitman’s sensualist model of 
desire and Emily Dickinson’s intellectualist mode that defers satisfaction. I contend that 
Ezra Pound, Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot, and H.D. (Hilda Doolittle) develop from 
Dickinson’s perspective of deferred satisfaction to an outright rejection of physical 
desire. The manner and implications of this reorganization of desire differ among these 
poets, as do the poetic techniques they utilize, but underlying these differences is a 
related refusal to pursue objects of sensual pleasure. Pound withdraws desire from the 
world by turning objects into static images; desire is then able to flourish in the creative 
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mind. Stevens allows the imagination to remake the world, creating manifold abstractions 
for subjects who otherwise reject sensuality.  
The second chapter provides a close reading of Eliot’s The Waste Land to show 
how the presentation of sexual futility leads to a poetic experience of separation as a 
means of spiritual reformation. The third chapter reads H.D.’s Trilogy as a contemplation 
of the destruction of World War II and the persistent, unified self that outlasts it. Rather 
than interacting with this devastated world, H.D. insists that desire must be redirected 
toward the effort of spiritual redemption. In the fourth chapter, Elizabeth Bishop begins 
to question the deliberate rejection of the world. She sees a world that reasserts itself and 
imagines a subject who, though still yearning for unity, must admit an inescapably 
physical environment. The conclusion considers how postwar American poets continue to 
dissolve the subject and release desire into the world, emphasizing the present moment 
rather than a lasting, unified self. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
In the criticism that seeks to describe and explain American poetry, it is common 
to begin with Walt Whitman and Emily Dickinson as representatives of two separate 
strands of poetic practice opposed to each other across a variety of stylistic and thematic 
concerns. These two become the progenitors, in one way or another, of all the American 
poetry that follows. This manner of approach is particularly well suited to my aim here, 
which is to focus on desire and subjectivity in American modernist poetry. Whitman and 
Dickinson employ two distinct and opposing models of desire; Whitman, in broad terms, 
is a sensualist, believing in the pursuit and enjoyment of objects of desire; Dickinson, by 
contrast, is an intellectualist who values self-restraint. Whitman’s model is concisely 
described in his brief poem “I am He that Aches with Love”: 
I am he that aches with amorous love; 
Does the earth gravitate? does not all matter, aching, attract all matter? 
So the body of me to all I meet or know. (265) 
For Whitman, desire is active throughout the universe, pulling all bodies together. It is 
sensual and can be described in physical terms. Whitman’s concept of satisfaction, 
therefore, is based on the act of touching. The physical sensation of bodies coming into 
contact is not only a means toward satisfaction, it is also a sufficient answer to 
metaphysical uncertainties, or what Whitman calls “the terrible doubt of appearances”:  
To me these [doubts] and the like of these are curiously answer’d by my lovers, 
my dear friends, 
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When he whom I love travels with me or sits a long while holding me by the 
hand, 
When the subtle air, impalpable, the sense that words and reason hold not, 
surround us and pervade us, 
Then I am charged with untold and untellable wisdom, I am silent, I require 
nothing further, 
I cannot answer the question of appearances or that of identity beyond the grave, 
But I walk or sit indifferent, I am satisfied, 
He ahold of my hand has completely satisfied me. (274-75) 
For Whitman, the physical sensation of the lover’s hand controverts the idea that things 
may be appearances rather than reality. Desire can be satisfied by the physical experience 
of desired objects. Whitman’s sensualist perspective conceives of a desire between 
subjects and objects that can ultimately be satisfied through physical conjunction. 
 Emily Dickinson, of course, employs a different structure of desire. Rather than 
imagining the general sensual interplay of all things, Dickinson conceives of desire as 
emerging from relations between subject and object that remain perpetually unfulfilled. 
Her speakers often find themselves chasing a receding or escaping object: 
Delight – becomes pictorial –  
When viewed through Pain –  
More fair – because impossible 
That any gain –  
 
The Mountain – at a given distance – 
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In Amber – lies –  
Approached – the Amber flits – a little –  
And That’s – the Skies – (Fr539) 
For Dickinson, the mountain in the distance is beautiful or desirable specifically because 
it is in the distance, out of reach. Whereas Whitman’s model involves the attraction of all 
objects toward each other, Dickinson’s deemphasizes physical objects and derives delight 
(which is also pain) from the distance separating subject from object. When the subject 
approaches the mountain, the “Amber flits,” always remaining out of reach. For 
Whitman, the future portends a consummation of touching, while Dickinson conceives of 
a future of deferred satisfaction. The subject attains the desired object just as it is drained 
of its allure. Dickinson’s subject must chase new objects, such as “the Skies,” which are 
even more impossible than mountains because intangible. In Dickinson’s work, 
satisfaction is repeatedly postponed, objects “flit” away, and subjectivity is defined by the 
pain and pleasure of eternal distance. 
 In this dissertation, I examine several American modernist poets in order to 
discover the models of desire that inhabit, inform, and shape their work. I contend that 
poets such as Ezra Pound, Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot, and H.D. develop from 
Dickinson’s perspective of deferred satisfaction to an outright rejection of physical 
desire. Whereas Dickinson retains the object of desire but pushes it away in order to 
maintain the painful-pleasurable experience of unfulfilled desire, modernists largely 
divert desire from objects and direct it toward the self and its imaginative and aesthetic 
capabilities. The manner and implications of this reorganization of desire differ among 
these poets, as do the poetic techniques they utilize, but underlying these differences is a 
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related refusal to pursue objects of sensual pleasure. Ezra Pound withdraws desire from 
the world by turning objects into static images; desire is then able to flourish in the 
creative mind. Wallace Stevens allows the imagination to remake the world, creating 
manifold abstractions for subjects who otherwise reject sensuality. T. S. Eliot refuses 
interaction with a depraved world and instead pursues the poetic experience of separation 
as a means of spiritual reformation. H.D. contemplates a destroyed world and directs 
desire toward the discrete and persistent self that outlasts it. Finally, though, Elizabeth 
Bishop begins to question the deliberate rejection of the world. She sees a world that 
reasserts itself and imagines a subject who, though still yearning for unity, must admit an 
inescapably physical world. 
  Before examining the work of these poets in detail, it is important to define the 
term “desire” further. The word is closely associated with human sexual drive, of course, 
but it has a long and complex history in psychoanalytic literary criticism, derived at first 
from Sigmund Freud’s dynamic theory of the human psyche. One of Freud’s most well-
known conceptions of desire in formal terms is the Oedipal triangle: a male child desires 
his mother and is threatened by his father; he ultimately passes through the Oedipus 
complex by learning to redirect sexual desire toward a more appropriate object. This is a 
dynamic view of desire and prohibition, whether or not one accepts the particulars of the 
formulation. A model arises, the triangle, in which the self projects desiring energy 
toward particular objects and interactions, and has them frustrated or redirected in turn. 
My critical perspective is based on the idea that creative artists can imagine new models 
of desire either related or unrelated to the Oedipus complex. One of Freud’s most useful 
applications of his critical theory occurs in “The Moses of Michelangelo,” where he reads 
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the sculpture of Moses as the triumph of self-regulation over a desire to be angry or 
vengeful. Desire, in this case, is not overtly sexual but is, instead, the energy the self 
directs at the world. It is more visceral than a “motive” and more rational than an 
“impulse.” Desire can be read as generalized libidinal energy, a way of interacting with 
the world.1 We can get a sense of this understanding of desire by reading Dickinson’s “A 
Pit - but Heaven over it” and mapping desire and restraint as they are structured in the 
poem. The poem begins by locating the subject within her environment: 
A Pit - but Heaven over it - 
And Heaven beside, and Heaven abroad; 
And yet a Pit - 
With Heaven over it. (Fr508) 
Dickinson sets the speaker between good and bad outcomes, represented by heaven and 
the pit of hell. In this middle ground, the speaker is uncertain both how to achieve a good 
outcome and avoid a bad one: 
To stir would be to slip - 
To look would be to drop - 
To dream - to sap the Prop 
That holds my chances up. 
Ah! Pit! With Heaven over it! 
The speaker is stuck between two opposing wishes: to move within the world in an 
attempt to reach heaven or to remain motionless in order to avoid perdition. Ultimately 
the speaker counsels caution and restraint. The intense desire to achieve heaven 
paradoxically demands that she withhold herself from the world, leaving her unable to 
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move backward, forward, or sideways. Dickinson’s organization of desire draws a line 
toward heaven but requires that one not proceed along it; the desire to ascend demands 
utter stillness, providing the tension that makes the poem compelling. 
“A Pit - but Heaven over it” also helps exemplify the concept of subjectivity used 
throughout this essay, which attempts to compare models of desire or interaction with 
spatial models of the self. In particular, dispersive models of the self are aligned with 
sensualist models of desire, while conceptions of whole and discrete selves attend models 
of restraint or rejection. In Dickinson’s poem, the speaker is perfectly balanced; any 
movement would lead to a fall and the forfeit of heaven. The physical move of stirring, 
the sensational move of looking, and the psychological move of dreaming are each 
perilous because they disturb the speaker’s stasis. All the lines end with the letter “p,” 
which leads back to the percussive, explosive, and dangerous word “pit.” The only way 
to ensure heaven would be to refuse motion altogether. The structure of this state of 
affairs again emphasizes Dickinson’s model of deferred desire, but it also reveals how 
this deferral must be accomplished: through stillness and unity. For Dickinson, the self 
must remain whole and unmoved. The poem ends by equipping the subject with a bomb 
that must never detonate: 
We - could tremble -  
But since we got a Bomb - 
And held it in our Bosom - 
Nay - Hold it - it is calm.  
Dickinson’s subject retains the explosive possibility of exercised desire, but the poem 
suggests that survival depends on one’s refusal to act upon it. The point she rests upon is 
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where she must remain; the self is unified at that immobile spot. Dickinson’s model of 
desire accords with her model of unified subjectivity.  
Whitman’s model of universal attraction and physical satisfaction, on the other 
hand, calls for a form of subjectivity marked by dispersal. At the close of “Song of 
Myself,” Whitman’s vision culminates in an image of the body dispersing into the world 
that surrounds him: 
The last scud of day holds back for me, 
It flings my likeness after the rest and true as any on the shadow’d wilds, 
It coaxes me to the vapor and the dusk. 
 
I depart as air, I shake my white locks at the runaway sun, 
I effuse my flesh in eddies, and drift it in lacy jags. 
 
I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, 
If you want me again look for me under your boot-soles. (247) 
All of nature, filled with the objects of desire, ultimately accepts a subject who dissolves 
and joins it. The very air is infused with the self; the subject transcends his mere physical 
space and enters into everything that surrounds him.2 
 Pound, Stevens, Eliot, H.D., and Bishop develop from Dickinson’s conception of 
the unified subject in the same way that they emerge from Dickinson’s model of deferred 
desire. This structure of self is single, unified, discrete, and isolated. I am building here 
on T. E. Hulme’s argument in his essay “Romanticism and Classicism.” A deeper 
discussion of Hulme occurs in the chapter on H.D., but it will be useful now to point to 
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the distinction he makes between spatial organizations of selfhood in romanticism and the 
classicism he saw reemerging in the early twentieth century: “The view which regards 
man as a well, a reservoir full of possibilities, I call the romantic; the one which regards 
him as a very finite and fixed creature, I call the classical” (117). For Hulme, optimism 
about human potential was misplaced in light of the historical and cultural developments 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Hulme’s word “fixed” intimates the challenges 
facing the subject in a modern era marked by rapid technological change, global war, 
environmental degradation, and cultural fragmentation. These challenges threatened to 
un-fix the modern subject, resulting in cultural and literary attempts to regain a sense of 
fixity. The rejection of desire, the unity of the self, and the empowerment of the 
imagination provided these poets answers to the apparent ills surrounding them.3 This 
paper traces the development of these models of desire and subjectivity in American 
poetry of the modernist period. 
 
Modernism is much more diverse than the discussion above suggests, of course; 
some modernist poets are intensely interested in physicality and the sensual experience of 
objects. William Carlos Williams, at least at some level, remains a sensualist in the 
tradition of Whitman. He believes that the subject exists in the world in order to interact 
with it. For Williams, this is a sensual process involving vision and our other senses; one 
must exist “to enjoy, to taste, to engage the free world” (207). Like Whitman, he sees the 
subject awash in the free flow of objects, necessarily interacting with them. His 
contention that “He who has kissed / a leaf // need look no further” echoes Whitman’s 
conception of satisfaction based on physical sensation (228). 
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In a number of ways, however, Williams does not fully share Whitman’s belief in 
universal gravitation. First, he demands a poetic process that selects from among the 
world’s objects. For Williams, poetic articulation is not simply agglutinative, the addition 
of objects using Whitman’s cataloging technique. This is evident in how much more local 
Williams is than Whitman. The rivers, parks, and homes of New Jersey provide the 
sources of Williams’ poetry, while Whitman famously ranges from the “cry of the 
Cossack” to the “locusts in Syria” in his all-encompassing vision (288). At the level of 
the individual object, Williams investigates the boundaries and edges of things: 
The rose is obsolete 
but each petal ends in 
an edge, the double facet 
cementing the grooved 
columns of air—The edge 
cuts without cutting 
meets—nothing—renews 
itself in metal or porcelain— 
 
Whither? It ends— (195) 
Williams begins by rejecting the rose as a complete and symbolic flower, focusing 
instead on the petals and how they end along a definable edge: one side is the rose and 
the other is nothingness. He performs the same operation on the stem, distinguishing its 
substance from the “columns of air” within them. The flower, from this perspective, is a 
complicated mixture of being and non-being, not an object that can be celebrated simply 
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or collected ecstatically in a catalog of the world’s munificence. Williams strives to 
understand the process of how an object comes into being, especially for the artist or 
poet. Through art, the rose begins again, reflected in metal or porcelain, renewing itself 
after passing through the non-being of empty space. The edge of the rose is both an end 
and a beginning. In fact, throughout Spring and All, Williams shows how endings always 
give rise to new beginnings. The world is made through an evolutionary process in 
which, when sameness comes to an end, the radically new emerges. Williams’ phrase 
“Suddenly it is at an end. THE WORLD IS NEW” is the paradox of every existing thing 
(182). The poet, therefore, must perceive the object by reflecting its physical 
objectiveness as well as considering the surrounding nothingness. This is an incredibly 
complex and tenuous relation to the real, especially when compared to Whitman’s 
metaphysical certainties. The tensions of Williams’ poetry center on how one can 
overcome the stark separation from the object, the nothing that defines it as an object. 
Williams contemplates where the flower goes after the poet’s reflection and answers, “It 
ends,” suggesting that an object is utterly lost without the poet’s ability to draw its outline 
or discover its edges. The flower experiences another, and perhaps perpetual, end after 
artistic representation. From this perspective, the poet’s task is to articulate the edges of 
things in order to recover them as objects: 
But if it ends 
the start is begun 
so that to engage roses 
becomes a geometry— (195) 
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Poetry must discover a geometry of engagement that exceeds mere touching. For 
Williams, one way to approach the object is to chisel reality down to isolated objects 
described in spare and direct language, capturing their physicality but also the white 
space of where they necessarily end. This chiseling involves breaking up Whitman’s long 
line. Williams writes that Whitman’s “structure has to be realized. He composed ‘freely,’ 
he followed his untrammeled necessity. What he did not do was to study what he had 
done, to go over it, to select and reject, which is the making of the artist” (Selected Essays 
230). For Williams, the poet must discriminate between the world’s many objects, 
understanding them as things that emerge from non-being. Williams’ objectivity, 
therefore, is paradoxically based on the ending of the object in empty space. He still 
believes we desire objects and must move toward interacting with them, but such 
movement cannot disregard the disruptions between subjects and objects. Williams often 
uses line breaks to signify ruptures that remove the object from easy tangibility: 
Crisp, worked to defeat 
laboredness—fragile 
plucked, moist, half-raised 
cold, precise, touching 
 
What 
 
The place between the petal’s 
edge and the. (Collected Poems 195) 
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Though “plucked” and “moist” suggest sensual knowledge of the flower, Williams breaks 
away from a description of how this “touching” works by not attaching the flower to 
anything. Instead, he breaks the verse paragraph and asks “What” rather than answering 
how it might articulate to the physical world. He offers a series of discontinuities, one 
between the “petal’s / edge” and another between that edge and the unknown thing that 
goes unspoken at the abrupt end of the line.  
Another way Williams approaches objects is through coining words that help 
reveal objects. Williams argues that “[t]he value of the imagination to the writer consists 
in its ability to make words. Its unique power is to give created forms reality, actual 
existence // This separates” (207). For Williams, it is important that these are “new” 
words. Too often, words are taken as transparent representations of things. Williams 
strives, instead, to destroy old and encrusted words so that new insights about the world 
might emerge. In a 1934 essay, he praises Gertrude Stein for just such a creative 
destruction: 
Stein has gone systematically to work smashing every connotation that words 
have ever had, in order to get them back clean. It can’t be helped that it’s been 
forgotten what words are made for. It can’t be helped that the whole house has to 
come down [. . .] because it has to be rebuilt. And it has to be rebuilt by unbound 
thinking. And unbound thinking has to be done with straight, sharp words. Call 
them nails to hold together the joints of the new architecture. (Selected Essays 
163-64) 
Stein’s manner of deconstructing language verges on the nonsensical, which Williams 
acknowledges in his essay. Williams’ own method involves inserting white space 
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between lines or the words themselves. This occurs most famously in the case of the red 
wheelbarrow: 
so much depends 
upon 
 
a red wheel 
barrow 
 
glazed with rain 
water 
 
beside the white 
chickens. (224) 
Williams looks at a solitary object and describes it directly and concisely in a mere 
sixteen words. However, the words are broken down and spread across eight lines, 
creating breaches of white space. The poet’s imagination must cross the space separating 
the object as a discrete thing from a subject who desires it. The poet does this partly by 
disrupting language and removing from it the burden of representation. He breaks 
“wheelbarrow” and “rainwater” into separate parts, interrupting the conventional 
comprehension of the words and forcing one to reassemble the constituent parts. But the 
lines are also enjambed, fluidly linking one line to the next. Rather than offering a purely 
objective description, as the poem is sometimes read, it develops a tense vibration of 
language. The line breaks point to nonbeing within the object which the poet must enter 
 14 
in order to come out with the word that builds it anew. One of the ways this poem builds 
a new relation to objects is through its subtle sense of progression. Though the poem 
appears to present an inert image, there are two ways Williams introduces movement. 
First, he repeatedly compresses the lines, following three-word lines with one-word lines. 
The image develops through insistent concision, a collapsing movement. Second, the 
one-word lines develop steadily toward authentic and autonomous movement. “Upon” 
suggests the stillness required to rest one thing upon another; “barrow” is a wheeled 
object that can be moved if one exerts a force on it; “water” is a substance that moves on 
its own, but does so according to the external and universal force of gravity; “chickens” 
represent the animal’s prerogative to move about on its own. The importance of this 
progression is that it ultimately leads back to the human subject. Though there is no 
subject described in the poem, the human perceiver is suggested in the first line, the one 
who determines just how much “depends / upon” the scene he sees. The breaking of these 
words vivifies the static image and authorizes human involvement in the surrounding 
world. 
 In this sense, words are an entry into active and dynamic situations. Though they 
do not provide unmediated access to objects, neither are they obfuscations of things. For 
Williams, desire moves through words. James Breslin reads the disruptions of the 
wheelbarrow poem in terms of the poet’s entry into the scene: “The particulars in the 
poem, broken apart to be seen clearly, are drawn together by the ecstatic feeling 
generated by the poet’s discovery. This kind of crisp, intense lyric, in which self is 
dissolved into scene, is one way Williams had of constantly renewing himself” (Williams 
55). Breslin sees the image as a way to invite the subject’s emotion into the surrounding 
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world. Emotional energy enters the world through the openings made possible by 
Williams’ fractured words, the fissures in his presentation. For Williams, the move from 
object to imagination is not a move away from reality but is, rather, a way of 
apprehending the world: 
But the imagination is wrongly understood when it is supposed to be a removal 
from reality in the sense of John of Gaunt’s speech in Richard the Second: to 
imagine possession of that which is lost. It is rightly understood when John of 
Gaunt’s words are related not to their sense as objects adherent to his son’s 
welfare or otherwise but as a dance over the body of his condition accurately 
accompanying it. By this means of the understanding, the play written to be 
understood as a play, the author and reader are liberated to pirouette with the 
words which have sprung from the old facts of history, reunited in present 
passion. (Collected Poems 234) 
The imagination does not allow possession of a lost object but is instead a dynamic 
interplay of words and situation, a “dance” upon our conditions. Williams approaches the 
object through words that work within the situation. If words are “clean,” broken away 
from a history that traps them in unexamined meanings, they have the ability to traverse 
the gap between subject and object. Williams believes the imagination is an energy that 
liberates words so that they can access reality. The poet’s task is to discover the words 
that join the subject’s desire to the object newly conceived: “I take what I find, I make a 
poem out of it. I make it into a shape which will have a quality which is no longer you. 
It’s come out of you, but I’ve objectified it. I’ve given it a form, a human habitation” 
(Interviews 24-25). Only by seeing the object as both substance and absence, a beginning 
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and an end, is Williams able to find the words to apprehend the object and insert the 
subject into it. 
Williams insists on the importance of objects and still maintains a model of desire 
that imagines the subject’s eventual connection with the object, but it must achieve this 
union by passing desire through words. Objects end and begin in a space that can only be 
traversed by the passionate interaction of subject, word, and object. Though still a 
sensualist in many ways, Williams believes the subject must “pluck” the object as one 
plucks a lute, in order to hear its music, perceiving it through art. This is one of the 
reasons Williams so deplored Eliot’s influence on modern poetry, for Eliot takes the 
aesthetic experience in place of the object, whereas Williams uses the aesthetic 
experience to achieve the object. Williams condemns both Eliot and Pound because they 
“rejected Whitman as a master” (Interviews 143) and were unable to relinquish old poetic 
forms and European languages in favor of the newness and directness of the young 
American language. For Williams, these direct forms allow access to the object, which, 
therefore, does not need to be rejected. 
 
Ezra Pound, in his imagistic works, rejects objects of desire in order to redirect 
desiring energy into poetic creation. Pound made shifting claims about imagism during 
his active involvement in the short-lived movement. His most well-known statement 
defined a poetic image as “that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in 
an instant of time” (“A Retrospect” 253). In his essay, Pound refers to British 
psychologist Bernard Hart, who defines a complex as “a system of connected ideas, with 
a strong emotional tone” (61). Hart traces these complexes as they encounter 
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psychological resistance and emerge in symptoms like projection and phantasy. Pound’s 
poetry written during his imagistic phase seems to respond to Hart’s definition, figuring a 
complicated relationship between sexual desire and the rejection of sexuality. The 
“complex” of these early poems centers on this tension. Pound’s poetic images present 
the metamorphosis of active desire into static natural objects. A potentially sexual 
situation unfolds but is captured or stilled into a final image that rejects sexuality. The 
poetic image, from this perspective, is the poetic speaker’s denial of carnal appetite. 
Pound argues that intellectual thought and poetic creation are undertakings greater than 
sexual gratification. The suspension of desire into still images, however, threatens to 
divest his poems of their productive capacity, rendering them desexualized creations of 
the mind. 
Pound’s short, imagistic poems develop dynamic, potentially libidinal situations 
and then transform the associated desire into images of natural objects. For example, 
“Gentildonna” describes the potent presence of a passing woman and then abruptly 
metamorphoses this tension into an image of leaves: 
She passed and left no quiver in the veins, who now 
Moving among the trees, and clinging 
        in the air she severed, 
Fanning the grass she walked on then, endures: 
 
Grey olive leaves beneath a rain-cold sky. (Personae 92) 
The poem describes a woman passing, and yet in some aspects, she remains, “clinging / 
in the air.” She departs as a libidinal object but paradoxically inhabits the air left behind. 
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Pound’s poems frequently bring absence and presence into just such an ambiguous 
simultaneity. She both moves and clings, fans and endures. Though she is gone, the 
poetic speaker records her passing and intently remembers her presence, her enduring 
qualities. Because she is absent, she leaves “no quiver in the veins”: departed, she no 
longer generates the speaker’s physical desire. The sexual possibility of her presence is 
transmuted into the resulting natural image: “Grey olive leaves beneath a rain-cold sky.” 
The object of desire is replaced by an image that quenches desire: grey, wet, and cold 
leaves. 
The poem formally accomplishes this quenching of desire by substituting leaves 
for the woman, replacing the pursuit of sexual pleasure with the rendering of the poetic 
image. But this substitution does not resolve desire; it merely suspends it. The 
enjambment of the first two lines reinforces her presence by pausing first on a relative 
clause in which the woman is the subject (“who now”) and then on the word “clinging,” 
which is both semantically and syntactically static. In fact, the first four lines comprise a 
string of clauses that depend on the woman who is not present except as a pronoun 
without an antecedent. So while the speaker replaces the woman with cold, wet leaves, he 
does this in remembrance of her.  The image in the final line is set off, first, by the colon 
that ends the previous line and, second, by the white space between them. In this space, a 
transformation occurs that attempts to clear out the woman and institute a non-human 
replacement. 
A similar transformation of sexual desire into the image of wet leaves occurs in 
“Alba”: 
As cool as the pale wet leaves 
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  of lily-of-the-valley 
She lay beside me in the dawn. (Personae 109) 
On the most immediate level, the poem is the antithesis of “Gentildonna,” for the lovers 
lie together in the dawn. The image seems to register the speaker’s feeling of 
contentedness after a night of passion. But there are important tensions in the poem. First, 
the speaker establishes a contrast between an embrace, which is commonly figured as 
warm, and the simile that stresses coolness. The cognitive difficulty of this simile 
disrupts our habituated notion of lovers and warm physical sensation. The woman’s 
primary features are coolness, paleness, and wetness. Second, the poem emphasizes the 
simile by placing it at the beginning. Rather than beginning with the subject phrase (“She 
lay beside me in the dawn”) and ending with the simile, the poem defers the subject until 
the final line. This structure emphasizes the leaves and minimizes the woman. We must 
wait for the subject of the unfolding comparison. The significant indention of the second 
line diverts attention from the image of the woman that begins the final line. Ostensibly 
about presence and physical connection, the poem defers the appearance of the woman 
with whom the speaker interacts.  
In both of these poems, the speaker’s sexuality is metamorphosed into poetic 
figures of static natural objects, the first in the sudden image following the colon, the 
second in a cyclical figure. This metamorphosis finds its most concise formulation in 
Pound’s famous “In a Station of the Metro”: 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd; 
Petals on a wet, black bough. (Personae 109) 
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“In a Station of the Metro” has long fascinated critics because the relation between the 
first line and the second line is left unarticulated. One critical strategy has been to see two 
distinct objects juxtaposed in order to encourage a contemplation of their similarities. But 
it is possible to see the faces of the first line transformed into the petals of the second 
line. In such a reading, the second line is a consequence of the first rather than a 
comparison to it. The second line presents the poetic speaker’s reaction to the situation in 
the first line. The speaker, or the one confronted by the faces in the crowd, mentally 
objectifies the faces into petals on a tree branch. And, in fact, this is the process Pound 
describes in his explanation of the poem’s genesis: 
Three years ago in Paris I got out of a “metro” train at La Concorde, and saw 
suddenly a beautiful face, and then another, and another, and then a beautiful 
child’s face, and then another beautiful woman, and I tried all that day to find 
words for what this had meant to me, and I could not find any words that seemed 
to me worthy, or as lovely as that sudden emotion. (“Vorticism” 284) 
The appearance of the beautiful faces is followed by the recognition that he cannot 
adequately express the emotion generated in the experience. It is only through the wet, 
black bough that he comes to a solution. Confronted by faces in a crowd, Pound 
transforms them into static petals. The poem is not a juxtaposition of images but a 
reorientation of desire into a distanced aesthetic mode. He has found more than just 
words; he has found an image that restrains desire. The desirable human objects are 
arrested and transmuted into the poetic image. The paradigmatic form of this 
reorientation is Ovid’s telling of the Apollo and Daphne myth: Apollo, enflamed with 
desire, chases Daphne, who transforms into a tree. The desirable object becomes an 
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inanimate one. Rather than falling into the dissolution of sexual satisfaction, Apollo 
regains himself and treasures a crown of laurel leaves, the poetic representation of 
Daphne. Desire is suspended rather than spent. 
While this persistent metamorphosis in Pound’s work signals the impediment of 
social or sexual gratification, it carries out another function related to Pound’s claims 
about how the mind operates. In his postscript to Remy de Gourmont’s book The Natural 
Philosophy of Love, Pound entertains the idea that “it is more than likely that the brain 
itself, is, in origin and development, only a sort of great clot of genital fluid held in 
suspense or reserve” (295). On the surface, this idea debases intellection by animalizing 
it, reducing it to simple physiology. And in some ways, Pound supports this conception 
by arguing, for example, that dreams occur when a person tilts his head to go to sleep 
(299). Thought is physiological and undoubtedly sexualized from this perspective.  But 
within his argument there is an elevation of the sexual, as well, and perhaps a call for its 
complete transformation. He delineates three “channels” for spermatozoide: “hell, 
purgatory, heaven, if one wants to follow yet another terminology: digestive excretion, 
incarnation, freedom in the imagination” (309). Thought emerges as the apex of a 
Dantean trajectory of sexual energy. According to this concept, the highest manifestation 
of sexuality, however, must be incorporeal rather than incarnate, mental rather than 
physical.   
Discussing the human evolution of “new faculties,” Pound suggests that “all sorts 
of aptitudes developed without external change, which in an earlier biological state would 
possibly have found carnal expression” (306). Pound insists that the capacity for thought 
and ideas involves the suspension of sexuality from its carnal ends as well as a 
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metamorphosis into new form-making possibilities. From Pound’s perspective, fecundity 
rather than physicality ties sex and thought together. In “Ortus,” Pound describes the 
creative process as a transformation of sexuality, though still figured in terms of sexual 
reproduction: “How have I laboured? / How have I not laboured / To bring her soul to 
birth” (1-3). Creative thought is a birth-giving process through which the poet “labors” to 
bring forth the forms he has generated. K. K. Ruthven points out that “ortus” means 
“birth” or “springing out” (187). This is consistent with Pound’s notion of the mind’s 
capacity for productive thought. The poet’s creation is “beautiful as the sunlight, and as 
fluid” (5). The word “fluid” hints at the same ideas that end up in Pound’s postscript to 
Gourmont: the fluid fecundity of spermatozoide. Pound argues that these new creations 
have reproductive force: 
creative thought is an act like fecundation, like the male cast of the human seed, 
but given that cast, that ejaculation, I am perfectly willing to grant that the thought 
once born, separated, in regard to itself, not in relation to the brain that begat it, 
does lead an independent life much like a member of the vegetable kingdom, 
blowing seeds. (301) 
Thoughts, ideas, and poems are born of the productive mind and are themselves able to 
reproduce. 
But there’s an unresolved tension between how Pound conceives of the poem as 
transformed sexuality and the process of transformation. Again, the imagistic poems 
arrest sexual desire and replace it with images that defuse it. The immediate replacement 
of “faces” with “petals” in the “Metro” poem is a steeling of one’s self against sexual 
desire. These poems are denials of desire rather than its elevation into a higher realm. The 
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experience of desire is quenched, substituted, replaced, suspended, and arrested rather 
than transformed. The fluidity of Pound’s imagistic poems is concretized into static 
images. “Ortus” confirms this poetic process by explaining the poet’s effort “To give 
these elements a name and a centre!” (4). Here, poetry is the act of circumscribing and 
naming elements, suspending flow and movement, and obstructing desire. The speaker 
has “laboured to bring her soul into separation” (7). But in this separation that causes its 
being, the poem gets isolated from its surroundings. The speaker goes on to insist that the 
poem is “no part, but a whole, / No portion, but a being” (15-16). This suggests that fluid, 
protean desire must be unified and solidified rather than act as a part in a flowing 
reproductive system. Poetry, from this perspective, must be separated, isolated, fixed, and 
totalized. 
This analysis of Pound’s view of cerebration allows us to recognize the insistent 
urging that occurs in another important group of Pound’s poetry, the poems about poems. 
If the imagistic poems metamorphose desire into a static image, the hortatory poems 
encourage social intercourse. He urges his poems to connect with the reading audience 
like “blowing seeds” across the landscape. For Pound, the poem should be a means 
toward reintegration, reconnection, social intercourse. Paradoxically, however, he asks 
this intercourse of the very poems that have been frozen into static images of suspended 
desire. They seem bound to fail because the flows required for social interaction have 
been stilled, fixed into images. In “Further Instructions,” for example, Pound exhorts his 
poems: “Come, my songs, let us express our baser passions” (1), but his imagistic poems 
arrest rather than activate sexuality. He diagnoses the problem when he complains: “You 
are very idle, my songs” (4). They are idle rather than active because they bind desire in 
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the static image. Even when he turns hopefully to his “newest song of the lot,” he says, “I 
will get you a green coat out of China” (18). The “green coat” that covers the poem’s 
libidinal energy is one more poetic image of leaves, enacting this familiar suspension of 
desire. Though he implores his poems to “Ruffle the skirts of prudes, / speak of their 
knees and ankles” (“Salutation the Second”), he himself invariably speaks instead of 
leaves and petals. 
While Pound wrote many poems in this period about the need for poems to 
interact, perhaps even physically, with readers, he also continued to insist on a distanced 
relation to sexuality, as in “The Condolence”: 
And now you hear what is said to us: 
We are compared to that sort of person 
Who wanders about announcing his sex 
As if he had just discovered it. 
Let us leave this matter, my songs, 
              and return to that which concerns us. (13-18) 
If it is clear that one must not indulge the purgatory of “announcing his sex,” it is less 
clear what the heaven of one’s true “concerns” should be. The absence of a clear 
statement reveals this poem as primarily a rejection rather than a creation. Even the 
poems that seem aggressively sexual are descriptions of possible but rejected desire. The 
woman in “The Garden,” for example, is a “skein of loose silk” who is likely to unwrap 
into nothingness. The speaker refuses to descend to her libidinal needs. Never is he a 
more separate and unified figure than when he threatens but withholds his libidinal 
energies. He is self-possessed, while the woman is in danger of “dying piece-meal” 
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because she desires connection. “The Encounter” similarly finds the speaker rejecting 
connection, while the woman’s fingers are made into a poetic image of papery thinness. 
In the form of always-merely-possible lovers, these poems dramatize a rejection of 
sexuality.  
Pound carries out the suspension of desire in sexual situations by creating poetic 
images like the leaves and flower petals in poems like “Gentildonna,” “Alba,” and “In a 
Station of the Metro.” Each static image rejects desire, separating the poetic speaker from 
social and sexual intercourse. Though Pound theoretically attempts to sexualize 
cerebration and access the fecundity of poetic creation, his poetic practice seeks to 
desexualize poetry. The poems are frozen images rather than opportunities for 
interaction. In his literary theorizing, Pound calls for increased sexual energy in the 
production of thought and poetry. The mind that transcends carnal desires achieves a 
fertility exceeding the power of sexuality, which can be extinguished. Though Pound 
believes in the reproductive capacity of thought, he asks his poems to exercise the very 
tactile, mobile, libidinal ability he has arrested in them. 
 
While Ezra Pound rejects sensual satisfaction and redirects desire to the creative 
mind, he does so largely through assertion; in his imagist phase, Pound is a declarative 
poet. Wallace Stevens, by contrast, engages in a similar rejection but follows it with a 
fully developed sensuality of the mind, conceiving of a capacity for meaningful 
experience distinct and separated from the physical body. Stevens is less interested in the 
tangibility of objects, their sensuality, than he is in the way they are produced by the 
imagination. The mind, from this perspective, does not work on the level of physical 
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objects but rather forms the world according to its own principles. In “Variations on a 
Summer Day,” for example, he explains that the interaction with an object, such as the 
sea, is always an “exercise” through which one repeats, with variations, the possibilities, 
but not the actualities, of interaction: 
An exercise in viewing the world 
On the motive! But one looks at the sea 
As one improvises, on the piano. (233) 
For Stevens, the sea is not a stable object with uniform properties; it is formed and 
reformed by the viewer, an improvisation, an abstraction of the real object, turning the 
sea into a set of variations. The speaker creates objects through his imagination and is 
free to turn the rocks of the cliffs into “the heads of dogs / That turn into fishes and leap / 
Into the sea” (232). Stevens emphasizes the priority of the imagination in our experience 
of the world: “If the imagination is the faculty by which we import the unreal into the 
real, its value is the value of the way of thinking by which we project the idea of God into 
the idea of man. It creates images that are independent of their originals” (“Imagination 
as Value” 735-36). The world, therefore, is perceived through abstractions such as 
similes and metaphors. In “Poem Written at Morning,” he describes how things are 
conceptualized through metaphors: 
By metaphor you paint 
A thing. Thus, the pineapple was a leather fruit, 
A fruit for pewter, thorned and palmed and blue, 
To be served by men of ice. (219) 
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Stevens does not attempt an objective description of the pineapple; he understands the 
object through an array of metaphors, turning pineapple into leather fruit, imagining the 
pewter on which it might be served and the coolness of the men who serve it. He insists 
that the experience of an object involves the substitution of one thing for another. 
Presented with a pineapple, the subject produces a constellation of other objects and 
effects. Stevens argues that we do not have access to objects except through the 
particularities of the mind that perceives them. External objects, therefore, are 
transformed when filtered through human experience: 
   The truth must be 
That you do not see, you experience, you feel, 
That the buxom eye brings merely its element 
To the total thing, a shapeless giant forced 
Upward. (219) 
Stevens suggests that a sensual object, that which we see with our “buxom eye,” is only 
an element of a much greater abstract thing formed by human experience. The world is 
conceptual rather than sensual; it is a power of the imagination, a “total thing” existing 
beyond any manifestation of physical things.4 
Stevens’ notion of the poetic imagination reverses the relationship between the 
conceptual and sensual realms in two important ways. First, he suggests that the poet has 
greater access to abstractions than things; the imagination, the conceptual or formal level, 
is immediate and takes precedence over physical sensation. Second, conceptual forms are 
more abundant than things; the primary area of activity and interest for human experience 
is the realm of the imagination. Rather than being constantly confronted by the objects of 
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the world and only rarely perceiving the realm of forms beyond them, Stevens considers 
forms many, varied, and mutable. There is a profusion of forms rather than objects, and 
instead of interacting with things physically, Stevens imagines interacting with 
abstractions. 
Stevens’ poetic technique, therefore, involves strategies of abstraction, the most 
noteworthy being the poem of iterations, in which the speaker constructs multiple 
responses to the physical world, replaying and adjusting his emotional and imaginative 
reactions. In an iterative poem like “Sea Surface Full of Clouds,” the speaker describes a 
seascape in Mexico, but this is a “description” only in the broadest sense, for the 
particulars soon become very general: 
In that November off Tehuantepec 
The slopping of the sea grew still one night 
And in the morning summer hued the deck 
 
And made one think of rosy chocolate 
And gilt umbrellas. Paradisal green 
Gave suavity to the perplexed machine 
 
Of ocean. (98-99) 
The first line provides contextual information, fixing the poem’s time and place: 
November in Mexico. Stevens describes the natural landscape of the sea in the second 
line, but he does so with a deflating irony, using the word “slopping” to refer to the 
actions of the sea. In the second stanza, landscape gives way to imaginative response, 
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where the speaker considers what the landscape makes him think of: “rosy chocolate” 
and “gilt umbrellas.” These subjective and idiosyncratic comparisons emerge from the 
poetic speaker’s mind. He also merges sea and sky, as the sea absorbs the clouds that 
float above and become new imaginary objects: sea-clouds. 
The sea-clouds whitened far below the calm 
And moved, as blooms move, in the swimming green 
And in its watery radiance. (99) 
The poem follows these “sea-clouds” as they move “below” the water’s surface “in the 
swimming green.” Stevens substitutes the new object, the sea-cloud of the imagination, 
for the mundane sea, the sea as an external object of nature. 
Stevens extends the poet’s powers of invention when he begins to repeat the 
description of the sea. Each of the poem’s five sections begin with the same first two 
lines, but everything else is changed. For instance, the first variation of lines 3 through 5 
are: “At breakfast jelly yellow streaked the deck // And made one think of chop-house 
chocolate / And sham umbrellas.” In broad outlines, Stevens presents the same scene but 
alters words, especially adjectives. “Rosy chocolate” becomes “chop-house chocolate”; 
“gilt umbrellas” become “sham umbrellas.” In each of these changes a pleasant or 
attractive modifier is deflated by an unpleasant one. The word “sham” even hints that the 
speaker’s search for a comparable image is suspect. The revised sections alter the scene 
so that no landscape truly exists. In this way, the actual sea and its surroundings lose their 
continuity as external objects, leaving the speaker adrift on his own imaginings. If so 
many variations can arise in the mind of the poet, then the poet’s mind is more powerful 
than the landscape.  
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 Yvor Winters has criticized Stevens for the authority that the imagining subject 
assumes in remaking his surroundings. Winters argues that Stevens “postulates the 
absolute severance of the intellectual and the emotional” (“Wallace Stevens” 91), leading 
to what Winters considers an inaccurate valuation and intensification of emotional 
experience. That is, he views Stevens’ subject as one who does not react to a world 
within certain constraints but instead intensifies experience through an imagination 
severed from a responsibility to the world. Winters contends that, for Stevens, playful 
intellectual thought is “valuable simply for the independent emotional excitement which 
one may derive from it” (92). Winters calls this form of thinking “hedonism” because it 
avoids any intellectual constraint, which is the foundation of moral order. Rather than 
requiring our senses to confirm the objectivity of things in the world, Stevens’ 
promiscuous eye allows the subject to exercise possibilities that exceed the visible object. 
Though Winters perceives Stevens’ gentle self-ridicule that accompanies this process, he 
also recognizes the authority that Stevens grants to the subject. 
It must be noted, however, Stevens rarely celebrates sensual intensity after the 
severance of intellect and emotion. In fact, in Stevens’ work, emotional intensity often 
involves heightening of loss. The imaginative recasting of the landscape in “Sea-Surface 
Full of Clouds,” for example, reiterates how distant the speaker is from the scene before 
him, for he is constantly exchanging impressions of the world. Though the mind is more 
powerful than the landscape, the world is paradoxically lost in the process; the speaker is 
unable to possess the sea or the clouds sensually. Reiteration effectively separates him 
from the world and reveals the insolidity of his surroundings. From this perspective, 
objects are unstable and irrecoverable. Stevens suggests that we have access to the 
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products of the imagination but rarely to physical objects. For all the lush imagery and 
playfulness of Stevens’ verse, the intangibility of its objects through abstraction provides 
a constraint that limits its free play. In fact, Stevens often emphasizes the sense of loss 
that accompanies the movement from sensuality to abstraction. In “Autumn Refrain,” 
Stevens replaces objects with words. A nightingale heralds the passing of a sensual 
world, but the speaker cannot sensually apprehend the bird’s song: 
The skreak and skritter of evening gone 
And grackles gone and sorrows of the sun, 
The sorrows of sun, too, gone . . . the moon and moon, 
The yellow moon of words about the nightingale 
In measureless measures, not a bird for me 
But the name of a bird and the name of a nameless air 
I have never—shall never hear. (160) 
The speaker is separated from the physical world and experiences the loss of the bright 
day and fruitful season when words replace things. The yellow moon that replaces the 
setting sun is a “moon of words,” insubstantial, transferred from object to abstraction. 
The nightingale, too, becomes words, a thing the speaker only experiences through poetic 
reference. Stevens alludes to Keats’ “Ode to a Nightingale,” another poem in which a 
poetic speaker tries to achieve a release from the human world. But for Stevens, it is a 
double loss, because he does not even hear the nightingale that for Keats “Singest of 
summer in full-throated ease” (206). Stevens’ speaker only experiences names that 
replace things: “the name of a bird and the name of a nameless air.” The declining 
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physical world is paralleled by a retreat into greater abstraction. The loss is more intense 
because the speaker still perceives a real world he cannot attain: 
And yet beneath 
The stillness of everything gone, and being still, 
Being and sitting still, something resides, 
Some skreaking and skrittering residuum, 
And grates these evasions of the nightingale 
Though I have never—shall never hear that bird. 
And the stillness is in the key, all of it is, 
The stillness is all in the key of that desolate sound. (160) 
The loss of the sensual world, the speaker’s inevitable separation from it, is exacerbated 
by the “residuum” he can sense poetically. Though the speaker has never heard or seen a 
nightingale, its poetic possibility suggests a world that resides beyond our ability to 
apprehend it. If there is an intensification of emotion in this poem, it is an intensification 
of loss. Rather than sensual hedonism, or even an excess of the imagination’s freedom, 
Stevens insists on loss as a necessary constraint. Stevens’ moral order allows the 
inventive play of imagination but only in a realm without access to the real world. 
Stevens rejects interaction with objects of desire, but the mind’s creative fecundity taking 
its place is merely an isolated and isolating activity. The stillness accomplished by 
turning away from the world allows imaginative productions, but they are always, for 
Stevens, “in the key of that desolate sound,” marked by the departed world. 
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 Stevens also marks loss by replacing objects with lines of movement. “Thirteen 
Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” one of Stevens’ iterative poems, replays persistent loss 
rather than persistent presence:  
The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. 
It was a small part of the pantomime. (93) 
Though the poem ostensibly takes the blackbird as its subject, Stevens sees it as part of 
the “pantomime” of nature, suggesting that external objects can only suggest existence 
rather than exemplify it. Nature is representational but only in a dramatic sense rather 
than an objective or scientific sense. In the pantomime, the blackbird is recast over and 
over by the subject imagining the world. The blackbird appears in spatial terms defined 
by the speaker: 
When the blackbird flew out of sight, 
It marked the edge 
Of one of many circles. (94) 
The speaker constructs a system around the bird that maps its progress with imagined 
concentric circles. The imagination is powered by the subject’s desire to retain the object 
in his own context. The speaker retains the blackbird in terms of these circles even 
though the bird has flown out of sight. The speaker has schematized his loss, and the 
schema is like the imagined skreak and skritter of the lost nightingale of “Autumn 
Refrain,” except that it is severe and detached rather than palpable. The poem as a whole, 
with its thirteen attempts to construct the blackbird in the imagination, is itself a sequence 
of concentric circles that replace the experience of a blackbird with abstract and 
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expanding lines of poetry. The poem ends with temporal dissonance, signaling the 
ultimate end of the day even while it is ongoing: 
It was evening all afternoon. 
It was snowing 
And it was going to snow. 
The blackbird sat 
In the cedar-limbs. (95) 
The speaker resigns himself to an ending because the day is intangible; it is a world he 
cannot grasp. The snow, which covers over the world in blankness, is ever present, itself 
avoiding or exceeding temporal rules by seeming eternal. Despite the erasure of darkness 
and obliterating snow, the speaker senses the blackbird abiding. The bird remains the 
residuum that the speaker cannot obtain but cannot relinquish. The bird represents 
persistent loss, and the poem is an elegy for that which has always departed. 
 The most extreme abstraction is death, a form of loss that signals an end to the 
subject’s power to construct reality as an experience of the imagination. In “The Emperor 
of Ice Cream,” the body is laid out and covered so that it cannot face the world: “And 
spead [the sheet] so as to cover her face. / If her horny feet protrude, they come / To show 
how cold she is, and dumb” (64). The lifeless subject cannot see the world to make a 
picture of it; dead, she is dumb, unable to speak her connection to the world. The corpse 
represents blankness, the extinguishing of the mind’s capacity to form the world from 
sensory impressions. Sensuality is only important as an input, not as a goal in itself. 
Rather than a collection of sensible objects, “Reality is an Activity of the Most August 
Imagination,” as he says in the title of a late poem comparing the physical world 
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surrounding the speaker to the objects one sees when driving a car at night. The 
headlights reveal objects along the road for only a moment before they are gone: 
There was a crush of strength in a grinding going round, 
Under the front of the westward evening star. 
 
The vigor of glory, a glittering in the veins, 
As things emerged and moved and were dissolved. 
 
Either in distance, change or nothingness, 
The visible transformations of summer night, 
 
An argentine abstraction approaching form 
And suddenly denying itself away. 
 
There was an insolid billowing of the solid. 
Night’s moonlight lake was neither water nor air. (Opus Posthumous 110-11) 
The grinding of the wheels is a metaphor of touching, a reference to the possibility that 
there may be physical contact with the world. For Stevens, however, this contact is 
correlated to movement through the world, involving the perpetual introduction of things 
that are just as perpetually lost; they emerge, move, and dissolve away. Therefore, the 
subject always exists in the act of imagining the world. All that exists are objects that 
cannot be grasped, paradoxically leaving only the act of our grasping. Stevens argues that 
the subject can never really access the true object and that, in its place, we have only the 
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experience of it: “The subject-matter of poetry is not that ‘collection of solid, static 
objects extended in space’ but the life that is lived in the scene that it composes; and so 
reality is not that external scene but the life that is lived in it” (“The Noble Rider” 658). 
Stevens explores loss as an inevitable part of life, but he offers the imagination as an 
activity that can provide a fullness that will not dissolve away, at least until the finality of 
death. Though objects themselves are “insolid,” there is a conceptual realm in which they 
are “billowing” with possibilities.  
Ultimately, Stevens suggests that things themselves only provide opportunities for 
us to create what is valuable about life. Therefore, our creative capacity, the sensuality of 
the imagination, is more important than our grasp of the physical object. In a 1948 letter, 
Stevens argues that reality, as it is so called, is only preparatory to life: 
After all, as you spend your summer getting well again, aren’t you in an 
extraordinary position to carry on the struggle with and against reality and against 
the fifth column of reality that keeps whispering with the hard superiority of the 
sane that reality is all we have, that it is that or nothing. Reality is the footing 
from which we leap after what we do not have and on which everything depends. 
(Letters 599-600) 
Stevens rejects reality for being dull and lifeless unless it can be infused with the 
productive influence of the mind. He imagines “combatting the actual” in order to 
achieve the “gayety of the mind” (600). The physical world, for Stevens, is barren and 
lacks the lushness of the imaginative landscape. Desire cannot be satisfied by objects but 
must be expressed in the poetic experience provided by the imagination.  
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The chapters that follow explore the nature of poetic expression in Eliot, H.D., 
and Bishop as a move away from sensual interaction with the world. Similar to Pound’s 
rejection of sexual desire and Stevens’ redirection of abstract constructs of the 
imagination, Eliot and H.D. reject desire for the world in order to construct new paths in 
terms of poetic experience. In Eliot and H.D., the new structure of desire takes on a 
spiritual cast, sometimes blossoming into a transcendent spiritual possibility that echoes 
Dickinson’s dilemma, a pit but heaven over it. Bishop reflects this same wish for 
rejection and the unified self, but objects in all their particularity begin to emerge in 
Bishop’s conception, changing the nature of aesthetic experience to one of dynamic 
interaction with the world. 
 
Notes 
1 Freud argues against the notion of a generalized libidinal energy in his 
disagreement with Jung as well as in his clinical studies and metapsychological texts. 
However, his critical responses to art and literature often consider broader, non-sexual 
energy, such as his consideration of anger in “The Moses of Michelangelo.” 
2 The poetry of Whitman and Dickinson is much more complex than the 
description I have given here, of course, but I contend that much of the tension that one 
sees across the body of their work is structured as complications, developments, or 
temporary reconsiderations of the respective models. For instance, Dickinson’s volcano 
poems often imagine the impossibility of restraint, and her poems of puncture or division 
contemplate the impossibility of stillness and unity. But these are examples in which she 
tests rather than overturns her philosophy of deferral. Likewise, Whitman’s catalogues 
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sometimes reveal the impossibility of sensation in the sense that he cannot 
simultaneously be everywhere or possess everything. In other words, their respective 
poetic visions involve explorations of the contours and implications of their overarching 
models of desire. 
 3 The phrase “rejection of desire,” throughout the text, is meant to refer to a 
formal analysis of the poetic works of these poets and is not meant to suggest or 
hypothesize about their personal lives. Similarly, “rejection of desire” does not diagnose 
the broader cultural context, especially in light of contemporaneous free-love movements 
and a general trend toward relaxed sexual regulation. Instead, the phrase refers to the 
dynamics of subjects and objects of desire in the texts themselves. While this is 
nominally a “psychoanalytic” perspective, I do not intend to direct it toward the poets or 
their socio-historical background. 
4 This “total thing” is similar to Plato’s notion of forms, conceptual ideas without 
properties that can be sensed in themselves. Forms exist beyond any physical object; 
objects can only temporarily and imperfectly approximate the form. The classic example 
is a chair; each really existing chair is unique and particular, but underlying this sensual 
variety is a conceptual unity. The total thing of “chair-ness” exists beyond any specific 
chair (Phaedo 74). 
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CHAPTER II 
PURGATORY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF DESIRE  
IN T. S. ELIOT’S THE WASTE LAND 
I argued in the introductory chapter that modernism marks a transition from a 
romantic subject who interacts positively with the natural world to a new subject who 
refuses to release desire into the world. Modernists reorganize desire into discrete, 
distinct, and self-authorizing subjects. Ezra Pound and Wallace Stevens diminish the 
external world in favor of the desiring self. T. S. Eliot’s poetic project in The Waste Land 
is related to these others in the sense that he withholds desire from external objects, 
reorganizing it around the self. However, he is more interested than Pound or Stevens in 
investigating the subject’s interaction with a degraded world and how one might convert 
unfulfilling worldly experience into meaningful and transcendent possibilities. In Eliot, 
the subject’s desire is retracted from the world and new sensations are created through the 
purgatorial, refining fire of poetic experience. 
In his essay on Byron, Eliot notes that Byron characterizes Don Juan’s sexual 
encounters as strangely innocent. Behind this sexual innocence, Eliot finds a sense of 
passivity: “The innocence of Juan is merely a substitute for the passivity of Byron; and if 
we restore the latter we can recognize in the account some authentic understanding of the 
human heart” (236). This notion of a substitution is provocative for two reasons. First, it 
shows that, for Eliot, criticism involves the attempt to expose underlying concepts from a 
textual surface that might belie them. Poetic expression is not direct communication but 
an act of substitution. That one thing can stand for another is both metaphorical (from a 
literary perspective) and Freudian (from a psychological perspective). Indeed, the notion 
 40 
of a substitution is very like Freud’s method of dream interpretation, which sees dream 
images as condensations or displacements the dreamer constructs from his daytime 
wishes. 
Eliot also views the substitution in terms of sexual desire. Sexual feeling is, for 
Eliot, an important question, one that can lead to an “authentic understanding of the 
human heart.” This, too, joins Eliot’s concern to Freud’s in many ways. Erotic desire 
drives the vicissitudes of human experience. In his poetry, Eliot makes a complex 
substitution: sexual desire is replaced by literary experience. He repeatedly portrays 
physical consummation as unfulfilling. In its place, he offers poetry as a site of emotional 
experience that supplants the sensual. The section of Don Juan that Eliot quotes in his 
essay speaks of the authority of desire: 
Alas! They were so young, so beautiful, 
    So lonely, loving, helpless, and the hour 
Was that in which the heart is always full, 
    And having o’er itself no further power, 
Prompts deeds eternity cannot annul. . . . 
As Eliot argues, Juan and his lover Haidee are helpless, and therefore passive, in the face 
of their sexual urges. Juan does not seduce but is himself seduced by his heart, over 
which he has no power. The pair is only active in the sense that they commit the deeds of 
love, but their conscience and rationality are passive. The differentiation between activity 
and passivity points to an internal rift between desire and the part of the self that 
surrenders to it. In Byron, this is not a struggle between the sexual urge and its restriction; 
it is a natural impulse toward sexuality to which the subject yields naturally. Byron goes 
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on to consider an earthly damnation for Juan and Haidee, but in their passion they are 
“quite antique, / Half naked, loving, natural, and Greek”  
(II.194). Sex is a natural expression of internal human nature. 
 Eliot not only explicates this passage from Don Juan in his essay but also alludes 
to these lines in the closing section of The Waste Land: 
My friend, blood shaking my heart 
The awful daring of a moment’s surrender 
Which an age of prudence can never retract 
By this, and this only, we have existed 
Which is not to be found in our obituaries.1 
In some ways this echoes Byron, encapsulating the same idea. The acts that “eternity 
cannot annul” in Byron are the same as those in Eliot that “an age of prudence can never 
retract.” In each, the deeds of passion can never be undone. But Eliot introduces the 
notion of prudence, which is not found in Byron. Byron views sex as a part of human 
nature. Sex is elevated, joined to eternity; its deeds outlast the ravages of time. For Eliot, 
by contrast, no amount of prudence can undo what is essentially an imprudent act. Eliot’s 
version intensifies the sense of sinfulness of the sexual act. It is a fall from grace rather 
than a natural expression of it.  
Eliot’s lines are detached; they are not part of a longer narrative like Byron’s. The 
Waste Land’s famously fragmented structure divorces sexuality from other events in an 
unfolding life. Byron’s lovers experience their consummation, whereas in Eliot one can 
only look back at it. Sensual pleasure is unavailable to Eliot’s speaker because it has 
always already happened. In fact, for Eliot, one only exists after it: “By this, and this 
 42 
only, we have existed.” The speaker, trying to understand desire and consummation, 
speaks of obituaries, memories, and wills read “under seals broken by the lean solicitor / 
In our empty rooms” (408-09). To exist after pleasure is to live after death, and it is the 
only form of life Eliot makes available. Thus the theme of the living dead, present 
throughout the poem, signifies Eliot’s understanding of desire as an energy without hope 
of earthly gratification. Unlike Byron’s sexualized subject, Eliot finds existence 
meaningful only in the tension between sensual pleasure and the prudence that forbids it. 
Although Eliot forecloses consummation as a means toward satisfaction, he offers 
an alternative route to it. In his literary criticism, he suggests that literature allows for a 
nearly physical experience. In his essay “The Metaphysical Poets,” he points out the 
ability of poetry to become experience: “A thought to Donne was an experience; it 
modified his sensibility. When a poet’s mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is 
constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man’s experience is chaotic, 
irregular, fragmentary [. . .] in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming 
new wholes” (64). This quotation conveys two important aspects of Eliot’s poetic project. 
The first is the obvious emphasis on wholeness and unity rather than fragmentation. This 
seems odd at first considering the extent to which the modernists are supposed to have 
expressed feelings of fragmentation and the fact that Eliot’s poem established 
fragmentation as a modernist mode. But Eliot, throughout his social and literary criticism, 
is intently interested in unity. The second implication for Eliot’s poetic practice is his 
insistence that good poetry is itself a meaningful experience. From this perspective, a 
thought is not a reflection on experience but is itself a rich and significant event. This 
event, this poetic experience, takes the place of physical consummation in Eliot’s view on 
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desire. The Waste Land is not merely the dramatization of sexual frustration or failure; it 
is also the unifying poetic experience that solves such erotic failure. Poetic effects, for 
Eliot, are more than mere aesthetic achievements. Poetry exceeds mere thought and 
enters the realm of sensation. In one of his 1926 Clark Lectures, he contends that “[i]t is a 
function of poetry both to fix and make more conscious and precise emotions and 
feelings in which most people participate in their own experience, and to draw within the 
orbit of feeling and sense what had only existed in thought” (Varieties 50-51). From this 
perspective, poetry is not solely intellectual but is, in addition, the cause of visceral, 
physical reaction.  
The experience of Eliot’s poetry is built upon four ideas: ritual, expression, 
redirection, and structural divergence. Maud Ellmann argues that Eliot’s fragmentary 
style is an abject ritual, and the poem “[repeats] death as if it were desire” (275). In this 
sense, the multiplicity of voices and the chaos of allusions create their own waste 
material that cannot coalesce into meaning. But Ellmann’s description of the poem as a 
“ritual” suggests that it performs some act beyond its own meaninglessness. F. O. 
Matthiessen points out that Eliot is able, through his special compression, to “condense 
into a single passage a concentrated expression of tragic horror” (22). In other words, one 
aspect of the “ritual” of the poem is that it “expresses” horror. Expression, in this sense, 
is more than description, depiction, or portrayal. Cleanth Brooks’ analysis of The Waste 
Land focuses on Eliot’s “paradoxical use of symbols,” which he refers to as “[working] 
by indirection” (209). According to Brooks, Eliot includes the complexity of the real 
world in order to resuscitate Christian tradition: “Eliot’s theme is the rehabilitation of a 
system of beliefs, known but now discredited” (209). For Brooks, Eliot seeks new, 
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defamiliarizing methods in order to espouse Christian beliefs before a secularized 
readership. Brooks suggests that Eliot’s method is essentially a “confusion” of opposites 
that allows a clear belief to emerge (210). As one of his examples, he explores the uses of 
“rock” as a symbol throughout the poem. While most instances of “rock” in The Waste 
Land emphasize the barrenness of the modern world, Brooks points to the earlier “Come 
in under the shadow of this red rock” line as an example of a countervailing 
symbolization because the rock protects the speaker (208). The complexity of this 
symbol, Brooks argues, is a mode of its truthfulness, which indicates the Christian 
theology of death and rebirth (208). 
However, Eliot uses rocks to insist that desire is experienced at the most 
elemental level. Before demonstrating this, however, it is necessary to see how Eliot 
emphasizes structural divergence, or the impossibility of reaching a satisfying 
consummation. In several places, including “The Metaphysical Poets,” he calls special 
attention to Donne’s line “A bracelet of bright hair about the bone” from “The Relique.” 
He suggests the line succeeds partly due to the proximity of the contrasting images of 
“bright hair” and “bone.” He refers to the “sudden contrast of associations” in these two 
images (60), but he refrains from describing them in detail. A closer look reveals that the 
two objects are structurally divergent from each other, symbolizing the inability to 
consummate a physical relationship. The speaker in Donne’s poem imagines his grave 
dug up in some distant future, but the person who digs it up finds the relic of the 
beloved’s hair encircling the speaker’s desiccated arm. One reason Eliot finds this poem 
so successful is that Donne extends the distance of time through which the emblem 
persists: “To place the discovery of the token at the moment when the grave is broken 
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open, instead of at the moment of shrouding the body of the late deceased, intensifies and 
makes more perdurable the passion, makes more vivid and significant the wreath about 
the arm, now bone” (Varieties 125). The wreath of the lover’s hair is more intense against 
the bone than it would be against flesh. In a sense, the passion is more acute because it is 
less achievable between hair and bone than it is between hair and flesh. Eliot values the 
line because it dramatizes desire in terms of impossible consummation. It is somehow 
pure and uncorrupted because gratification remains out of reach. 
This recognition illuminates Eliot’s invocations of “rock” in The Waste Land. 
Eliot juxtaposes rock and water that can never come together. One obvious difference 
between Donne’s line and Eliot’s is that Eliot repeats this juxtaposition over and over: 
Here is no water but only rock 
Rock and no water and the sandy road 
The road winding above among the mountains 
Which are mountains of rock without water 
If there were water we should stop and drink 
Amongst the rock one cannot stop or think. (331-36) 
Rather than one striking moment, as in Donne, The Waste Land’s rock represents 
accumulated futility; one substance cannot achieve its desired complement. Eliot has 
found a way to intensify Donne’s juxtaposition by bringing rock and water both closer 
together and farther apart than hair and bone. There is a repetitive friction as they tumble 
incessantly around each other, creating a staccato rhythm as the lines get shorter: 
If there were water 
And no rock 
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If there were rock 
And also water 
And water 
A spring 
A pool among the rock 
If there were the sound of water only 
Not the cicada 
And dry grass singing 
But sound of water over a rock 
Where the hermit-thrush sings in the pine trees 
Drip drop drip drop drop drop drop 
But there is no water (345-58) 
Despite the intensity of their interaction, they never get any closer to culmination: the 
stanza ends with the finality of “But there is no water.” Eliot achieves a purity of poetical 
figure by denying contact between rock and water. He demonstrates that sensuality, the 
union of physical substances, is impossible. In one of his Clark lectures he suggests that 
Donne’s shortcoming in “The Extasie” is his reliance on physical love: “What is there for 
Donne? This union in ecstasy is complete, is final; and the two human beings, needing 
nothing beyond each other, rest on their emotion of enjoyment. But emotion cannot rest; 
desire must expand, or it will shrink” (Varieties 114). According to Eliot, culmination in 
physical consummation ends desire. Donne therefore succeeds where he divides lovers 
and distances seeker from sought, and he fails where physical union represents the 
realization of human potential. If Eliot’s speaker is caught in the contemplation of rock 
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without water, this impossibility opens up a higher realm made possible by that very 
divergence. For Eliot, wanting is meaningful in itself; the meaning of wanting is achieved 
not by the physical congress of objects but by the movement of words in poetry like 
parallel lines that never touch. Writing of Lucretius and Dante, Eliot explains that “poetry 
can be penetrated by a philosophic idea, it can deal with this idea when it has reached the 
point of immediate acceptance, when it has become almost a physical modification” 
(“Dante” 162-63). Eliot employs this structural divergence, that is, the necessary lack of 
consummation, in his own poetry and conceives of its experience as almost physical. 
 The scene of rock and no water, however, can be read alongside the physical 
encounter between the typist and the “young man carbuncular” to see how even obvious 
sexual consummation leads to emptiness. There is no lasting relationship here to sanctify. 
It exists only as long as the act itself. Sex is only an action, signifying nothing. After their 
physical encounter, the typist “smoothes her hair with automatic hand, / And puts a 
record on the gramophone” (255-56). Her motion is equated to the arm of the 
gramophone, mechanical and perfunctory. The sexual act does not complete a union and, 
in fact, barely affects its participants. The woman is untouched, for whatever touching 
occurred was merely physical. The young man’s hands are much more active than hers, 
but they are almost desperate in their actions: “Flushed and decided, he assaults at once; / 
Exploring hands encounter no defence” (239-40). Hands are too physical to achieve the 
type of experience Eliot values. The man and woman do not share any thoughts 
afterwards. Instead, his hands resume their blind searching, grabbing at mundane objects 
in the same way he had grabbed at the typist; he “Bestows one final patronizing kiss, / 
And gropes his way, finding the stairs unlit” (247-48). The unlit stairs suggest a reversal 
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of an ideal of love, such as the Renaissance model outlined in Castiglione’s The Courtier. 
Rather than “ascending the stair of love,” which one does by substituting spiritual for 
carnal experience, Eliot’s young man plunges downward into darkness. In an earlier draft 
of the poem, the young man “Delays only to urinate, and spit” (Facsimile 46), but Eliot 
follows Pound’s advice to drop these lines. These bodily displays press the distinction too 
bluntly. Eliot closes with the unlit stairs to symbolize the loss of a higher spiritual 
attainment in favor of baser physical acts. He dramatizes the poverty of physical union.  
Eliot develops a sense of the insufficiency of physical sensuality through his 
comments on the work of Donne and Dante, which he amplifies through his use of urban 
imagery. Many critics have persuasively argued that The Waste Land is primarily 
concerned with life in the modern city, but in many ways this interpretive avenue has not 
been fully explored.2 It is as if our assumptions about the dehumanizing effect of the 
urban environment are too readily accepted to require detailed argument. Even when 
there is a more formal theoretical underpinning, such as in Marianne Thormählen’s study 
involving a consideration of German social thinker Oswald Spengler, it only works to 
confirm the general malaise caused by modern urban living. Thormählen points out, for 
example, “In Eliot’s poetry, and particularly in The Waste Land, the metropolis is a huge, 
decaying receptacle which holds millions of people unable to reach across to one 
another” (237). “Reaching,” in this case, indistinctly suggests poor communication or 
insufficiently meaningful interaction; in the city, we merely fail to communicate with 
others. 
Eliot, however, takes this reaching seriously. He conceives of the city in terms of 
the need for intimacy. At the same time, however, he recognizes the ultimate 
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impossibility of such closeness. In his earliest poetry, he attempts a few positive 
characterizations of the modern city. In “Second Caprice in North Cambridge,” for 
example, he tries to make the modern urban environment conform to the Romantic ideal: 
“With an unexpected charm / And an unexplained repose / On an evening in December / 
Under a sunset yellow and rose” (Inventions 15). Though he describes a degraded 
environment, Eliot finds an urban sublime. Like the Romantic poetry he revises here, the 
early Eliot suggests that the full range of human capacities might still find fitting 
expression in the landscape, though it is now inevitably urban. This perspective was 
exploratory, however, and does not last in Eliot’s verse. His poems from Prufrock and 
Other Observations, for instance, depict modern speakers who cannot find fulfillment in 
the urban landscape. In many poems, an observer walks through the streets and spies 
people in windows or doorways, emphasizing the boundaries between public and private. 
The city in these scenes has an almost soul-crushing effect in “Morning at the Window”: 
“And along the trampled edges of the street / I am aware of the damp souls of 
housemaids / Sprouting despondently at area gates” (Collected 18). The home provides 
only a brief respite from the surge and press of a city that tramples us. One must 
nevertheless emerge and confront it. Eliot captures that dramatic moment at the gate, 
paused precariously between public and private, where we must steel ourselves to the 
welter of the street. In “Preludes,” he multiplies this effect across the city: 
The morning comes to consciousness 
Of faint stale smells of beer 
From the sawdust-trampled street 
With all its muddy feet that press 
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To early coffee-stands. 
 
With the other masquerades 
That time resumes, 
One thinks of all the hands 
That are raising dingy shades 
In a thousand furnished rooms. (13) 
The urban environment produces ubiquitous despondency. The solitary image stands for 
a thousand rooms; the street is a mass of muddy feet. At this stage, Eliot still represents 
the attempt to break through and reach out to another. The observer, after taking in these 
discouraging scenes, is “moved by fancies that are curled / Around these images, and 
cling: / The notion of some infinitely gentle / Infinitely suffering thing” (14-15). At this 
point, Eliot continues to imagine a sensitive and recoverable center of humanity. 
However, in Eliot’s vision, this hope begins to fade in the absence of meaningful 
connection. In “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” the speaker questions the value of 
walking the streets where he only sees reflections of his own loneliness: “Shall I say, I 
have gone at dusk through narrow streets / And watched the smoke that rises from the 
pipes / Of lonely men in shirtsleeves, leaning out windows?” (5). Such a gesture is 
worthless because people are ever more remote. They become, in fact, mermaids, 
mythical beings that he struggles to hear, with whom he fears he will never be able to 
commune. He becomes only this desire to reach out and touch: “I should have been a pair 
of ragged claws / Scuttling across the floors of silent seas” (5). He laments the inability to 
touch another, imagining himself a creature with an overgrown ability to grasp but who 
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has nothing to hold, reduced to these claws, this need. Starved for human connection and 
intimacy, the speaker imagines the city has become a desolate sea floor with the 
sexualized mermaids out of reach. Prufrock’s primary problem is that he is unable to 
achieve the social or sexual interaction he craves. The tragedy, if it can be called such, is 
that sexual desire persists in an environment in which it cannot be consummated. 
The Waste Land presents a very different depiction of sex. Sexual activity is not 
impossible; it is pervasive, meaningless, and unsatisfactory. Sex proves no deliverance 
for the speaker and, in fact, offers physicality at the expense of intimacy. The city 
mechanizes sexual interaction. The concept of urban desensitization was already well-
developed in Georg Simmel’s 1903 essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in which he 
argues that the modern city is a form of social organization that substantially affects the 
psychology of the people who live there. Specifically, the metropolis forces people into 
increasingly abstract relations: 
the metropolitan type [. . .] creates a protective organ for itself against the 
profound disruption with which the fluctuations and discontinuities of the 
external milieu threaten it. Instead of reacting emotionally, the 
metropolitan type reacts primarily in a rational manner, thus creating a 
mental predominance through the intensification of consciousness, which 
in turn is caused by it. Thus the reaction of the metropolitan person to 
those events is moved to a sphere of mental activity which is least 
sensitive and which is furthest removed from the depths of the personality. 
(326) 
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The young man carbuncular and the typist have moved their sexual interaction to a less 
sensitive level. They are protected by their indifference to a possible emotional meaning 
to their relationship. Sexual interaction takes place on the same level of abstraction that 
Simmel attributes to money: “To the extent that money, with its colorlessness and its 
indifferent quality, can become a common denominator of all values it becomes the 
frightful leveler—it hollows out the core of things, their peculiarities, their specific values 
and their uniqueness and incomparability in a way which is beyond repair” (330). 
Sexuality is no longer based on the sensitivity of emotional relations but is instead a 
process of abstract exchange through which people lose their individuality rather than 
express it. In Eliot’s poetry the city is characterized as crowds of people, as well as being 
a landscape enveloped in fog. In this environment, people cannot be seen except as 
masses, somehow abstract, undone, devoid of particularity. To bring two of these people 
together is not to recover them from abstraction but to recognize their indifference, their 
mechanical exchange. That which was formerly sensitive is now protected by disinterest. 
This appears in the irony of the typist’s “perilously spread” underclothing strung out in 
public, for she does not feel any shame in the display: 
Out of the window perilously spread 
Her drying combinations touched by the sun’s last rays, 
On the divan are piled (at night her bed) 
Stockings, slippers, camisoles, and stays. (224-27) 
This is less a display of her most private clothing than it is the desensitizing of another 
layer of the self. They are held out to the turmoil of the city. There is no escape from 
public interactions, no possibility for private intimacy. Eliot twice mentions the fact that 
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the divan is also used as a bed, which suggests a “publicizing” of sex. She piles her 
private underclothing in a sitting room, and they have sex there, as well. Sexuality, 
because it has been put through the desensitizing indignities of the urban environment, is 
unable to provide the satisfaction that Eliot’s earlier speakers such as Prufrock seek. Eliot 
suggests that Prufrock’s reaching would fail even if he were able to grasp his object. He 
describes the young man’s actions as attempts rather than accomplishments; he does not 
caress, he “Endeavors to engage her in caresses” (237). The caress is impossible even at 
the moment it occurs. Eliot rejects sexuality by suggesting that satisfaction eludes even 
those who attain physical union. 
Though the sexual episode must obviously be interpreted on the level of the two 
participants, it is important to note that Eliot chooses to present the scene as the narration 
of Tiresias, the blind seer. The implications of this decision are many and complex, so 
much that Eliot’s claim for the importance of Tiriesias is well-founded. In his notes to the 
poem, Eliot calls Tiresias “a mere spectator and not indeed a ‘character’” but “is yet the 
most important personage in the poem, uniting all the rest.” Critical response to the 
problems raised by Tiresias has diverged considerably. Some scholars have attempted to 
read the entire poem through the lens of Tiresias, while others have sought to limit his 
unifying role, especially as the narrator of the entire poem.3 Without trying to adjudicate 
this dispute, it is safe to say that Eliot’s choice of Tiresias as narrator of this section is not 
without import. In fact, the list of implications encapsulates many of the concerns found 
in other sections of the poem. Although Tiresias appears explicitly in only nine lines, 
Eliot emphasizes the importance of this “personage.” Tiresias dramatizes the 
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impossibility of sexuality and the need to substitute poetic expression for the satisfaction 
of desire. 
One aspect of this choice is simply that Eliot gains emotional intensity by 
utilizing a specific speaker rather than an unnamed, generalized, and omniscient narrator. 
His very early works, such as his “caprices,” employ anonymous speakers, often in the 
first-person plural “we.” He does not describe the speaker but instead focuses on 
depicting the urban environment. Without an identifiable speaker, the poems end up 
exploring feelings of indifference rather than more intense emotional states. “Interlude in 
London” demonstrates this tendency: 
We hibernate among the bricks 
And live across the window panes 
With marmalade and tea at six 
Indifferent to what the wind does 
Indifferent to sudden rains (Inventions 16) 
Nameless people live across from one another, protected from the wind and rain, but also 
protected from acute emotion. Readers are not invited to identify with any discernible 
character. While this impersonality may have been Eliot’s principle intent in his early 
work, he pursues a very different strategy in The Waste Land. The narrative is interrupted 
three times to allow Tiresias to voice his reactions to the unfolding drama. And, of 
course, the primary emotion is suffering. It is palpable in a human form. Though emotion 
is personalized in the form of Tiresias, he is a viewer rather than a participant. By 
presenting the scene as Tiresias’s vision, Eliot gives character and particularity to one 
who does not act but watches instead. This has the paradoxical effect of heightening the 
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emotion while distancing the action, as Eliot insists on separating desire from 
consummation. His note on Tiresias gives further evidence of this separation. He suggests 
that there is something crucial about viewing an event that exceeds participating in it. 
This upends our usual notion in which to participate in an event is more authentic and 
meaningful than to witness it. Watching is different from participating because it involves 
holding back rather than experiencing, retaining desire rather than expending it.  
Along with being personalized and being separated from the action, Tiresias is 
physically separated from what he narrates. As a blind seer, he does not really see. This 
means, first of all, that Eliot again deemphasizes physical sensation. Therefore, Tiresias is 
not really a voyeur or a peeping tom: his reflections or insights are abstract ideas rather 
than sensual experiences.4 Tiresias’s perspective avoids the sensuality of what he 
perceives. He recognizes the poverty of the senses, their inability to connect people, their 
essential insufficiency. The blind Tiresias sees how meaningless it is to see, and he feels 
how empty it is to feel. The sexual encounter he perceives is just the most extreme 
example of this insight, the act that most dramatically exposes the gap between the senses 
and the impossibility of consummation. In many ways, Tiresias is also necessary because 
the young man carbuncular and the typist are unable to understand their feelings. Tiresias 
acts as an objective correlative, a figure appropriate to the emotions depicted in a literary 
text. Eliot infamously criticizes Hamlet for excessive, unattached, and unexplainable 
emotion; Shakespeare depicted what Eliot called “intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, 
without an object or exceeding its object” (“Hamlet” 102). But in The Waste Land, 
Tiresias is the poetical figure through which the reader comprehends the scene’s intense 
emotion as well as the realization of the insufficiency of the senses. That is, Eliot’s poem 
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requires a watcher: the scene is less about the feelings of the young man and woman than 
it is about the feeling of the one who witnesses the failure of desire. The narrator’s 
knowledge adds depth and complexity to the drama unfolding in the text. Through the 
perspective of Tiresias, Eliot employs one of the methods he outlines in “On the 
Definition of Metaphysical Poetry” for investing sense with thought: what he calls the 
word made flesh. Homer exemplifies this method: “When Helen looks out from Troy, 
and thinks she sees her brothers in the host, and Homer tells us that they were already 
dead, we partake at the same time of her feelings and those of the omniscient witness, and 
the two form one” (Varieties 55). Tiresias is such a narrator who knows what the 
participants do not understand. He helps express the desire that goes unfulfilled in the 
sexual act. 
Tiresias also intensifies impossible sexual union because he is a hermaphrodite. In 
his note, Eliot writes that “the two sexes meet in Tiresias. What Tiresias sees, in fact, is 
the substance of the poem.” What Tiresias sees, of course, is a sexual encounter, but one 
in which the adding of two elements yields something less than its parts. In a way, the 
sexual act expends the participants. Tiresias, on the other hand, brings the sexes together 
in a way that retains them and their perspectives. Eliot considers the idea of multiple 
perspectives in his dissertation, where he argues that a perspective is merely the 
possession of a solitary “finite centre” and cannot comprise reality unless overlayed with 
the perspective of another finite centre: “There are two (or more) worlds each continuous 
with a self, and yet running in the other direction – somehow – into an identity. Thus in 
adjusting our behaviour to that of others and in co-operating with them we come to intend 
an identical world” (Knowledge 143). This is a dialectical view combining two 
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perspectives. Eliot uses the term “identity” in this context to mean a unity of two 
perspectives, which can establish an ideal meaning, a shared mental understanding. This 
is in some ways a call for community, but in the episode of the typist and the young man 
Eliot demonstrations how the most intimate community fails. Eliot rather plaintively 
admits he is uncertain how unity is achieved, but in Tiresias, he presents one possible 
solution. As a hermaphrodite, Tiresias is “throbbing between two lives, / Old man with 
wrinkled female breasts” (218-19). “Throbbing” indicates unresolved sexuality; though 
he contains both sexes, he cannot achieve release through sexual activity. The sexual 
collision of man and woman is, for Tiresias, an internal struggle, but for that reason it is 
an effort of unity. Eliot describes both the difficulty and the value of such a struggle: “no 
finite centre can be self-sufficient, for the life of a soul does not consist in the 
contemplation of one consistent world but in the painful task of unifying (to a greater or 
lesser extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and passing, when possible, from two or 
more discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall somehow include and transmute 
them” (Knowledge 147-48). As both male and female, Tiresias watches sexual activity 
that leads to neither relief nor satisfaction because these are one-sided perspectives and 
therefore destined to fail. Tiresias is at the tense boundary between man and woman but 
is not sexually active. Instead, he painfully unifies, transcending the failure of sex. 
Eliot also separates desire from consummation by exposing the distance between 
two temporal planes. Tiresias does not immediately experience but rather “foretells” the 
sexual event: “I Tiresias [. . .] / Perceived the scene and foretold the rest” (228-29). The 
event he foretells appears to be in the future, but he narrates it as if it is the present, 
indeed, in the present tense. Eliot again separates viewer from experience by divorcing 
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them in time. Eliot refuses access to an unadulterated present because it would rely too 
heavily on the sensual. Tiresias repeats “At the violet hour” (215; 220) and produces a 
mostly chronological narrative, but it is punctuated with references to foretelling: 
(And I Tiresias have foresuffered all 
Enacted on this same divan or bed; 
I who have sat by Thebes below the wall 
And walked among the lowest of the dead.) (243-46) 
He exists in the present but also foresees the empty sexual act to come. Temporally, 
therefore, he does not describe an occurrence but rather an eternal occurring. He is both 
drawn to and condemned to view the unfulfilling act again and again. He represents the 
repeated recognition of impossible desire. 
This temporal separation that distances poetic speaker from acts of desire occurs 
throughout the poem and is especially prominent in the first section, “Burial of the 
Dead,” where Eliot separates present from past. Eliot presents other episodes taken to 
suggest sexual encounters as memories of youth. Marie describes a childhood memory: 
And when we were children, staying at the arch-duke’s, 
My cousin’s, he took me out on a sled, 
And I was frightened. He said, Marie, 
Marie, hold on tight. And down we went. (13-16) 
Marie’s sensual experience occurs in an unrecoverable past, before she is transformed 
into the adult who now avoids the passions of winter: “I read, much of the night, and go 
south in the winter” (18). The abrupt transition to present tense wryly undoes the activity 
now relegated to the past. Its matter-of-factness punctures the narrative drama of the 
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sequence and retreats from youthful activity. The hyacinth episode is another description 
of passionate, or at least emotionally powerful, moments: 
“You gave me hyacinths first a year ago; 
“They called me the hyacinth girl.” 
—Yet when we came back, late, from the Hyacinth garden, 
Your arms full, and your hair wet, I could not 
Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither 
Living nor dead, and I knew nothing, 
Looking into the heart of light, the silence. 
Oed’ und leer das Meer. (35-42) 
This narrative takes place in the past, presenting two people separated by a year from 
their earlier encounter. Whatever the nature of their interaction, it remains in the past. 
And like the sledding scene, the last line of this episode deflates the earlier emotion. The 
line “Oed’ und leer das Meer” (“desolate and empty is the sea”) depopulates the 
landscape and ultimately proves the present a place in which past consummation cannot 
be reclaimed. The twin forces of memory and desire, announced as primary concerns in 
the opening section of the poem, are shown to be inadequate in bridging the gap that 
confronts them. Memories of earlier sensuality mix with, and stir up, desire, but Eliot 
carefully undercuts the possibility of consummation in each case. Another feature of this 
temporal disconnection is that the earlier period is marked by gardens and flowers while 
the latter becomes the dry and desolate waste land. Marie’s reminiscence begins in a 
public park, while the hyacinth reminiscence occurs in a garden. Eliot sets the earlier 
episodes in a natural world of beauty and light, while the present is a depraved and 
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darkening world. He contrasts what was with what can no longer be, separating 
consummation from asceticism. In “Unknown Terror and Mystery,” Ronald Bush 
suggests that the sexual scene in the hyacinth garden represents the pivotal moment in 
The Waste Land: “If [Eliot’s] speaker can sustain his love into eternity, if this moment 
can be made from the foundation of a set of permanent values, then his emotional self 
will have been validated” (256). He argues that Eliot returns to this moment again and 
again in his work, but that, for Eliot, the problem is ultimately insoluble. As Bush points 
out, the moment is in the past and admits no resolution. However, The Waste Land is, at 
root, Eliot’s attempt to dramatize the transformative value of the loss of satisfaction. The 
poem derives its energy from the tension between the desire for satisfaction and the 
recognition that satisfaction is ultimately empty. The moment is in the past, and Tiresias 
sees its recurrent irresolution in the future. 
Eliot places Tiresias at the intersection of these contending principles, but the 
poem itself leaves Tiresias after the music of the gramophone. As Tiresias recedes and 
the generalized poetic speaker returns (257-65), there is a respite from the intensity of 
Eliot’s theme of sexual frustration and its lessons. In a poem of jarring transitions, the 
break between the sexual encounter and the subsequent verse paragraph is decidedly less 
discordant than many others in the poem. The two sections are connected by the music of 
the gramophone that leads to the music that “crept by me upon the waters” (257). And 
there is a similar musicality to the verse, as well, although it is no longer in rhyming 
iambic pentameter. In fact, the sections are similar enough that we might assume this is 
not a wholly new section at all except we know from the facsimile of the early drafts that 
Eliot placed significant white space between the two. Despite their correspondences, the 
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differences are instructive. The former arrays man against woman, while the latter 
presents collective “fishmen” (263); dusk and darkness give way to “noon” (263); the 
failure to communicate transforms into easy talk: “a clatter and a chatter from within” 
(262); the messy apartment is replaced by cathedral walls in “splendour of Ionian white 
and gold” (265). In each case there is an easing of the tensions that were present in the 
sexual episode.  
Eliot replaces the earlier sordidness, brought into clear relief by the irony of its 
mellifluous rhyme and meter, with a more textured poetry with greater metrical and 
rhyming variability. Eliot retains some rhymes, but they now appear organic, as in the 
short and long lines: “Of Magnus Martyr hold / Inexplicable splendour of Ionian white 
and gold” (264-65). Rather than rattling numbers of a purling stream, Eliot introduces 
rhyme to staggered lines with less adornment. Classical references and Latinate words 
give way to Middle English words such as “clatter” and “chatter” or the long emphasized 
o’s of “lounge” and “noon.” Eliot reverses the irony and uses the common to reach the 
beautiful rather than the opposite. The music passes through the socially imbricated 
environment in order to reach the church of Magnus Martyr. The poetic voice descends 
and the irony recedes while the dramatic trajectory leads upwards. In Eliot’s note to this 
line, he describes his admiration for “The interior of St. Magnus Martyr,” which he feels 
is “to my mind one of the finest among Wren’s interiors.” By referencing interiors, Eliot 
highlights the movement of this stanza from the external observer who wanders the city 
to one who seeks beauty in interiors. The Ionian columns suggest support and elevation 
as well as the obvious implication that religion might provide them.  
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For a poem as dark, chaotic, sterile, and debased as The Waste Land, the 
possibility of respite or perhaps even salvation represented by the church would make for 
a fittingly uplifting conclusion. But, as is quite obvious, the poem does not end here. Eliot 
cannot arrive at the church of Magnus Martyr and consider the matter, or the poem, 
sufficiently resolved. But what remains unaccomplished in such a moving stanza that 
makes it fail to achieve dramatic resolution? The poem escapes to Magnus Martyr, but it 
does not reorganize desire. That is, the poetic speaker is led away from the music of 
sexual frustration and toward a music that speaks of community and religious order and 
beauty, but he is not transformed through this pilgrimage. He witnesses a bit of brightness 
in the city and is led to a house of worship, but the poem dwells on the scene’s physical 
features there. The speaker comes to view the objects of religious beauty, such as Ionian 
columns, but he comes to the place of worship unchanged. Eliot builds to a conclusion in 
which the speaker must learn how to worship. As the rest of “The Fire Sermon” makes 
clear, unrestrained sexuality is too insidious to escape by mere flight. It flows through the 
world like a dirty river: 
The river sweats 
Oil and tar 
The barges drift 
With the turning tide (266-69) 
Eliot replaces the gold of Magnus Martyr with a sweating river; the refuge of the church 
is swept away like a barge with the turning tide. The river represents the “cauldron of 
unholy loves” in Augustine’s Confessions to which Eliot alludes in the line “To Carthage 
then I came” (307). Augustine curses the insistence of physical desire: “To Carthage I 
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came, where there sang all around me in my ears a cauldron of unholy loves. I loved not 
yet, yet I loved to love, and, out of a deep-seated want, I hated myself for wanting not. I 
sought what I might love, in love with loving, and safety I hated, and a way without 
snares” (13). The boiling cauldron, for Augustine, is a figure for the unrelenting force of 
physical desire; he suffers the tension of the various forms of love, certain that he is 
overtaken with improper drives. For Eliot, the Thames is the figure for this flood of 
clamorous needs. He intensifies his presentation of physical desires with the three songs 
of the Thames-daughters, which shorten and repeat tales of sexual undoing. In the last of 
these, Eliot’s speaker dismisses the rhyme and musicality of the other two and plainly 
says “I can connect / Nothing with nothing” (301-02). The Thames-daughter realizes the 
emptiness of sexual union. This is, in a sense, Tiresias’s realization as well as the primary 
lesson of the poem to this point. Nothing can be joined, neither past to present nor male 
to female. If one does not seek the satisfaction of desire, however, one simply retains 
desire toward no end. Eliot closes “The Fire Sermon” by presenting this continued 
burning of desire: 
Burning burning burning burning 
O Lord Thou pluckest me out 
O Lord Thou pluckest 
 
burning (308-11) 
These words from the Buddha’s fire-sermon depict the mind on fire; the world is alight 
with sensation and elicits the fires of passion. These fires tempt the mind, The Waste 
Land calls for a means to transform the mind. 
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But first, Eliot envisions the opposite of burning desire. The “Death By Water” 
section offers a counterexample in which desire drops to absolute zero. Phlebas the 
Phoenician is “a fortnight dead,” drained of all volition and desire: 
  A current under sea 
Picked his bones in whispers. As he rose and fell 
He passed the stages of his age and youth 
Entering the whirlpool. (315-18) 
Phlebas is subject to the actions of the world rather than making the world conform to his 
desires. The form of the lines on the page suggest the swelling of the sea; the two short 
lines and two long indents create white space between the otherwise long lines, 
suggesting a current in the water that picks at Phlebas. It is well-known, of course, that 
Eliot originally intended a longer “Death By Water” section and, after Pound reduced it 
to what would become its final form, Eliot considered cutting it entirely, but the part that 
remains is an effective erasure of desire that appears in counterbalance to the fire-sermon. 
The almost monosyllabic section reduces expression to its bare minimum as the simple 
actions of the world subsume the power of the individual. In the context of the preceding 
section, “Death By Water” adds to a palpable easing in the poem by putting two kinds of 
negative emotion alongside each other, represented by burning and drowning. In 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot describes a “structural emotion” that does not 
derive from the poet’s expression of his feelings: “This balance of contrasted emotion [in 
The Revenger’s Tragedy] [. . .] is, so to speak, the structural emotion, provided by the 
drama. But the whole effect, the dominant tone, is due to the fact that a number of 
floating feelings [. . .] have combined with it to give us a new emotion” (57). The excess 
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of desire described in the fire-sermon is given an opposite outlet. But this opposite, the 
utter end of desire, is not truly a solution; it is the means to a solution. Submerging desire 
does not end it; the image of drowning that Eliot takes from The Tempest is a means of 
transformation rather than closure.  
Eliot refers to a similarly transformative process in his response to Coleridge’s 
“Kubla Khan,” where he discusses the unconscious redirection of emotional energy: “The 
imagery of that fragment, certainly, whatever its origins in Coleridge’s reading, sank to 
the depths of Coleridge’s feelings, was saturated, transformed there—‘those are pearls 
that were his eyes’—and brought up into daylight again” (Use of Poetry 146). This 
drowning metaphor, which ends desire as it is traditionally conceived, is, for Eliot, a 
means for metamorphosis. He foreshadows the transformation of desire in “The Burial of 
the Dead,” when the clairvoyante, Madame Sosostris, informs the speaker “Here, said 
she, / Is your card, the drowned Phoenician Sailor, / (Those are pearls that were his eyes. 
Look!)” (46-48). Despite the dry and barren wasteland depicted throughout the text, Eliot 
structures a promise of water, and though it drowns Phlebas, it also transforms his eyes 
into pearls. The “stages of his age and youth,” or the sensual experience of the world, are 
left behind and another realm becomes available. Eliot goes on to criticize Coleridge’s 
poem because it is a fragment that does not develop a vision for the transformed feeling: 
“[Coleridge’s image] is not used: the poem has not been written. A single verse is not 
poetry unless it is a one-verse poem; and even the finest line draws its life from its 
context. Organization is necessary as well as ‘inspiration’” (Use of Poetry 146). By 
contrast, in Eliot’s poem, fire and water are set against each other in the service of a 
conclusion that can retain but transform desire. The lesson of “Death By Water” is that to 
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be desireless is to be dead; to forget “profit and loss” (314) is to fall into the whirlpool of 
death. Eliot demands a dialectical resolution to the tension he sets up, one that can 
transform desire to something higher, a spiritual and poetic release. 
In spite of his voluminous writings, Eliot nowhere describes such ideas concisely, 
primarily because his full conception is dialectical. Eliot insists on the importance of 
including objects in poetry. In his essay “Swinburne as Poet,” Eliot criticizes Swinburne 
for allowing the object to disappear: “Swinburne defines [a] place by the most general 
word, which has for him its own value [. . .] it is not merely the sound that he wants, but 
the vague associations of idea that the words give him. He has not his eye on a particular 
place” (147). A poem like The Waste Land, with its dramatic presentation of particular 
urban objects, shows that Eliot avoids such pitfalls in his own work. But there is an 
obvious counterargument: objects by themselves are not enough to explain our 
experience of them. Eliot constructs an opposition between objects and the vague, general 
words of Swinburne, valorizing the former and denigrating the latter. By the end of the 
essay he offers a synthesis that brings language and feeling together: “the language which 
is more important to us is that which is struggling to digest and express new objects, new 
groups of objects, new feelings, new aspects” (179). Eliot implicitly contends that objects 
themselves are not enough; language digests objects. Rather than simply presenting 
objects, poetic language must transform objects into new feelings. Eliot’s concept is 
dialectical; poetry is the relation between objects and subjects. 
Eliot considers this relation between objects and subjects in his 1926 Clark 
lectures, in which he points out what he sees as the lamentable transition in intellectual 
history from ontology to psychology. He argues that Descartes was the first to respond to 
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ontological questions with psychological answers. This modern perspective began when 
Descartes “clearly stated that what we know is not the world of objects, but our own 
ideas of these objects” (Varieties 80). He calls this an “extraordinarily crude and stupid 
piece of reasoning” (81) because it emphasizes the mind’s capacity to create reality: 
“Instead of ideas as meanings, as references to an outside world, you have suddenly a 
new world coming into existence, inside your own mind” (80). Eliot’s problem with this 
perspective is not merely that it is incorrect but that it allows for a misguided use of 
emotion. His antithetical examples are Donne and Dante. Donne’s poetry is guilty of 
“teasing the idea”: “Donne, instead of pursuing the meaning of the idea, letting it flow 
into the usual sequence of thought, arrests it, in order to extract every possible ounce of 
the emotion suspended in it” (85-86). For Eliot, this is a perversion in which reality has a 
meaning that the poet disregards in order to procure a desired emotional experience. The 
foundation of that experience is missing, falsely supplied by the fancy of the poet.  
But Eliot employs Dante as a counterexample to Donne’s psychological view. 
Eliot quotes an ontological example from the Purgatorio in which the spirit of Statius 
attempts to embrace Virgil, who refuses and replies, 
“Brother, do not so, for thou art a shade and a shade thou seest.” 
Statius, rising, replies: 
“Now canst thou comprehend the measure of the love which warms me toward 
thou, when I forget our nothingness, and treat shades as a solid thing” (qtd. in 
Varieties 89).  
Dante’s insistence on reality is most powerful, for Eliot, in a scene in which reality is first 
forgotten. The scene illustrates the undeniability of reality, but it does so within the 
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context of our perceptions, however mistaken they may be, and against the motives of 
desire. In other words, this is not a settled scene between Statius and Virgil. It is, rather, a 
recognition of the impossible, a restraint in the face of the surprising knowledge that our 
ability to satisfy our desire, our ability to match our solipsistic perception to reality, is 
inevitably remote. Eliot’s argument for ontology over psychology does not accomplish an 
easy universe of pacific objects among which we count ourselves; being, for Eliot, is a 
process of disillusionment, a stark recognition of incompatibility, a bracing return from 
fancy. Eliot’s “ontology” is based on the forced dismissal of our yearning. He therefore 
doesn’t dismiss psychology; he requires that the psychological reaction to the reality of 
being is a part of what it means to exist. In Eliot’s synthesis of the ontological-
psychological problem, we are the perpetual rejection of our desire. And it is fitting that 
Statius and Virgil are shades, insubstantial against their surroundings, for to be too 
material suggests an authority over reality that we do not possess. 
Eliot puts the subject in a middle ground between desire and restriction, life and 
death, and free will and determinism. Subjectivity, for Eliot, is a form of purgatory. His 
synthesis of the ontology-psychology problem, which occurs more in his poetry than in 
his criticism, is apt to be overlooked. Yvor Winters, for example, delivers a blistering 
critique in his essay “T. S. Eliot or The Illusion of Reaction,” where he attacks Eliot for 
his “determinism.” He contends that Eliot allows the individual no agency to direct his 
own actions, and complains that Eliot sometimes argues that we can and must control 
ourselves and determine the contours of our personalities and, at other times, argues that 
our natures are determined and there is no hope of transcending them. But then Winters 
chooses from among Eliot’s positions (the one he prefers far less) and admonishes him 
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for such a foolish and morally repugnant view: “Eliot’s position is one of unmitigated 
determinism. The point of view here indicated is, furthermore, related to the Marxist and 
Fascist view that the individual lacks the private and personal power to achieve goodness 
in a corrupt society” (100). For Winters, our ability to shape ourselves against our 
environment must be absolute. To allow that we are in some ways determined, according 
to Winters, leads to the ultimate rejection of personal agency, which takes the form of 
personal character, the power to do the right thing. Winters finds support for his reading 
of Eliot in various sources, particularly After Strange Gods: 
No sensible author, in the midst of something that he is trying to write, can stop to 
consider whether it is going to be romantic or the opposite. At the moment when 
one writes, one is what one is, and the damage of a lifetime, and of having been 
born into an unsettled society, cannot be repaired at the moment of composition. 
(qtd. in Winters 100) 
According to Winters, Eliot is in no position for moral action because the range of his 
action is already predetermined. But this is a misreading of Eliot’s critical position, and it 
leads to a jaundiced view of The Waste Land. Perhaps the problem that arises for Winters 
centers on the word “is” in the quotation he takes from Eliot: “one is what one is.” “Is” 
suggests a stability of being that, as we just discovered, is always, for Eliot, wrapped up 
in emotional experience, even as such experience must be subsumed to reality. 
Determinism is carefully balanced with free will throughout Eliot’s work and typifies the 
synthesis that marks his examples of transformation. Eliot remarks in his essay on Pascal, 
for instance, that “[i]t is recognized in Christian theology—and indeed on a lower plane it 
is recognized by all men in affairs of daily life—that free-will of the natural effort and 
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ability of the individual man and also supernatural grace, a gift accorded we know not 
quite how, are both required, in co-operation, for salvation” (153). Eliot does not 
condemn the poet to remain as he “is” but instead suggests that free will and divine 
mercy allow for spiritual and intellectual progress. This balance of human and divine 
mirrors the unity of subject and object. 
 Eliot’s view of free will as an integral part of human existence allows for a moral 
reading of The Waste Land that an interpretation like Winters’ does not. For Winters, 
Eliot’s determinism affects his artistic method as well. Winters contends that Eliot 
observes our debased surroundings and then presents them as such. The world must be 
fully accepted as it is because, according to Winters’ reading of Eliot, we are derived 
from and beholden to those surroundings: “Eliot, in dealing with debased and stupid 
material, felt himself obliged to seek his form in his matter: the result is confusion and 
journalistic reproduction of detail” (111). While there is indeed a good deal of confusion, 
Eliot offers it as a pervasive and undeniable aspect of contemporary urban life. But this is 
not mere mimesis. For Eliot, the poem must be up to the task of including that with which 
it seeks to come to grips. Eliot articulates his moral and aesthetic vision in reaction to the 
chaos he allows into the poem. Chaos, in fact, provides the context for moral action. In 
After Strange Gods he explains that the chaos of the passions is not, in itself, the province 
of art properly conceived: 
violent physical passions do not in themselves differentiate men from each other, 
but rather tend to reduce them to the same state; and the passion has significance 
only in relation to the character and behavior of the man at other moments of his 
life and in other contexts. Furthermore, strong passion is only interesting in strong 
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men; those who abandon themselves without resistance to excitements which tend 
to deprive them of reason, become merely instruments of feeling and lose their 
humanity; and unless there is moral resistance and conflict there is no meaning. 
(59-60) 
Eliot argues that poetry must present a conflict between desire and personal restriction. 
The task of the poet is to recover self-control from the mire in which the modern world 
threatens to submerge it. Eliot insists that it is in just such a moral struggle that “men and 
women come nearest to being real” (After 46). People lose their very substance if they do 
not act against base desires, those passions that inhabit us all. And for this redirection of 
desire, the subject must have free will. The aim of poetry is to offer a means for this 
redirection. Eliot’s defense of Baudelaire provides an insight into his notion of a poet’s 
ability to respond to a depraved world. He underscores the “sublimation of passion 
toward which Baudelaire was always striving” (“Baudelaire in Our Time” 100). For 
Eliot, Baudelaire is not a purveyor of sin but one who is surrounded by it. Baudelaire 
does not submit to his passions; he contains and examines them. Poetry is an avenue for 
sublimation, for a reorganization of desire. Eliot argues that Baudelaire works toward this 
sublimation through the poetic intensity of his representation of the modern urban 
environment: 
It is not merely in the use of imagery of common life, not merely in the use of 
imagery of the sordid life of a great metropolis, but in the elevation of such 
imagery to the first intensity—presenting it as it is, and yet making it represent 
something much more than itself—that Baudelaire has created a mode of release 
and expression for other men. (“Baudelaire” 234) 
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Eliot values Baudelaire’s poetic representation of the city because its emotional intensity 
exceeds mere description; it is objectively accurate, but it also includes the human 
relations to the city. One of the ways it achieves intensity is to show the city’s rough and 
vile contact with us: “Teeming city, full of dreams, where in broad / Daylight the specter 
grips the passer-by!” (34). These lines are from Baudelaire’s “Les Sept vieillards” (“The 
Seven Old Men”), which Eliot quotes in the notes to The Waste Land, where he first uses 
the phrase “unreal city.” For Eliot, we approach our surroundings most significantly 
when their tensions are exposed and we see them intensified. On one level, Baudelaire’s 
specters are the seven old men, but on another, the city is the specter who accosts the 
modern subject with its decrepitude. We cannot refuse to notice the corrupt world, for it 
takes hold of us. In Baudelaire’s poem, the old man is multiplied seven times, replicating 
himself, surrounding the speaker with his decayed and degenerate form. The subject must 
navigate these disorienting dangers. The poem ends “And my soul danced, danced, like 
an old lighter / Without masts, on a monstrous, shoreless sea” (35). The intensity of this 
image, a bewildered subject adrift upon a sea of senselessness, provides an experience of 
release. Eliot argues that Baudelaire “perceived that what really matters is Sin and 
Redemption” (235); he contends that Baudelaire’s urban imagery demands a response to 
sin, an approach to good and evil. Eliot believes Baudelaire engages in a moral struggle 
to transform his relationship to the world through poetry as a mode of release.  
Eliot’s unreal city is much like Baudelaire’s, intensifying modern life. It is first a 
staging ground for the dead: “A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, / I had not 
thought death had undone so many” (62-63). The city is not just decrepit; it is made up of 
the dead. In this case, Baudelaire’s debased city is given another layer in the form of 
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Dante’s imagery of hell. Spiritual growth in Dante requires movement through hell and 
purgatory before reaching paradise. Eliot searches for a way to transform death into 
spiritual renewal and offers the image of the planted corpse: 
There I saw one I knew, and stopped him, crying “Stetson! 
You who were with me in the ships at Mylae! 
That corpse you planted last year in your garden, 
Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year? 
Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed? 
Oh keep the Dog far hence, that’s friend to men, 
Or with his nails he’ll dig it up again! 
You! hypocrite lecteur!—mon semblable,—mon frère!” (69-76) 
The city of the wandering dead gives way to a specific conversation about the buried 
corpse that, although grotesque, provide an opportunity for spiritual transformation. Eliot 
creates his own structure of redemption and renewal based on the vegetation rituals of 
primitive humans. He points out in the notes to The Waste Land that “[n]ot only the title, 
but the plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism of the poem” comes from Jessie 
Weston’s study of the Grail legend, as well as James Frazer’s The Golden Bough. These 
works investigate the imaginative and symbolic history of humankind and look for 
persistent patterns and enduring myths. Weston in particular finds commonalities in the 
Grail legend as it takes different forms through history. She argues that a primitive 
vegetation ritual is at the heart of each of these iterations. The burial of the dead 
represents an end to the mundane, corporeal body and the birth of a transcendent spiritual 
being.  
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For Eliot, this rite is more than just a story from the past; it represents 
transformational possibilities for the present. In a discussion of Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring, he describes how ancient rituals can retain their significance if they include 
modern concerns: 
The Vegetation Rite upon which the ballet is founded remained, in spite of the 
music, a pageant of primitive culture. It is interesting to any one who had read 
The Golden Bough and similar works, but hardly more interesting. In art there 
should be interpenetration and metamorphosis. Even The Golden Bough can be 
read in two ways: as a collection of entertaining myths, or as a revelation of that 
vanished mind of which our mind is a continuation. In everything in the Sacre du 
Printempts, except in the music, one missed the sense of the present. (“London 
Letter” 189) 
The Rite of Spring, according to Eliot, does not bring the ritual and the imagery of the 
past into sufficient “interpenetration” with the modern world. Whether or not this is a 
valid criticism of Stravinsky’s ballet, Eliot clearly indicates his interest in vivifying the 
vegetation myth with contemporary human concerns. For Eliot, the modern mind is a 
direct descendent of the primitive mind. The interpenetration he recommends in his 
review arises in The Waste Land through the careful intersection of Baudelaire’s modern 
depraved city and the ancient burial that inaugurates the vegetation ritual. 
 The buried corpse also symbolizes the denial of desire, the submersion of will, 
and the metamorphosis of the self. Because it is underground, it cannot interact sensually 
with the world. For Eliot, the realm of sensual human relations is inadequate to the 
spiritual needs we possess. He argues that romantic love poetry is not able to find a 
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transcendental action: “Indeed, in much romantic poetry the sadness is due to the 
exploitation of the fact that no human relations are adequate to human desires, but also to 
the disbelief in any further object for human desires than that which, being human, fails 
to satisfy them” (“Baudelaire” 235). Eliot insists on moving beyond human relations 
toward a spiritual transcendence that gives up sexual desire for poetic sensation. This 
substitution or sublimation is a moral struggle, requiring not only the recognition of our 
incapacity to be fulfilled by sensual means but by the need to escape these failures by 
activating the symbolic power attending poetic sublimation, that is, the union of thought 
and feeling in poetic practice. Rather than leaving the vegetation myth as some inert part 
of our human past, Eliot intensifies the tension inherent in the burial of the dead by 
challenging the modern reader, when he again quotes Baudelaire: “You! hypocrite 
lecteur!—mon semblable,—mon frère!” (Hypocrite reader! my twin! my brother!). The 
reader is implicated in the actions of the poem, dragged through the city and its sexual 
degradations in order to build toward a spiritual transformation. The ancient mind is 
implicated in the present, and the burden of renewal and transcendence long figured in 
the vegetation myth recurs here as a moral struggle to deny sensuality. 
 Eliot effectively presents this moral struggle and transformation in the complex 
ending of The Waste Land. Winters and others find merely allusive chaos rather than the 
resulting poetic unity achieved through sublimation. According to Winters, the array of 
quotations at the end is confused and helpless, and it allows Eliot professions on both 
sides of an issue that, for Winters, can support only the purest of positions: “He has 
loosely thrown together a collection of disparate and fragmentary principles which fall 
roughly into two contradictory groups, the romantic on the one hand and on the other the 
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classical and Christian” (112). Winters declines to identify which quotations support 
which of these positions, but it is possible to interpret these quotations in light of the 
tensions in the rest of the poem and in Eliot’s thought more generally. The quotations can 
be read in two ways: first, as individual lines to be interpreted in relation to their original 
sources; and, second, as a whole, for they take part in a dynamic process in Eliot’s poem 
that requires analysis in its own right. 
 Although they are drawn from various languages, literary traditions, and cultural 
contexts, Eliot’s quotations each describe a middle ground between unity and dissolution, 
portraying the suffering inherent in establishing self-control in a disintegrating or 
degenerate world: 
London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down 
Poi s’ascose nel foco che gli affina 
Quando fiam uti chelidon—O swallow swallow 
Le Prince d’Aquitaine à la tour abolie 
These fragments I have shored against my ruins 
Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo’s mad againe. 
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata. 
 
  Shantih     shantih     shantih (426-33) 
The nursery rhyme of London Bridge, with its “falling down,” suggests that the world is 
given to decay and entropy. It reflects the imminent destruction of the external world. 
Perhaps deriving a sense of destruction from the experience of the Great War, and 
anticipating the Second World War, Eliot insists on a spiritual rather than worldly 
 77 
redemption, for the world is increasingly pushed to the brink of utter destruction. The 
repetition of “falling down” signifies the persistence of such collapse over time.  And yet 
the musicality of the line, the sing-song melody from the familiar nursery rhyme, adds an 
ambiguous levity to what is otherwise a chilling process of ruination. The sense of 
destruction is filtered through the music of nursery rhyme, displacing the objective to the 
subjective. A degraded world cannot be denied, but it must be perceived through 
aesthetic experience. In a way, Eliot’s use of this line exemplifies his notion of a poetry 
that brings together disparate ideas into a sensible moment, “when an idea, or what is 
only ordinarily apprehensible as an intellectual statement, is translated in sensible form; 
so that the world of sense is actually enlarged” (Varieties 53-54). Eliot makes sensational 
through musicality the idea of simultaneous life and death, melody and entropy, internal 
and external. 
The same ambiguity of destruction and redemption appears in the line taken from 
Dante: “Poi s’ascose nel foco che gli affina,” translated as “Then he hid himself in the 
fire that refines them.” Fire is usually understood to devour, but Dante, and Eliot after 
him, recognizes not its destructive power but its refining capability. It burns away the 
degraded exterior and transforms the remainder into a refined purity. The fire therefore 
does not destroy, nor is it a punishment; it is instead a transformation, a crucible of 
reformation. It is also distinguished from the burning of desire treated in “The Fire 
Sermon,” described as “Burning burning burning burning” (308). Rather than a fire from 
which one seeks deliverance, the refining fire ensures deliverance. In his 1927 essay on 
Dante, Eliot explains the nature of this fire:  
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In [the Purgatorio] the Lustful are purged in flame, yet we see clearly how the 
flame of purgatory differs from that of hell. In hell, the torment issues from the 
very nature of the damned themselves, expresses their essence; they writhe in the 
torment of their own perpetually perverted nature. In purgatory the torment of 
flame is deliberately and consciously accepted by the penitent [. . .]. The souls in 
purgatory suffer because they wish to suffer, for purgation. (“Dante” 220)  
Eliot suggests that one cannot be pure except through suffering and that we must desire 
this suffering. He insists that we experience degradation in the modern world so that we 
might emerge “souls [prepared] for blessedness” (220). Renunciation of physical desire, 
as we saw in After Strange Gods, is what makes us human. It raises us above the level of 
animals and prepares us for spiritual transformation. 
The means for achieving this blessedness, for Eliot, come through the poetic 
process. His quotation from Pervigilium Veneris, “Quando fiam uti chelidon,” (“When 
shall I be the like the swallow?”), is one of many references the story of Philomela, but 
this time it emphasizes the voice rather than the sexual barbarism of rape. Eliot is 
interested in the muse that gives voice to the voiceless and transforms physical sexuality 
into poetic experience. Poetry is a form of sensation; song transcends the experience of a 
corrupted world. Earlier in the poem, Eliot refers to the “inviolable voice” (101), 
suggesting that the voice cannot be violated by sexual desires that enflame the body. The 
swallow exists outside the actions of rude desire. It is important to note, however, that 
Eliot’s speaker does not imagine he is the swallow but rather wonders when he shall 
become like the swallow. The speaker is caught between his wish to escape the degraded 
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world and his realization that he has yet to make that escape. He resides in a purgatory of 
wishing, like Arnaut Daniel in Dante’s scene alluded to in the preceding line (427). 
In the next line, Eliot again references the subject’s status between the world and 
a self-reflexive removal from it: “Le Prince d’Aquitaine à la tour abolie,” translated as 
“The Prince of Aquitainia whose tower has been torn down.” The poem from which it is 
taken, Gérard de Nerval’s sonnet “El Desdichado,” is a mystical and symbolic meditation 
on the experience of melancholy. The speaker is disconsolate, surrounded by a dead and 
darkened celestial sphere and plagued by memories of earlier peace and beauty: 
I am the Tenebrous one, —the Widower, —the Disconsolate, 
The Prince of Aquitania whose tower has been torn down: 
My only Star is dead, —and my constellated lute 
Bears the Black Sun of Melancholia. 
 
In the night of the Tomb, You who consoled me, 
Give me back Posilipo and the Italian sea, 
The flower so dear to my disconsolate heart, 
And the arbor where the Vine Branch intertwines with the Rose. (qtd. in Knapp 
246-51) 
Nerval’s poem, like Eliot’s, mixes memory and desire, imagining not only a lost garden 
of fruitfulness but the inevitable destruction of the tower that attempts to rise above the 
postlapsarian world. The line that Eliot selects shows the speaker at a point in which his 
defenses have collapsed. He is a “Widower,” without a sexual partner but still in a 
sensual world. The speaker wonders whether he is “Amor or Phoebus?. . .Lusignan or 
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Biron?” (251), characters driven by sexual desire but unable to achieve their aims. His 
“forehead is still red from the Queen’s kiss” (252), suggesting that he is marked by sexual 
desire. The closing of the sonnet, however, transforms this sexual tension into the 
possibility of aesthetic expression: 
And twice I crossed the Acheron, a victor: 
Intoning in turn on Orpheus’ lyre 
The sighs of the Saint and the cries of the Fairy. (253-54) 
Orpheus’ lyre signals the music of poetry and the sublimation of desire into creativity. 
This music echoes the song of the swallow in the preceding line (428) as well as the 
transformative musicality of in the London Bridge nursery rhyme. Eliot was perhaps 
drawn to Nerval’s poem for its vision of a refining process that can convert desire into 
new experience. Nerval also imagines the crossing of Acheron, between life and death 
and back again, that anticipates Eliot’s interest in the state between life and death, as well 
as the purgatory between hell and paradise. Eliot’s allusion to the ruined tower suggests a 
broken structure but not a destroyed human being. Instead, the subject is exposed to the 
tensions of a depraved world and given an opportunity to transfigure them into new song, 
“[i]ntoning in turn on Orpheus’ lyre.” 
For Eliot, the preceding fragments join to form a unity, a music of poetic 
experience. He announces the purpose of the foregoing quotations quite clearly: “These 
fragments I have shored against my ruins” (430). Though Winters and others have 
complained that the ending quotations are too disparate, too abstruse, or in too many 
languages, Eliot appreciates the sound and rhythm of words as a particular form of 
meaning. In a lecture on Matthew Arnold, Eliot refers to what he calls the auditory 
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imagination: “the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious 
levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and 
forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back, seeking the beginning and 
the end” (Use of Poetry 118-19). Eliot suggests that the musicality of verse allows access 
to a “primitive” level of thought from the “vanished mind” of the past that we 
nevertheless inherit. This anthropological motive also “[seeks] the beginning and the 
end,” a holistic and unifying view of human history. Eliot’s rhythmic auditory 
imagination might be heard to operate more readily where the foreign language produces 
more music for most readers than meaning. In fact, Eliot valorizes the meaning within 
sound, which occurs through intensity rather than semantics:  
The chief use of the “meaning” of a poem, in the ordinary sense, may be [. . .] to 
satisfy one habit of the reader, to keep his mind diverted and quiet [. . . .] But the 
minds of all poets do not work that way; some of them, assuming that there are 
other minds like their own, become impatient of this “meaning” which seems 
superfluous, and perceive possibilities of intensity through its elimination. (Use of 
Poetry 151). 
In other words, asking the ending of The Waste Land to make sense only at the level of 
semantics when Eliot might be seeking to eliminate it is to misread the poem, to choose 
an approach not warranted by the text. Eliot’s poetic theory allows for the pleasure of 
sound to replace the demands of semantics, creating a reading process similar to that of 
the poet, who fuses feelings into a new experience: 
And what is the experience that the poet is so bursting to communicate? [. . .] The 
“experience” in question may be the result of a fusion of feelings so numerous, 
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and ultimately so obscure in their origins, that even if there be communication of 
them, the poet may hardly be aware of what he is communicating; and what is 
there to be communicated was not in existence before the poem was completed. 
“Communication” will not explain poetry. (138) 
The string of quotations closing the poem is linguistically foreign but metrically familiar, 
ancient but modern, and may be too divergent to communicate in a traditional way. But, 
for Eliot, this is one of the powers of poetry, to create new experiences in which sense 
and feeling are unified. Each quotation subtly suggests a middle ground between sensual 
drives and the renunciation of desire. The poetic speaker admits the lines are fragments 
but also gives them a unified purpose; they support the self against possible ruin. The 
fragments paradoxically ensure a whole self. Eliot puts these quotations together in order 
to signify the process of experiencing poetry. That is, the quotations Eliot chooses are 
from those texts that have joined thought and feeling by enacting the refining power of 
purgatory. Each quotation registers that life is a form of suffering and that the 
transcendent self is made of the rejection of sexual desire.  
Perhaps the most difficult of these final lines to understand in terms of the context 
of its original source is “Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo’s mad againe” (431). The chief 
emotion of Thomas Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy, from which the passage comes, is 
revenge. Hieronymo hates those who have murdered his son, and he sets himself to 
revenge the murder. Eliot’s other final lines, by contrast, do not depict such violent 
passions. Hieronymo succumbs to his passions in a way that Eliot discourages throughout 
the poem, but Eliot includes the line to show how Hieronymo carries out his revenge by 
using art. Hieronymo does not pursue his true object of desire, which is his murdered son. 
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Consonant with the rest of Eliot’s poem, the past is irrecoverable. Instead, he devises a 
method of expressing this desire in an artistic mode. In setting up his ruse, he explains his 
interest in “fruitless poetry”: “When I was young, I gave my mind / And plied myself to 
fruitless poetry” (IV.1.71-72). The irony, of course, is that he uses his tragedy to author a 
new tragedy, bringing his plans to fruition. Poetry, in this case, is not fruitless. But it does 
not bring him his object of desire, his son. Instead, he diverts his energy into the play 
through which he carries out his revenge. He also escapes damning eternal judgment: the 
ghost of Andrea pronounces: “I’ll lead Hieronymo where Orpheus plays, / Adding sweet 
pleasure to eternal days” (IV.5.23-24). He ends up transformed to an afterlife of pleasure 
that he could not attain in real life, and this afterlife takes place in the musical, artistic 
realm of Orpheus. On another level, the line from Kyd constitutes the interjection of 
another voice that contradicts the poetic speaker who tries to pull together the preceding 
fragments. The speaker is “mad againe” if he believes such a goal is possible. But, like 
Hieronymo, his drama has consequences. In both works, the subject moves beyond the 
present world and reaches some spiritual peace beyond. 
Eliot finds terms for this spiritual peace in the Upanishads, classical Hindu sacred 
texts. The Waste Land’s penultimate line, “Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.,” recalls the 
three scenes Eliot outlines earlier in “What the Thunder Said.” In each of these scenes, 
the subject yields desire to a power that controls it. In the original source, these are the 
lessons of Prajāpati, the creator god, and are revealed through the thunder’s syllable 
“DA.” In The Waste Land, these lessons reiterate the subject’s distance from the world. 
In the first, the thunder explains that we must “give,” something Eliot’s subject has done 
irrevocably in the past: 
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Datta: what have we given? 
My friend, blood shaking my heart 
The awful daring of a moment’s surrender 
Which an age of prudence can never retract (401-04) 
Eliot’s subject looks back at a moment of emotional interaction and recognizes its 
importance in forming the self: “By this, and this only, we have existed” (405). James 
Miller, Jr. argues that this scene refers to a “suppressed” homosexual experience Eliot 
shared with Jean Verdenal (127-28), but this interpretation has been criticized by other 
Eliot scholars for its paucity of biographical evidence. The text does suggest, however, an 
intense physical experience. As discussed earlier, this passage of Eliot’s echoes Byron’s 
description of Don Juan’s sexual encounter. A daring sensual moment provides the life-
generating gift that, while it can never be negated, can also never be repeated or 
replicated. Sensual activity, for Eliot, is bereft of either present or future possibility. In 
fact, these three segments are split temporally into past, present, and future. “Datta” 
imagines an irrecoverable past when giving was possible, but the moment is always past. 
In his dissertation, Eliot describes memory as the continual creation of a new object in the 
present, never a recovery of an actual past moment: 
The idea [. . .] is not a glass through which we descry a past reality, but the idea of 
a past reality is itself the object, an object which is not past in the sense of a past 
object of experience, and which is not present in the sense of a present object. It 
may appear a paradoxical statement, but it is not altogether untrue to say that the 
object of a memory is the memory itself. (Knowledge 52) 
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In this way, the sensuality of giving cannot be conceptually reclaimed, for its memory is 
a new object that cannot contain the original moment. The speaker responds to the 
commandment to “give” by reflecting on a fulfilling, but necessarily earlier, moment of 
giving. 
 “Dayadhvam,” or mercy, is used in the Upanishads to temper the impulse of 
demons to be cruel. Mercy, in this sense, means refraining from action in which one 
would otherwise be inclined to engage. Prajāpati asks the demons to reject their natural 
desires. Eliot’s poem has a similar intent, but it focuses on acts of worldly or sensual 
experience: 
Dayadhvam: I have heard the key 
Turn in the door once and turn once only 
We think of the key, each in his prison 
Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison 
Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours 
Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus. (411-16) 
Eliot describes a self-imposed prison of human isolation and loneliness. The subject’s 
thought of the key, or the thought of freedom, paradoxically ensures that one remains in 
prison. In his notes to the poem, he cites F. H. Bradley in order to suggest the difficulties 
of human communication: “My external sensations are no less private to myself than are 
my thoughts or feelings. In either case my experience falls within my own circle.” 
Bradley argues that one’s experience of the physical world is just as individual as his 
inner thoughts and thus cannot be communicated. By linking the self-imposed prison to 
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the epistemological challenges described by Bradley, Eliot insists that the experience of 
the senses cannot be shared and thus isolates the modern individual. 
 By using “Damyata,” or control, Eliot imagines a future moment in which one 
might be able to gain control of the self: 
Damyata: The boat responded 
Gaily, to the hand expert with sail and oar 
The sea was calm, your heart would have responded 
Gaily, when invited, beating obedient 
To controlling hands. (418-22) 
For Eliot, desire must be controlled in order to avoid the barren and fruitless outcomes 
seen throughout the poem. The boat, Eliot’s symbol of control, rides upon the water. The 
subject is between the realms of air and sea, not prone to the dangers of either; the image 
portrays an escape from the risk of drowning described earlier in the poem. The subject 
controls himself, but the passage also suggests that he yields control to an external force. 
In light of Eliot’s later conversion to Anglicanism, this surrender is significant to those 
critics attentive to biographical facts, but it is important to realize in either case that the 
subject must relinquish personal desire. 
 In The Waste Land, Eliot conceives of a symbolic process through which desire 
finds expression, not in actions taken in the world nor through sensual satisfaction but 
through its redirection. The poem is a reorganization of desire, withdrawing it from the 
external world and instead allowing for its manifestation through the practice of poetry. 
Poetry has a genuine and affirmative project. In his essay “The Frontiers of Criticism,” 
Eliot argues that “to understand a poem it is also necessary [. . .] that we should endeavor 
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to grasp what poetry is aiming to be” (122). A poem, for Eliot, is the possibility of action, 
a thing with “aims.” Eliot’s view of poetry, therefore, is teleological rather than inert. The 
Waste Land, from this perspective, has potential energy rather than a static content that it 
communicates. The poem’s energy is realized when the reader encounters the poem:  
I suspect, in fact, that a good deal of the value of an interpretation is – that it 
should be my own interpretation. There are many things, perhaps, to know about 
this poem, or that, many facts about which scholars can instruct me which will 
help me avoid definite mis-understanding; but a valid interpretation, I believe, 
must be at the same time an interpretation of my own feelings when I read it. 
(127) 
The energies in which the poem traffics are, to some degree, the reader’s feelings. But 
more importantly, the text elicits the reader’s feelings. In some ways, this is basic 
Aristotelian criticism: tragedies elicit the fear and pity of their audiences, and texts makes 
these emotions possible.  
However, Eliot proceeds beyond Aristotle by claiming for poetry an important 
relation to the poet’s emotion. Though he famously espoused a theory of “impersonal” 
poetry, he nevertheless evinces a poetic practice based on psychological energy. In “The 
Frontiers of Criticism,” he quotes from Carl Jung’s essay “On Psychic Energy” to explain 
how poems operate: “The energic viewpoint on the other hand is in essence final; the 
event is traced from effect to cause on the assumption that energy forms the essential 
basis of changes in phenomena” (qtd. in “Frontiers” 122). Jung’s theory allows Eliot to 
focus on the effect of poetry as an expression of energy. Eliot quotes Shakespeare’s “Full 
fathom five they father lies” and Shelley’s “To the Moon” (“Art thou pale for weariness / 
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Of climbing heaven and gazing on the earth”) as examples of poetry that he understands 
“without explanation” (129). His reason for claiming to understand these lines is based on 
the emotional energy they make possible: “My best reason, perhaps, for believing that I 
am not deluded in thinking that I understand such poetry [. . .] is that these two poems 
give me as keen a thrill when I repeat them to-day as they did fifty years ago” (129). 
Such poems allow Eliot an aesthetic experience that approaches—but stands in place 
of—the sensual. It is noteworthy that these two passages are concerned with unbridgeable 
distances, such as the vast emptiness between the moon and the earth: two objects that 
can never come together. Like Donne’s bracelet and bone or Dante’s nearly embracing 
shades—but also like the irrecoverable pasts of Marie and the Hyacinth girl, the image of 
typist alone in her room and the clerk in the unlit stair, the image of rock and no water, 
and the refining fire of purgatory—Eliot raises the impossibility of consummation to an 
aesthetic experience in its own right. 
 
Notes 
1 Quotations from The Waste Land are from Collected Poems, 1909-1962 unless 
otherwise noted and will be cited by line number parenthetically in my text. These are 
lines 402-06. 
2 Critics often approach Eliot’s urban content as material for biographical analysis 
or simply to point to the physical landmarks that appear in the poem. A provocative 
exception is Hugh Kenner, who sees Eliot’s process of composition as emphasizing “the 
urban apocalypse, the great City dissolved into a desert” (46). One aspect of Kenner’s 
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dissolution is the “unreal automation of Love,” which he suggestively associates with 
Plato’s concept of ideal forms but does not develop further. 
3 Robert Canary provides an admirable survey of the range of interpretations of 
Tiresias and the question of his importance to the poem. He quite correctly dismisses as 
overburdened those studies that attempt to read the entire poem through Tiresias’s 
perspective, but in doing so he rejects an important question: Why does Eliot choose 
Tiresias? Canary responds to an essay by Michael Hancher by pointing out that Hancher 
fails to explain why Tiresias’s perspective must guide the entire poem: “This connection 
of Tiresias with the problems of solipsism and skepticism may help explain Tiresias’ 
presence in the poem and [Eliot’s] note, but does not, as Hancher seems to assume, 
require that Tiresias be the protagonist” (99). Canary is not convinced that Hancher 
provides a good enough rationale for Tiresias as an overarching narrator or protagonist, 
but he doesn’t fully investigate other claims about Tiresias. While Hancher’s essay surely 
has its shortcomings, Canary does not offer a competing explanation. Instead, he turns 
from the question in order to praise a number of essays that dismiss Tiresias entirely. It is 
as if he finds the whole question of Tiresias misguided, a red herring. This strategy does 
little to help elucidate, at the very least, the scene in which Tiresias appears, and why 
Eliot places such emphasis upon him. 
4 Some critics maintain that Tiresias engages in prurient sexual behavior by 
watching the sexual encounter. Sharon Stockton, for instance, argues that “Tiresias 
remains voyeuristically apart from those he watches, enabling a flirtatious association 
with rape that remains essentially private and powerfully sovereign” (378). This view 
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overlooks the fact that Tiresias cannot, in fact, see, nor does he seem to gain either a 
sense of enjoyment or any noticeable power. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ECSTASY OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION IN H.D.’S TRILOGY 
In End to Torment, her memoir of her complex relationship with Ezra Pound, 
H.D. recounts her birth as an imagist poet: 
“But Dryad,” (in the Museum tea room), “this is poetry.” He slashed with a 
pencil. “Cut this out, shorten this line. ‘Hermes of the Ways’ is a good title. I’ll 
send this to Harriet Monroe of Poetry. Have you a copy? Yes? Then we can send 
this, or I’ll type it when I get back. Will this do?” And he scrawled “H.D. 
Imagiste” at the bottom of the page. (18) 
Looking at H.D.’s writing, Pound saw a confluence of poetic visions, recognized the 
similarities between his emerging poetic theory and her stark presentation of natural 
images. Their respective projects are related in rejecting the link between desire and the 
world. I argue that modernists organize desire around the self, containing rather than 
releasing it. This general tendency, however, manifests in various forms throughout the 
modernist era. In Pound’s imagism, for instance, the subject is able to metamorphose 
external objects in order to freeze desire. H.D.’s imagist works differ from Pound’s in 
that the self is destroyed by the world: the processes of nature, such as night, wind, or 
winter, abolish the subject. Paradoxically, however, H.D.’s subject desires this 
destruction, finding within it the potential for transformation. In this chapter, I will show 
that H.D.’s poetry develops from these Imagist lyrics of the end of desire into longer 
poems that transform desire into spiritual energy. The external world is still destructive, 
but the later H.D. conceives of a resilient and transformative subject who can reach 
spiritual heights. 
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H.D.’s imagist poems, like Pound’s, are clear and concise. They often present 
images of natural objects such as flowers or fruit without ornament or excessive 
comment. Yet it must be observed that she typically focuses on the destructive force of 
nature or its inevitable decay rather than its capacity for growth and renewal. Flowers, 
leaves, or fruit are left to the processes of a natural world that ultimately destroys them. 
“Evening,” for example, describes the passing of day into night with special attention to 
shadows and the effect of darkness on flowers: 
The cornel-buds are still white, 
but shadows dart 
from the cornel-roots— 
black creeps from root to root, 
each leaf 
cuts another leaf on the grass, 
shadow seeks shadow, 
then both leaf 
and leaf-shadow are lost.1 
In this poem, the natural world promises destruction. Nature is the movement of shadow 
over its objects, the creeping of utter blackness; each day proceeds into an evening in 
which the drama of shadows results in a necessary loss. The first four quoted lines end 
with the “t” sound, concluding each line in harsh closure. Adjacent stresses such as 
“bláck créeps” and “éach léaf” create emphatic, spondee-like punctuations, and the 
inevitability of cutting is made clear by the fact that “each leaf,” as a line of poetry, is 
itself cut short even in this short-lined context. The sharpness of H.D.’s presentation 
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partly relies on the savagery of nature, its ability to annihilate. “Night,” another poem that 
dramatizes such natural obliteration, finalizes the transformation of the flower: 
O night, 
you take the petals 
of the roses in your hand, 
but leave the stark core 
of the rose 
to perish on the branch. (15-20) 
Again the flower is subject to the destructive force of nature, which is unforgiving in its 
cycles. The personified nature refrains from delivering a killing stroke, but this 
paradoxically heightens the poem’s sinister effect by leaving the “stárk córe” (another 
example of consecutive stresses) to perish, inevitably, by an unseen but irresistible force. 
Both of these poems proceed as direct description, neither naming nor developing 
a poetic speaker. The human is thoroughly absent. One way to compensate for this 
reduced human role is to read the flowers as metaphors for people, in which case the 
certain destruction coming to the objects in nature is also destined for human beings. The 
poems become dramatizations of a human experience, a recognition of mortality. When a 
speaker is present, he or she usually expresses these finalities. This metaphorical reading 
is especially available in “Mid-day,” a companion piece to “Evening” and “Night.” Here, 
H.D. delivers the natural image through an overt poetic speaker: 
A slight wind shakes the seed-pods— 
my thoughts are spent 
as the black seeds. 
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My thoughts tear me, 
I dread their fever. 
I am scattered in its whirl. 
I am scattered like 
the hot shrivelled seeds. (5-12) 
In this case, the struggles of the human speaker and the seeds are meshed together, 
sharing a similar fate. The subject is governed by the vicissitudes of nature. The wind 
shakes loose the seeds, and the speaker observes that the process is similar to the way her 
thoughts are lost to an inhospitable environment. The inevitability of destruction ties 
together nature and the speaker. 
 This poem is less Imagistic than the other two precisely because the speaker’s 
concerns are so plain and obtrusive. One recalls T. E. Hulme’s complaint about romantic 
poetry: “I object to the sloppiness which doesn’t consider that a poem is a poem unless it 
is moaning or whining about something or other. I always think in this connection with 
the last line of a poem of John Webster’s which ends with a request I cordially endorse: 
‘End your moan and come away’” (“Romanticism” 126). This is part of Hulme’s larger 
argument about romantic poetry’s tendency to reach for the infinite rather than recognize, 
as classical poets do, that the self is inevitably finite. In fact, Hulme constructs a theory of 
modern poetics based on the notion that writers in the early twentieth century were 
beginning to reject romanticism in favor of a more limited concept of the self. In 
“Evening” and “Night,” H.D. refuses to recruit nature to access the infinite; instead, 
nature itself establishes the boundaries of the natural object. Hulme suggests that such 
writing promotes a “dry hardness” inimical to the romantic attitude (126). “Mid-day” 
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threatens to lose its hardness and dryness because it plunges into the subjective infinitude 
suggested by the speaker’s complaints. But the poem is perhaps saved, from Hulme’s 
perspective, by its narrative conclusion: the subject ultimately perishes as a hard, dry, and 
finite seed among the rocks. H.D.’s speaker is not infinite but must find a context for 
herself in the world. Though there is a great poplar at the end, against which the speaker 
contrasts the perishing seed, she does not possess an endless power to exceed her finite 
circumstances. 
 Hulme’s declaration that “the great aim [of poetry] is accurate, precise and 
definite description” (132) encourages an understanding of the world as comprised of 
concrete and authentic objects. This conception then forbids an expansive, infinite 
subjective spirit. Objects are impermeable in Hulme’s theory. Imagist poetry focuses on 
the dramatic actions of these discrete objects. H.D.’s “Storm” relates the violence of the 
wind as it devastates the landscape: 
You crash over the trees, 
you crack the live branch— 
the branch is white, 
the green crushed, 
each leaf is rent like split wood. (1-5) 
The poem describes the action of the event rather than characterizing it by using nouns; 
rather than using words such as “rain,” “lightning,” or “thunder,” H.D. addresses the 
storm directly in the second-person “you” and follows its actions. She presents the storm 
in its “crash” and “crack,” concise and immediate actions rather than things overburdened 
with the infinite. The poem is stark and restrained in its metaphysical overtones, 
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especially in contrast to a romantic poem such as Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind.” In 
Shelley’s ode the self is necessarily implicated in every aspect of the wind, and in fact the 
poem is essentially an exercise in finding the subject in the natural world and vice versa: 
Make me thy lyre, even as the forest is: 
What if my leaves are falling like its own! 
The tumult of thy mighty harmonies 
 
Will take from both a deep, autumnal tone, 
Sweet though in sadness. Be thou, Spirit fierce, 
My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one! (57-62) 
Shelley infuses the wind with a spiritual energy that transcends mere mechanical action. 
The poet seeks to make its power coextensive with his own and conceives of himself as a 
fellow spirit of nature. Because the poem is driven by this wish, it ends by invoking the 
spring that will follow: “If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?” (70). The poet 
aspires not just to be the leaf or the wind but wishes to be infused with the spirit of 
nature. 
 The implications of Hulme’s theory highlight an important difference between the 
underlying principles of romantic and modernist poetry: the romantic poets conceive of 
the infinite, but the poetry itself reveals their striving for it rather than its ultimate 
realization. Shelley’s poem, for instance, is a prayer rather than a description of 
transformation. The poem expresses a plea, a wish that a putative spirit infinite in scope 
might be released by a kindred natural spirit. But this release never precisely occurs. 
Shelley spends much of the poem imploring the wind to hear his appeal but never 
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actualizes the spirit in himself. This is not meant to diminish Shelley’s poem or 
romanticism in general, nor should it undercut the importance of infinitude in our 
conception of romanticisim. It is, rather, a crucial step in recognizing what is important 
about infinitude for romanticism: it sets the direction of desire; it organizes desire. The 
structure of subjectivity, the conception of self, is not boundaryless; it is the 
circumscribed in search of infinitude. Romanticism is not infinitude but rather the urge 
for it. 
If one reads romantic poetry in terms of this desire, the complementary question 
for modernism becomes: how does modern poetry respond to the desire for infinitude? 
Hulme is correct to suggest that modernism is cognizant of limits upon the self, but he 
writes as if this limitation somehow abolishes the wish for infinitude. In other words, he 
attempts to correct what he sees as the excesses of romanticism, but his negative reigning 
in is not balanced by a positive project for modernism. The intent is merely to constrict. 
He writes, for instance, of “the concentrated state of mind, the grip over oneself which is 
necessary in the actual expression of what one sees” (“Romanticism” 133). But he does 
not describe the impulse underlying this grip. According to Hulme, concentrated effort 
limits the subject. This is an important point because Hulme is not arguing that we are 
naturally disposed to anti-romantic, limiting tendencies. He argues instead that we must 
be more disciplined against what is a natural impulse for infinitude. In other words, he 
contends that romantics had insufficient means or methods for counteracting expansive 
desire. Modernism, from this perspective, is the imposition of a new discipline.  
H.D.’s “Oread” provides a possible reorganization of the desire for infinitude by 
imagining a self-canceling union with nature:  
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Whirl up, sea— 
whirl your pointed pines, 
splash your great pines 
on our rocks, 
hurl your green over us, 
cover us with your pools of fir. (1-6) 
The poem is striking in many ways and is justly famous for its concentrated and 
evocative power. But critics often respond to it in purely formal ways, using it to 
exemplify Imagist techniques. “Oread” provides an intriguing and complex notion of 
epistemology by mixing two natural objects so completely as to merge them in human 
perception and in this fusion creates a less familiar meaning: the wood nymph, or Oread, 
is swept up and merged with the oceanic forest. The ocean threatens to dissolve the 
speaker, to cover and obscure her. However, the dissolution does not take place within 
the poem. The covering, dissolving, or merging has not yet occurred. Much like Shelley’s 
“Ode to the West Wind,” the poem reads like a prayer and for the same reason reveals 
something about the desire underlying and informing the poem. Rather than wishing to be 
carried along on the wind, and thereby take on some of the power of nature, H.D.’s 
speaker wishes to be covered or perhaps dissolved by the oceanic forces of the world. 
Hulme points out that “the romantic attitude seems to crystallise in verse round 
metaphors of flight” (120), and Shelley’s speaker is indeed held aloft by this notion of 
flight. H.D., however, describes a dream of burial or dissolution. Again driven by verbs 
deployed in short imperative clauses, the poem demands action and imagines a coastline 
that brings together sea, forest, and rocks. But this is a grinding boundary, making 
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possible the disintegration that the speaker desires. The poem is not simply the passive 
presentation of nature’s destruction, as in “Evening,” “Night,” and “Storm.” It is, rather, a 
complex interplay of the subject, the powerfully destructive natural world, and the 
subject’s desire for dissolution. The speaker wishes to be covered, to enter the oceanic 
forest, to become undifferentiated. We have returned to the romanticism of Shelley’s 
west wind, but what distinguishes the two poems is the nature of the subject’s infinitude. 
Shelley’s speaker would be infinitely realized, while H.D.’s subject would be infinitely 
dispersed; the one is infinitely alive, while the other is infinitely dead. 
 H.D. creates an intense paradox in this poem, however; it is a poem about death 
that is ardently alive. “Oread” is a stunning poem for the clarity of the speaker’s desire to 
give up desire. The poem points beyond the negative, beyond the fact of dissolution. 
Though any positive content is missing, the breathless passion of the invocation prompts 
us to agree with Jacob Korg that “[n]early every line of Hilda Doolittle’s poetry seems to 
be spoken in reverential tones as part of a pagan rite” (135). There is a hint of union 
within the dissolution. In her later poetry, by contrast, H.D. insists on the subject’s finite 
hardness, its inevitable persistence in the face of destruction rather than its dissolution 
into the infinitude of death. 
 H.D. announces the development of this concept of finitude in 1919 in her “Notes 
on Thought and Vision”: “Three states or manifestations of life: body, mind, over-mind. 
Aim of men and women of highest development is equilibrium, balance, growth of the 
three at once” (17). With this statement, H.D. reveals a concern with the body and 
growth. While destruction will continue to play an important role in her poetic practice, it 
is subsumed in her theorizing by the overriding concept of growth. Whereas the early 
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poems portray disembodied desire, her later works develop a concern for the body. What 
marks H.D.’s unique concept of the body, however, is its potential connectivity to the 
objects of the world. It pulls mind, world, and desire together. Her metaphor for this is 
the jellyfish, with its long tentacles that join the body to the world. Here she posits a 
“love-region” of the body: “The love-region is excited by the appearance or beauty of the 
loved one, its energy not dissipated in physical relation, takes on its character of mind, 
becomes this womb-brain or love-brain that I have visualised as a jelly-fish in the body” 
(22). From this perspective, thought does not begin in the mind. Instead, thought is 
produced by the “love-region” of the body when it interacts with an object in the outside 
world. The mind is dependent upon excitations from without, and these excitations are 
specifically sensual. 
 But H.D. openly struggles with the jellyfish metaphor. Later she posits that “the 
body, I suppose, like a lump of coal, fulfills its highest function when it is being 
consumed” (47). So, although the body gives rise to thought and vision, it does so as part 
of a transformation. From H.D.’s perspective, the body does not communicate these 
excitations; instead, it gives itself up to them, transforming substance to energy. This 
creative transformation is “the process whereby the heat of the physical body is 
transmuted to this other, this different form, concentrated, ethereal, which we refer to in 
common speech as spirit” (48). In this sense, creativity is not an intellectual pursuit as 
much as it is a conversion of the body’s energy to a vitality that H.D. describes as 
spiritual. And in the same sense, subjectivity is not defined by a soft, amorphous body but 
by the energy it creates through transformation. She describes it as a form of 
concentration: 
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I imagine it has often been said that the body is like an oyster and the soul or 
spirit, a pearl. But today I saw for myself that the jelly-fish over my head had 
become concentrated. I saw that the state of mind I had before symbolised as a 
jelly-fish was just as well symbolised differently. That is, all the spiritual energy 
seemed concentrated in the middle of my forehead, inside my skull, and it was 
small and giving out a very soft light, but not scattered light, light concentrated in 
itself as the light of a pearl would be. (51) 
In substituting metaphors, H.D. exchanges expansion for contraction. She sees the 
essential part of the self as intensely concentrated, a tight and circumscribed unity from 
which its power emerges. She places this finite and limited pearl within the skull, itself a 
hard exterior that anticipates her structural concept of subjectivity in the Trilogy poems. 
Before discussing exteriors and subjectivity in Trilogy, however, it is worth 
gaining from “Notes on Thought and Vision” a sense of the dynamism that H.D. 
associates with self-conception. Structure without dynamism provides only a one-sided 
perspective of the human condition. For H.D. the contraction and inwardness that mark 
subjectivity do not necessarily isolate the self from the outside world. Rather, an intense 
and minute contemplation of objects can lead to a special kind of self-completion. She 
tells the story of Lo-fu, a poet who meditates upon a fruit tree. He sees it first as a whole 
object, a complete and distinct thing. As he examines it closer, focusing on a leaf, he 
begins to recognize in it the wider world: “And when he knew the skeleton of that leaf, 
the rivers, as it were, furrowing that continent, his mind was content. But it had only 
begun its search. Between each river there lay a fair green field—many, many little fields 
each with an individuality, each with some definite feature setting it apart from every 
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other little plot” (44). The skeleton of the leaf is analogous to the rivers running over the 
earth and the small patches of green represent the fields. The features of the physical 
world are, for H.D., replicated in one of nature’s smallest accomplishments, the leaf. In 
one sense, this shift between orders of magnitude signals a union of the natural world; it 
smooths over a potential unlikeness, small- versus large-scale, by providing a conceptual 
unity. The complexity of the world is thus diminished; the rough edges of difference 
become aligned, and the tension of dissonance abates in meditative comprehension. 
Along with this type of realization, however, comes the idea of divergence or 
separation that shapes H.D.’s concept of the self. She continues the story of Lo-fu: “Then 
he went inside and in his little cool room out of the sun he closed his eyes. He saw that 
branch but more clearly, more vividly than ever. That branch was his mistress now, his 
love” (44). For H.D., the poet paradoxically becomes closer to and more invested in the 
world by removing himself from it. He goes inside, thereby creating a boundary, a line 
that demarcates inside and outside. This self, this “inside,” is finite in a way that the 
romantic subject is not, for it exists as a contraction, separation, and isolation rather than 
merging with the objects it encounters. Nature still provides the impetus for spiritual 
growth and self-understanding, but, in H.D.’s narrative, sensual perception, such as the 
sublimity so frequently described in romantic poetry, is secondary to the poet’s mental 
reflection apart from physical stimulus. This separation, and the boundary it establishes, 
defines a discrete self that engages in a distinct manner of intercourse with the world. 
Passions are separated from their objects. The subject is denied material access: “Here, in 
his little room, the world had ceased to exist” (44-45). Interaction with the world, then, is 
no longer tactile or sensual but conceptual. Desire maintains boundaries rather than 
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merging subjects with objects. Like Pound in his early imagist poems, H.D. redirects 
desire from the world to the self. Also like Pound, she shifts to metaphors of birth and 
self-definition rather than romanticized mergings with nature or the infinitude elicited by 
natural sublimity. Modernists consistently forge the self in terms of boundaries rather 
than mergings, and the world must be in some sense denied in order to make this happen. 
For H.D., the self is a construct that emerges from its structural divergence from the 
world. 
H.D., who takes such care to describe the objects and processes of nature, in fact 
uses these descriptions to circumscribe the self. She completes the story of Lo-fu by 
abolishing the leaf as leaf and constructing a distinct and complete self divorced from the 
world: 
To him that apple branch, outside in the orchard, existed as an approach to 
something else. As the body of a man’s mistress might be said to exist as the 
means of approach to something else, that is as a means or instrument of feeling 
or happiness, so the branch in the orchard existed to Lo-fu as the means of 
attaining happiness, as a means of completing himself, as a means of approach to 
ecstasy. (45 emphasis added) 
An object comes under intense scrutiny, and the poet’s mind is moved by it toward a 
greater understanding but only by retreating from the sensual world and entering the 
sensuality created in the mind. This is a desire for unity rather than object-desire in the 
traditional sense, unless the object is defined as the self, a finite unity marked by the 
possibility of ecstasy within its own concentrated field, a hermetic isolation that eludes 
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the physical world. “Notes on Thought and Vision” imagines that self-creation admits 
ecstasies emerging from the mind rather than through physical contact with the world.  
That the world might be sensually denied in order to achieve a self of 
concentrated unity, however, underlies H.D.’s theoretical exploration of subjectivity and 
the creative act. The challenge in her Trilogy poems is to consider the notion of finitude 
and unity against the backdrop of a historical situation that does not admit such ideal 
conceptions. In Trilogy, written in response to the bombing of London during the Second 
World War, H.D. contemplates the construction and maintenance of this finite self in the 
face of physical dangers that threaten its sanctity. The world is no longer Lo-fu’s apple 
blossom but rather a rubble of destroyed objects. The poems utilize images of reduction 
and persistence to construct a unified and finite self. The rigid body survives in a 
demolished world. She finds that the skeleton, the rigid center of a human body, the 
symbol of death and persistence, gives rise to greater intensities of spiritual feeling than 
any other. From the destruction of London during the Blitz in The Walls Do Not Fall to 
the consecration of Christ’s birth at the close of The Flowering of the Rod, H.D’s Trilogy 
follows the transformation of desire from the reality of destruction to the possibility of 
spiritual rebirth. 
 
H.D. opens The Walls Do Not Fall by comparing Karnak, the ancient Egyptian 
temple complex, with London during the Second World War. Each place has been 
ravaged, one by time and the other by war: 
there, as here, ruin opens 
the tomb, the temple; enter, 
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there as here, there are no doors: 
 
the shrine lies open to the sky, 
the rain falls, here, there 
sand drifts; eternity endures. (I.1.10-16) 
H.D. calls attention to the validity of her poetic superimposition of Karnak and London. 
She equates “here” and “there” so forcefully, in fact, that it disrupts (by over-emphasis) 
the normal working of metaphorical language. Rather than appreciating the poet’s 
comparison of two objects or the surprising commonalities of two sets of particulars, the 
subject of the comparison becomes comparability itself. The devastated buildings in both 
Karnak and London exemplify the principle that destruction comes to all things. The 
comparison urges one to consider the nature of destruction, not as the ruin of particular 
places but as a continuous and irresistible force. The intensity of H.D.’s act of 
comparison distances the subject from the natural world in a way similar to Lo-fu’s 
retreat indoors. The contemplative poet cordons off the external and considers how the 
self might be conceived or completed distinct from such a world. 
The first realization about the nature of the self in a world of destruction is that 
the self is paradoxically resilient and open. Buildings are destroyed but never fully 
decimated. The walls do not fall, though roofs and doors lie in rubble. This means that 
the act of destruction is more a transformation than an erasure. H.D.’s project in many 
ways is to explore the possibilities of this transformation. Destruction changes the 
possible manifestations and actions of the self. She suggests that the most significant of 
these new attributes is openness: “ruin opens / the tomb” and “the shrine lies open.” But 
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it is important to note that this is not mere openness to the elements; it is not an invitation 
to greater commerce with the physical world. It is rather the perceptiveness to a spiritual 
force that transcends the mundane: 
ruin everywhere, yet as the fallen roof 
leaves the sealed room 
open to the air, 
 
so, through our desolation, 
thoughts stir, inspiration stalks us 
through gloom: 
 
unaware, Spirit announces the Presence (I.1.16-22) 
The devastation, the fallen roofs and unhinged doors, make possible a subsequent 
inspiration and bring us closer to “Spirit.” These opening stanzas are filled with 
assonance (such as those in “ruin,” “roof,” “room,” “through,” and “gloom”) rather than 
the hard consonants one might expect in a destruction narrative. Instead of the harsh stops 
of guttural k’s or g’s, the flowing vowel sounds convey space, continuity, and motion, 
especially as they are accompanied by so many words that end in consonants like m and n 
that linger rather than end abruptly. In the face of destruction, H.D. insists on movement 
and growth. 
 Through her visual imagery and sound effects, H.D. suggests a two-fold spatial 
character to the subject. First, the subject is transformed rather than destroyed by the 
violence of World War Two. Though reduced in some ways, the subject retains a hard 
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and essential core. Second, this transformation opens up a vertical direction in which the 
self moves toward spiritual fulfillment. In the first, the essential core of the body is akin 
to the concentration of the pearl in “Notes on Thought and Vision.” The body is reduced 
to the structural “walls” that uphold it: 
the bone-frame was made for 
no such shock knit within terror, 
yet the skeleton stood up to it: 
 
the flesh? it was melted away, 
the heart burnt out, dead ember, 
tendons, muscles shattered, outer husk dismembered, 
 
yet the frame held: 
we passed the flame: we wonder 
what saved us? what for? (I.1.43-51) 
The violence of war metaphorically melts away the flesh, but the skeletal frame remains. 
Persistence exists alongside the destruction. Like the temples at Karnak and the London 
buildings torn down by bombs, the body is, for H.D., a structure that signifies persistence 
and openness, but she celebrates the rigid skeleton rather than the soft and fleshy body. 
The heart is like the flesh; both are soft and susceptible to the destructive heat of the 
world. In this environment the heart is an “ember,” which H.D. then incorporates into the 
word “dismemberment.” The heart is paradoxically implicated in its own discorporation. 
H.D. concentrates the notion of finitude down to the “bone-frame.” The rhythmic phrase 
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“téndons, múscles, sháttered” chisels away the exterior, leaving the skeleton. But for 
H.D. the skeleton signals the persistence of the self and the source of renewal and growth. 
Though merely bones, we are nevertheless “saved” as such. She asks “what saved us?” 
and the answer relies on a rigid, internal, and finite self. 
 In section two, H.D. points out that “Good was smug and fat” (I.2.4) while “Evil 
was active in the land” (I.2.1), suggesting that the “good” is in need of a destructive 
renewal. H.D. pursues a similar point in Tribute to Freud, which she composed 
contemporaneously with the Trilogy poems. Here, the destroyed body suggests the 
process of getting underneath the ego to the unconscious within. The process of 
psychoanalysis must first shatter the self: “[The patient] must clear away his own rubbish, 
before his particular stream, his personal life, could run clear of obstruction into the great 
river of humanity, hence to the sea of super-human perfection, the ‘Absolute,’ as Socrates 
or Plato called it” (Tribute 84). In her descriptions of destruction and her understanding 
of the psychoanalytic process, H.D. imagines breaking down and clearing away an 
inessential exterior. From this perspective, the clearing away of the self is a form of 
revelation, allowing one to become open to the “Absolute.” The metaphors of 
psychoanalysis, such as the conscious and the unconscious that underlies it (or manifest 
content and the latent content that underlies it), are presented here in terms of the body: 
the flesh, heart, and muscles cover the “bone-frame” underlying it. As in her earlier 
poetry, H.D. insists on the inevitability of destruction, but she also recognizes that one 
must desire this destruction as a way of uncovering the self. 
H.D. insists, however, that desire for destruction alone does not make spiritual 
development possible. Instead, one must recognize what outlasts such a destruction of the 
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self. She works to obliterate the inessential and recover the potential within that which 
remains. In doing so, she repeatedly employs a hard-soft binary, valuing the hard as 
opposed to the soft. In the first section, for example, she describes a wall relief found at 
the temple site: 
still the Luxor bee, chick and hare 
pursue unalterable purpose 
 
in green, rose-red, lapis; 
they continue to prophesy 
from the stone papyrus (I.1.5-9) 
Because it has been carved into the stone, the wall relief lasts through the centuries. In a 
time of destruction, H.D. values the ability of this artwork to endure. The individual bee, 
chick, and hare have passed away, but the stone retains their unalterable essence. The 
hard and unchanging are more lasting and meaningful than the soft and mutable. The 
artistic endeavor is ultimately tied to this chiseling search for essentials and is, at the 
same time, an aspect of the essential itself. Despite the extreme distance in time between 
the modern visitor to Karnak and the faded Egyptian civilization that constructed the 
shrine, striving is understandable across time. Art is capable of portraying the truths of 
experience, which are true precisely because they persist through time. The striving of the 
animals and their unalterable purpose are captured by the striving of artists to represent 
them, and this creative urge energizes us even in the face of destruction and is related to 
the inspiration offered from above.  
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It is also noteworthy that H.D. is inspired by Egyptian art, which is known for its 
hard and abstract appearance. H.D.’s valuation of the hard over the soft recalls Hulme’s 
insistence that the primary features of modern art must be hardness, sharpness, and 
angularity. Hulme’s observations are not meant to chart the developments of art history 
but rather to understand within artistic production one’s manner of relating to the world. 
Hulme argues that the general attitude underlying culture and art since the Renaissance 
had been marked by aesthetic empathy, naturalism, and organicism until the early 
twentieth century, when it tended toward abstraction, geometric shapes, and hardness. 
Drawing upon the work of Wilhelm Worringer, Hulme explains that the inclination 
toward abstraction and hard geometrical shapes, such as might be seen in H.D.’s 
skeleton, arises from the artist’s unsettled and uncertain relationship with the world: “In 
art this state of mind results in a desire to create a certain abstract geometrical shape, 
which, being durable and permanent shall be a refuge from the flux and impermanence of 
outside nature” (“Modern Art” 86). The abstract object does not imitate the external 
object; rather, it has been set in relief, crystallized, put in stasis. Worringer describes the 
process as “taking the individual thing of the external world out of its arbitrariness and 
seeming fortuitousness, of eternalising it by approximation to abstract forms and, in this 
manner, of finding a point of tranquillity and a refuge from appearances” (16). In both of 
these explanations, the artist’s preference for different forms is related not to the imitation 
of nature but to the difficult experience of being in the flux and uncertainty of the world. 
Hulme’s adoption of this idea acknowledges that the twentieth century was a time 
of such uncertainty and anxiety and suggests that its general attitude therefore turns to 
abstract art. That is, he suggests that modern artists seek satisfaction in abstraction due to 
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an apprehensive relation with the world. Egyptian art, which H.D. sees on the walls of the 
Karnak temple, represents this abstract perspective. For H.D., the wall relief symbolizes, 
in its hardness and abstractness, the possibility of enduring in a disintegrating world. The 
possibility proceeds along two axes: first, H.D. turns this perspective inward, 
contemplating a new conception of the self, its structure hard and abstract rather than soft 
and organic; second, H.D. posits that the artistic endeavor itself emerges from this desire 
for abstraction. 
 H.D.’s notion of the self centers on the creation of one’s hard exterior and the 
discovery of one’s unalterable purpose. In section four, H.D. utilizes a sea-shell metaphor 
to describe this self-creation: 
There is a spell, for instance, 
in every sea-shell: 
 
continuous, the sea-thrust 
is powerless against coral, 
 
bone, stone, marble 
hewn from within by that craftsman, 
 
the shell-fish. (I.4.1-7) 
In order to survive against the eroding waves, one must have a strong exterior. The 
necessary hardness is reinforced by the interior rhyme “bone, stone,” with its strong, one-
syllable repeated vowel, and even in the consonance of “coral” and “marble.” The self 
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must close and present a hard exterior if it is to survive the “invasion of the limitless, / 
ocean-weight” (I.4.25-26). The self is defined by its limits. But H.D.’s ontological vision 
is not entirely physical. She ends this section, which urges us to “be firm” (I.4.38) and 
“be indigestible” (I.4.42), with a move beyond the material self: “living within, / you 
beget, self-out-of-self, // selfless, / that pearl-of-great-price” (I.4.43-46). If one is reduced 
to the physical essentials, the spiritual realm, that which exceeds the self, is suddenly 
available. For H.D., creation and the finite self are intimately related.  
Starting in section six, H.D. shifts to a worm/butterfly metaphor in order to 
represent this limited self as a means to achieve life, growth, and transformation. Section 
six is, in a sense, an adventure narrative in which the worm, the figure of nascent 
subjectivity, narrowly escapes the physical dangers of the world: “persistence: I escaped, 
spider-snare, / bird-claw, scavenger bird-beak” (I.6.3-4). Nature does not promote growth 
but is that from which one must seek protection. H.D. intensifies her presentation of these 
dangers with a string of compound words made of harsh consecutive stresses to describe 
nature: “grass-blade,” “storm-wind,” “rose-thorn,” and “rain-swept” join “bird-claw” and 
“bird-beak” to suggest the jagged processes of nature. Against these dangers, H.D. offers 
the cocoon as the image of the contrast between inside and outside; in the cocoon, the self 
is separated from nature: “for I know how the Lord God / is about to manifest, when I, // 
the industrious worm, / spin my own shroud” (I.6.33-36). The shroud represents spatial 
distance and protection from the world, encasing the worm in a hard exterior. Whereas 
the romantic poets imagine a union of the self within the processes of nature, H.D. 
conceives of the self as arising from the resistance to nature. 
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 Unlike H.D.’s imagist poems of dissolution in nature, Trilogy cocoons the self 
away from nature. She extends the worm/butterfly metaphor through the next several 
sections, and in these she articulates her vision of this transformation. The image gets part 
of its power, paradoxically, from the fact that the cocoon is itself a natural process. The 
transformation that H.D. imagines and toward which she works in Trilogy ultimately 
finds some authority in the natural world. But her method also draws upon the 
supernatural. Section seven compares the horns of gods and goddesses to the antennae of 
butterflies and the crest of the cobra: 
Gods, goddesses 
wear the winged head-dress 
 
of horns, as the butterfly 
antennae, 
 
or the erect king-cobra crest 
to show how the worm turns. (I.7.1-6) 
This comparison overlays the personal transformation with a religious or spiritual 
meaning. Gods and goddesses exceed human capabilities. Through this comparison, the 
butterfly seems similarly endowed with supernatural powers. The body of the worm was 
too earth-bound to achieve the power or wisdom of the gods. The butterfly is more able 
to assume such power, but H.D. suggests that it is through their antennae rather than their 
wings that butterflies become remarkable. This transformation is not inevitable, however; 
H.D. distinguishes between “those who have done their worm-cycle” (I.8.23) and those 
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who have not and cannot understand the insights gained by such a transformation. Poets, 
the “bearers of the secret wisdom” (I.8.9), go through this metamorphosis. Poets are the 
elect, but those who remain unmetamorphosized are not able to value the wisdom of 
poets and the importance of their role in a time of war: 
So we reveal our status 
with twin-horns, disk, erect serpent, 
 
though these or the double-plume or lotus 
are, you now tell us, trivial 
 
intellectual adornment; 
poets are useless (I.8.1-6) 
The poet, as a worm-transformed-to-butterfly, is receptive to a higher and more ancient 
awareness through the “adornment” of its antennae.  
H.D. characterizes this awareness and wisdom in various ways, but in these early 
sections it primarily takes the form of the word. For H.D., the word acts as a vehicle for 
thoughts to enter the world of objects. She rejects the idea that words are non-utilitarian 
and argues that we must understand words in order to see what they conceal (I.8.16-18). 
Words have a revelatory power, and they endure. Repeating her interest in what outlasts 
destruction, she points out that “the stylus, / the palette, the pen, the quill endure” (I.9.2-
3). Alongside the structure of the lasting self, exemplified by hard exteriors, H.D. 
suggests that words are a crucial source of transformative power. She lists the items and 
instruments of writing (books, folio, manuscript, parchment) and investigates the 
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underlying word at the heart of writing. The most important aspect of the word is that it is 
generative. The word is prior to the objects and actions it makes possible: “in the 
beginning / was the Word” (I.10.15-16). For H.D., words bring forth things: 
Without thought, invention, 
you would not have been, O Sword, 
 
without idea and the Word’s mediation, 
you would have remained 
 
unmanifest in the dim dimension 
where thought dwells, 
 
and beyond thought and idea, 
their begetter, 
 
Dream, 
Vision. (I.11.1-10) 
For H.D., words mediate thought and its material inventions. She addresses the sword 
that symbolizes the violence of war and insists that the pen is mightier than the sword, 
primarily because the sword relies on the constructive power of words. But H.D. moves 
beyond the cliché of pen and sword by positing an even earlier impetus to human action: 
dream and vision. Each of these progressions, from sword to word to dream, moves 
farther from the realm of objects and toward psychological meaning. Concepts are the 
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root of all of human endeavor, and they come from the realm of dream. The power of 
dream exceeds the mundane world, which is only dream’s manifestation. The challenge 
H.D. confronts in The Walls Do Not Fall is the violence and destruction of war, 
symbolized by the Sword she addresses here. Her discursus on vision in these lines 
reveals the manifestation of violence as a natural outcome of her dynamic ontological 
framework. That is, the structure of her argument does not undercut violence so much as 
trace it back to the human dream; the human impulse seems, therefore, a violent vision. 
The Sword enacts a prior dream of violence. In fact, the “word” that mediates the dream 
is contained in the word “Sword.” 
 H.D.’s challenge, then, is to imagine how words might purify dream and vision. 
Words take on three characteristics in H.D.’s conception. First, she associates words with 
the gods, who have a special valuation in her work: 
for gods have been smashed before 
 
and idols and their speech is stored 
in man’s very speech, 
 
in the trivial or 
the real dream [. . .] (I.8.24-28) 
This suggests that language is wrapped up in the secret of the gods, that it has spiritual 
powers beyond human measure. Speech of the gods has been broken and spread into 
human speech. Second, words are “magic, indelibly stamped / on the atmosphere 
somewhere, // forever (I.10.9-11). The words written by the poet transcend the 
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degradations of time: “we take them with us // beyond death” (I.10.4-5). Words, though 
they may manifest as the Sword, paradoxically outlast the Sword because they are 
endlessly generative, marked by recurrence and immortality. Finally, the words speak 
louder than destruction: “though there was whirr and roar in the high air / there was a 
Voice louder” (I.12.13-14). The voice, the possibility of speaking, exceeds the power of 
violence. Language, as the power to create anew, transcends any particular instantiation. 
In all these examples, H.D. substitutes the immaterial, or spiritual, for the objective fact, 
as well as substituting the creative for the created.  
Through these early sections, H.D. has carefully developed two positive and 
transformative ideas, exemplified by the shrouded worm and the creative word. But she 
points out that the shrouded subject needs to find a way to complete the transformation or 
it risks stasis. The world threatens to intrude on and disrupt the potential remaking. H.D. 
suggests that moments of disunity may allow us to move outside ourselves through the 
world: 
Yet we, the latter-day twice-born, 
have our bad moments when 
 
dragging the forlorn 
husk of self after us, 
 
we are forced to confess to 
malaise and embarrassment; 
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we pull at this dead shell, 
struggle but we must wait 
 
till the new Sun dries off 
the old-body humours; 
 
awkwardly, we drag this stale 
old will, old volition, old habit 
 
about with us (I.14.1-13). 
The husk of self is empty of the dynamism of contemplation or the creative language of 
the gods. The body is too much an object because it is without the creative will. Its 
sluggish materiality and tension against itself suggest it is no longer the concentration of 
self but rather a division of self. It becomes that against which one acts. It is an old self, 
trudging along with its ossified will, volition, and habit. 
 In this sense, H.D. raises the problem of a concentrated subject that loses its 
ability to transcend its material self. In the face of this problem, she develops a rite that 
enacts creative and spiritual power. The shrouded subject is not just meant to be protected 
from the world; it is meant to transcend it. More important than the concentrated subject 
is the elevating, spiritual force at work in the world. H.D. introduces this force in a 
number of guises, drawing upon her occult erudition, but the primary fact of this force is 
that it appears: “Ra, Osiris, Amen appeared / in a spacious, bare meeting-house” (I.16.1-
2). The problems of the separated husk of self described in sections 14 and 15 receive a 
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sudden answer in the arrival of Amen, indicating the desire to worship and to be reborn in 
the act of worshipping: 
for we must go forward, 
 
we are at the cross-roads, 
the tide is turning; 
 
it uncovers pebbles and shells, 
beautiful yet static, empty 
 
old thought, old convention (I.17.2-7) 
H.D. contrasts forward movement with the stasis of the pebbles and shells at the 
crossroads. These discrete objects are beautiful, but they lack the dynamism she values. 
They are symbols of selves that must be left behind. Again, the closing consonance in 
“pebbles” and “shells” suggest that these static objects are closed to spiritual possibilities. 
Even “beautiful” follows the form of the closing “l” sound; beauty is insufficient to 
achieve the type of transformation toward which H.D. drives. These shells, if they remain 
empty, become old. This passage also invokes the clichés “at the cross-roads” and “the 
tide is turning,” phrases that suggest an important moment of decision, a time when 
things might change direction, but ironically they are old and hackneyed phrases. H.D. 
transforms the clichés by melding them together, by bringing the worshipper to the shore, 
where the road meets the tide. At this juncture, the exhausted selves can be regenerated 
with the “new” fire and the “new” sun: 
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let us go down to the sea, 
 
gather dry sea-weed, 
heap drift-wood, 
 
let us light a new fire 
and in the fragrance 
 
of burnt salt and sea-incense 
chant new paeans to the new Sun 
 
of regeneration; 
we have always worshipped Him, 
 
we have always said, 
forever and ever, Amen. (I.17.2-18) 
This ceremony brings together all of the elements: earth, sea, fire, and the air into which 
all things burn. It is a rite of transformation in which material is converted to energy and 
rises to the sky, creating “fragrance” and “incense.” The sibilance of these two words 
evokes the hissing sound that accompanies fire. Fire, fragrance, and scent also suggest 
immateriality, signifying a move from the mundane to the spiritual. To these expanding 
and elevating scents, H.D. adds the “chant of paeans,” a reference to the power of words 
that contain the remnants of the gods. These words travel to “the new Sun,” which can 
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also be read as the son of God, referring to the “Christos-image” of section 18. Like the 
bombs of the earlier sections, the fire is not destructive but rather transformative; in this 
case it allows “regeneration” or renewal. The pebbles and shells, and indeed all the 
material objects of the world, burn up into the prayer that ends “Amen.” On one level, 
H.D. employs a standard Christian idiom, “forever and ever, Amen,” in order to draw 
upon traditional sacred words that sanctify a Christian prayer. In this sense, “Amen” 
marks the closing of a spiritual communication. However, she also works against the 
Christian “amen” by overlaying it with the Egyptian god Amen, calling attention to an 
even more ancient tradition. What becomes eternal, then, is not a particular spiritual 
tradition but the desire for worship. She alludes to the Biblical phrase “let there be light,” 
but she calls for us to “light a new fire,” instead. H.D. resists a particular instance of 
religious observation and instead uncovers the eternal wish for transformation. 
 H.D. insists upon this human impulse for spiritual rebirth and its important 
relationship to how one conceives of the self. Before the activation of spiritual desire, the 
self is either old and decrepit or broken. The urge for completion occurs through 
openness to the possibility of transcendence. But again H.D. refuses the romantic image 
of the self awash in the natural world. Instead, she returns to the discrete image she 
suggested earlier of the unified self: 
Splintered the crystal of identity, 
shattered the vessel of integrity, 
 
till the Lord Amen, 
paw-er of the ground, 
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bearer of the curled horns, 
bellows from the horizon: 
 
here am I, Amen-Ra (I.21.1-7) 
H.D. begins the first two lines by describing a state of disunity, but then she balances 
each of these lines with what the subject seeks: the splintered seeks identity; the shattered 
seeks integrity. This structure also has a temporal element. One is first splintered and 
shattered then unified in a future identity and integrity.  
The catalyst for this transformation is the appearance of Amen-Ra: “here am I.” 
For H.D., however, the “here” is more important than the “I” that indicates Amen-Ra. 
She begins with the shattered self and then builds to a sudden appearance. “Paw-er,” 
“bearer,” and “bellows” begin with p’s or b’s that burst into sound. H.D. emphasizes 
action over being, or more appropriately, associates being with the necessity of action. 
Amen’s variability also serves to stress the action of being rather than the identity of 
being. Through these few sections, he is Ra, Osiris, Amen, the Sun, Christos, the Holy 
Ghost, and Aries the Ram. Rather than establishing a cohesive mythological figure that 
bestows selfhood upon the subject, H.D. deemphasizes the meaningfulness of Amen’s 
particulars and instead stresses the dynamic role he plays. He is something we say: 
“Amen.” He is the expression of our desire for him. In other words, he is the reflection of 
our wanting. “Amen” is a performative speech act, constituting subjectivity in the 
expression of desire.  
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Though Amen reflects our own wish for selfhood, H.D. shows how radical and, in 
fact, painful such a transformation proves to be. In sections 25 through 29 she introduces 
an image in which the heart is invaded by a seed: 
Amen, 
only just now, 
 
my heart-shell 
breaks open, 
 
though long ago, the phoenix, 
your bennu bird 
 
dropped a grain, 
as of scalding wax (I.25.1-8) 
Earlier in the poem Amen had simply appeared and galvanized the speaker’s spiritual 
desire. The word was used as a closing to the prayer. But here, H.D. begins with “Amen,” 
now the first word in a transformative process. The eternal Amen assumes a temporal 
dimension, “only just now.” H.D. signals the material process needed to access the ideal 
or absolute realm. First, “heart” is joined into a compound word “heart-shell,” suggesting 
a hardness not typically associated with the soft musculature of the heart. Second, the 
phoenix contains both its beginning and its end, birth and death. Finally, the grain, which 
also brings life, is compared to “scalding wax” that burns rather than grows. The 
transformation is driven by the heart, but a heart that is concentrated and stark rather than 
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overtly emotional: “the ultimate grain, // lodged in the heart-core, / has taken its 
nourishment” (I.25.14-16). The spiritual desire that underlies Amen’s appearance at first 
suggests infinitude but not the expansive infinitude contemplated by the English 
romantics. Instead, H.D. describes a hard and hermetic emotional realm: 
O Heart, small urn 
of porphyry, agate or cornelian, 
 
how imperceptibly the grain fell 
between a heart-beat of pleasure 
 
and a heart-beat of pain; 
I do not know how it came 
 
nor now long it had lain there, 
nor can I say 
 
how it escaped tempest 
of passion and malice (I.28.1-10) 
The heart is made of hard substances that survive the heat and pressure of emotion. The 
grain of spiritual desire falls between pleasure and pain and is therefore not an 
instantiation of either. It transcends the vagaries of emotional excess, escaping the 
dangers of “passion and malice.” It must be hard and essential like the walls that endure 
the bombs that fall from the sky. Both the seed and the heart are simultaneously enclosed 
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and explosive. For H.D. this is a new organ, unlike the soft romantic heart. It is, instead, a 
hard core breaking into spiritual growth. H.D. is careful to stress that spiritual 
transformation is an act of the heart rather than the mind. She conceives of two aspects of 
the mind, neither of which makes them capable of spiritual transformation. The more 
easily dispatched is the scientific mind, operating, as H.D. argues, by “sterile logic, trivial 
reason” (I.30.15). But she also counsels against a mind open to occult knowledge. The 
danger here is that ideas external to the mind invade and direct it. The mind reels in the 
face of this intrusion: 
[. . .] instrusion of strained 
inappropriate allusion, 
 
illusion of lost-gods, daemons; 
gambler with eternity, 
 
initiate of the secret wisdom, 
bride of the kingdom, 
 
reversion of old values, 
oneness lost, madness. (I.31.21-28) 
H.D. warns against the sort of mind that seeks a “secret wisdom” from external sources, 
that patches together meanings through “inappropriate allusion.” She distrusts earlier 
ways of attributing symbolic value to the universe. In subscribing to prior traditions, one 
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becomes the “bride of the kingdom,” bound to a powerful but self-legitimating system. 
For H.D., this surely leads to “madness.” 
 In contrast to pursuing these external means, H.D. proposes an individual path 
that navigates through the world: 
has its peculiar ego-centric 
 
personal approach 
to the external realities, 
 
and differs from any other 
in minute particulars, 
 
as the vein-paths on any leaf 
differ from those of every other leaf (I.38.19-26) 
The spiritual path, according to H.D., must be travelled individually. Each person’s 
journey is a “personal approach.” She figures fulfillment as a unique and discrete object: 
“as every snow-flake / has its particular star, coral or prism shape” (I.38.27-28). The 
motion of the spiritual journey is, in some ways, circular, traveling about the body in an 
orbit that creates the discrete self, “ego-centric.” The spiritually attuned mind creates 
itself. This is, for H.D. the activity of spiritual desire: 
Let us substitute 
enchantment for sentiment 
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re-dedicate our gifts 
to spiritual realism, 
 
scrape a palette, 
point pen or brush, 
 
prepare papyrus or parchment, 
offer incense to Thoth (I.35.1-8) 
The creative act of pen or brush carries out spiritual rather than earthly desire. H.D. 
insists that we recover enchantment, the recognition that objects are more than just their 
mundane manifestations.  
Beyond a concern with surface reality, H.D. suggests a realm of the spiritually 
real. The poet is not merely in nature and does not grasp at the objects of the world but 
instead seeks to offer a vision attuned to pattern and form in the world. She describes this 
movement toward the ideal in her consideration of Sappho: 
Not roses, but an island, a country, a continent, a planet, a world of emotion, 
differing entirely from any present day imaginable world of emotion; a world of 
emotion that could only be imagined by the greatest of her own countrymen in the 
greatest period of that country’s glamour, who themselves confessed her beyond 
their reach, beyond their song, not a woman, not a goddess even, but a song or the 
spirit of a song. (The Wise Sappho 58-59) 
H.D. is not primarily interested in Sappho as a historical personage; she argues, instead, 
that Sappho is the abstract, underlying “spirit of a song.” In the same way that Sappho 
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was “beyond the reach” of her contemporaries, she cannot be a material fact for twentieth 
century readers. Instead, H.D. pursues an imaginative path through associations derived 
from her contemplation of Sappho, leading to a formal, visionary construct. The poet 
gains access to another stage of meaning by tracing the embodied self back to a rigid, 
formal level. Sappho’s poems offer warmth to help fire the process of transformation: “as 
if the brittle crescent-moon gave heat to us, or some splendid scintillating star turned 
warm suddenly in our hand like a jewel” (57-58). This is not an offer of wisdom but 
rather the heat needed to enter into the world of emotion that recognizes desire. 
H.D. argues that such transformative possibility also lies within words. Words 
are, of course, references to things, but they are also masks for spiritual meanings that 
might be uncovered: 
[. . .] I feel 
the meaning that words hide; 
 
they are anagrams, cryptograms, 
little boxes, conditioned 
 
to hatch butterflies . . .” (I.39.5-9).  
Words, which earlier had the power of gods, are now puzzles underneath which the self 
forms and is released, translated into butterflies. H.D.’s ellipsis suggests transformation, a 
new and undiscovered state, because it is followed by what might be called an empty 
line. The preceding 37 sections are in couplets, creating the expectation, almost a 
yearning, for a companion line that, in this case, does not follow. Instead, H.D. ends with 
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hatching butterflies, an ellipsis, and a white space that lead into the next section outlining 
her interpretive method. The path begins with her analysis of the name Osiris in section 
40: 
For example: 
Osiris equates O-sir-is or O-Sire-is; 
 
Osiris, 
the star Sirius, 
 
relates resurrection myth 
and resurrection reality (I.40.1-6) 
H.D. sees Osiris as a box, which she opens to find the words “sir” and “Sire.” Both of 
these words intimate authority. The fact that she finds them here authorizes her method. 
“Sir” relies on patriarchal social structure, and “Sire” implies political authority, but H.D. 
transfers these associations to “Sirius,” the star that exceeds such terrestrial powers. 
Susan Stanford Friedman explains that “[t]o find ‘Sirius’ hidden in the name of the god is 
to reveal not only his connection with yearly regeneration or resurrection, but also with 
the mother goddess Isis, his opposite” (225). H.D. explores these rich and layered 
mythological meanings at the same time she elicits morphological possibilities, allowing 
her to move from “myth” to a new form of “reality.” Her poetic project is to merge 
possible meanings, constructing new myths that, as the poem progresses, incorporate the 
subject, giving it a conceptual body symbolized by the benediction of divine birth. 
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 H.D. brings The Walls Do Not Fall to a close by returning to images of destroyed 
structures, a landscape ruined by war. Unlike at the beginning, however, H.D. is now 
interested less in the walls that remain than the path that leads through such destruction: 
“our bodies blunder // through doors twisted on hinges” (I.43.8-9). This change in 
representation, from destroyed objects to the ways we might navigate around them, 
signals a change to come in the remaining two poems comprising Trilogy. In a sense, one 
might say that the butterfly has emerged and must interpret the world it finds, where 
“even the air // is independable, / thick where it should be fine // and tenuous / where 
wings separate and open” (I.43.16-20). H.D. now begins a narrative in which the subject 
is born with a new-found capacity for spiritual growth. Rather than a collection of 
objects, the world is now a “thin air” through which one moves only in order to approach 
transcendence (I.43.13). The remainder of Trilogy is a spiritual journey: 
we are voyagers, discoverers 
of the not-known 
 
the unrecorded; 
we have no map; 
 
possibly we will reach haven, 
heaven. (I.43.27-32) 
H.D. leaves behind the material world and inhabits a negative space, the not known, the 
un-recorded. She inverts the romantic immersion in the natural world by positing a pure 
escape into a space of spiritual dynamics. Once again, she utilizes the Christian tradition 
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by referencing heaven, but it is a crucial aspect of her poetic vision that she must point to 
the imperfection of any received religious tradition. She writes “haven” before “heaven,” 
not just to explain heaven as a haven but to generalize the spiritual impulse. Heaven is an 
instance of a haven, but it is only realized in religious tradition when it fulfills the 
meanings of “haven.” H.D.’s poetry employs the religious symbol to understand desire 
and imagination. 
  
 H.D.’s imagery in The Walls Do Not Fall focuses on the hard, essential self that is 
exposed through destruction and the spiritual openness that results. The remainder of 
Trilogy seeks a religious imagery that transforms this openness into a redemptive vision. 
What distinguishes these latter two parts from the first is a new reluctance to include 
natural objects as the foundation for her poetic symbols. In fact, such natural objects were 
spare even in The Walls Do Not Fall, and it is perhaps a shortcoming of the analysis 
above to have addressed them so single-mindedly. While that first section includes 
London and the remains of Karnak, the shell-fish, the worm and butterfly, and the fire 
ritual along the strand as means to consider the self within the modern world, it is also 
densely layered with various occult references. The intensity of this occult side of H.D.’s 
writing increases with Tribute to the Angels and The Flowering of the Rod. H.D.’s occult 
poetics emerge from a history of poetry made up of diverse attempts to order the chaotic 
world. For H.D., classical and romantic modes did not recognize the subject’s role in 
organizing desire.  
 The classical view might best be exemplified by Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man, 
which conceives of a divinely organized universe: 
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All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee; 
All Chance, Direction, which though canst not see; 
All Discord, Harmony, not understood; 
All partial Evil, universal Good: 
And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason’s spite, 
One truth is clear, ‘Whatever IS, is RIGHT.’ (I.289-94) 
Though this section is often quoted in order to chastise Pope for holding conservative 
views, my purpose here is to point out how simple this view makes it to access meaning 
in the world. His only requirement is that one “Submit—In this, or any other sphere,” in 
order to be “Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear” (I.285-86). To submit to a 
preexisting order is to guarantee oneself a place within that order. Romantic poets, by 
contrast, reject the passivity required of such a system. Instead, they grant subjects access 
to a realm of order based on the powers of nature. In a sense, the romantic subject is a 
replica of nature furnished with a soul that exercises the immensity of nature’s capacity. 
An example could be drawn from any number of romantic poems, but Wordsworth’s 
opening to The Prelude provides a compelling example of the subject as a reflection of 
nature’s power: 
O there is blessing in this gentle breeze 
A visitant that, while he fans my cheek, 
Doth seem half-conscious of the joy he brings 
From the green fields, and from yon azure sky. 
Whate’er his mission, the soft breeze can come 
To none more grateful than to me [. . .] 
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[. . .] 
For I, methought, while the sweet breath of heaven 
Was blowing on my body, felt, within, 
A correspondent breeze, that gently moved 
With quickening virtue [. . .] (1-6; 33-36) 
The romantic subject in the natural world recognizes an affinity between himself and the 
dominion of nature. Wordsworth uses the image of the breeze upon the body to sketch the 
correspondences between nature and the human being. The human universe shares in the 
power and liberty of the natural universe. Wordsworth’s romantic subject recognizes this 
analogous relationship and seeks transcendence by enacting the potency of nature in a 
human realm.  
Despite this liberty, however, one might argue that romantic subjects are further 
away from attaining an ordered universe. Rather than simply submitting to the chaos that 
Pope assures us is only apparent, the romantic subject must seek out meaning and order 
in a natural world that was rapidly diminishing in the face of industrialization. There are 
gaps, as it were, in the transcendence offered by the romantic recourse to the natural 
world. Most famously, of course, Wordsworth’s “Lines Composed a Few Miles above 
Tintern Abbey” reveals the urban contrast to the natural world: 
               These beauteous forms, 
Through a long distance, have not been to me 
As is a landscape to a blind man’s eye: 
But oft, in lonely rooms, and ’mid the din 
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them 
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In hours of weariness, sensations sweet, 
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart; 
And passing even into my purer mind, 
With tranquil restoration [. . .] (22-30) 
The romantic subject is built upon the memory of a sublime natural world while 
surrounded by the actual “din / Of towns and cities.” A full restoration of the subject only 
occurs when refreshed by increasingly occasional visits to nature. More often romantic 
odes turn to elegies as the wish to experience nature’s power and order exceeds the 
actuality of that experience. And, again, the romantic poets often describe a wish to 
assume nature’s power rather than a description of how such power is realized. Romantic 
poetry offers a model of transcendence, but the intensity of the poet’s desire for it often 
overshadows the absence of its actuality. 
 Modernist poetry generally denies the subject these forms of order. Instead, it 
takes the subject out of both the chaotic-but-ordered world of Pope and the sublime 
natural world of Wordsworth. Instead of nature or the Christian God impressing the mind 
with its sources of power or order, modernists assign the power to create order to the 
human mind, and they investigate the forms this power takes when ordering the world. In 
H.D.’s work, the world itself is impoverished in a way that invalidates those earlier 
paradigms. The bombs demolish parts of London, making it not merely chaotic but 
irreversibly disordered. Nature itself has also been destroyed or is unrecoverable in 
H.D.’s Trilogy. In Tribute to the Angels, H.D. comes upon a half-destroyed tree, which 
symbolizes the possibility of renewal, but the tree is not able to sustain the hope she 
placed in it. Instead, she relies on the mysticism of angels to bear the weight of 
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symbolizing transformation and rebirth. In other words, the natural symbol does not 
suffice. The poet, and by extension the subject, is too far removed from the natural world 
for it to be a model of transcendence. Instead, modernists construct new meaning 
systems, often by organizing the detritus of prior meaning systems. This is especially true 
of H.D. Meaning is available in traditions of the past, but one cannot merely adopt a 
tradition wholesale. Instead, it must be remade. Tradition is a source of mystery and 
experience rather than a guide to all that’s right and true. For H.D., religious tradition is 
not meant to be passively received but more appropriately conceived of as an intellectual 
and creative effort.  
H.D.’s metaphor for this creative process is alchemy. She opens Tribute to the 
Angels by invoking Hermes Trismegistus, the “patron of alchemists” (II.1.2). He 
represents esoteric knowledge, of course, but he also acts as H.D.’s muse of 
transformation. Rather than calling upon him to transmit knowledge, H.D. asks him to 
“steal then, O orator, / plunder, O poet” (II.1.7-8) in an effort to 
melt down and integrate, 
 
re-invoke, re-create 
opal, onyx, obsidian, 
 
now scattered in the shards 
men tread upon (II.1.16-20) 
H.D. describes two levels to the alchemical process. First, the joining of the actual 
material of the world that has been torn asunder by war. Even the remains of a destroyed 
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world might be brought together in a way that transcends its pieces. H.D. lists opal, onyx, 
and obsidian, hard materials created by heat, intensity, and pressure. Though the world is 
in shards, H.D. imagines its possible union. Hermes, her patron of alchemy, symbolizes 
the transformation from the shards of destruction to the unity of the precious stones. 
Second, H.D. also insists that Hermes represents the transformation of language. She 
picks up the alchemical metaphor in section eight when the crucible distills the essence of 
mar into the religious and generative figure of the Mother through the play of language: 
Now polish the crucible 
and in the bowl distill 
 
a word most bitter, marah, 
a word bitterer still, mar, 
 
sea, brine, breaker, seducer, 
giver of life, giver of tears; 
 
now polish the crucible 
and set the jet of flame 
 
under, till marah-mar 
are melted, fuse and join 
 
and change and alter, 
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mer, mere, mère, mater, Maia, Mary, 
 
Star of the Sea, 
Mother. (II.8.1-14) 
The alchemical process yields new knowledge by melting down language and finding a 
more essential substance. But language participates in this transformation. This section 
begins with bitterness and ends with the Mother as a symbol of fecundity and generation. 
Friedman comments that “[i]n the crucible of poetry, heated by the fire of war, H.D. 
distilled the words associated with sea water and bitterness to restore the origins of life, 
the Mother, to her pre-Judeo-Christian essence” (247). Language is melted, fused, joined, 
charged, and altered, a string of permutations that insists on a whole new valuation based 
on the origins of life from the ashes and bitterness of death. This process is the symbolic 
antithesis of the destruction that propels The Walls Do Not Fall. The earlier poem began 
with the sense of fragmentation characteristic of modernist texts, but H.D. strives to 
rebuild and recreate the world as whole and meaningful. The final move from Mary to 
Mother generalizes the historical and religious Mary to the ultimate creative capability of 
Mother. 
 Section nine distills this material one step further, concluding with a “jewel / in 
the heart of the bowl” (II.9.1-2), this new, unified, hard, discrete, and living object “with 
a pulse uncooled that beats yet” (II.13.5). The jewel is that concentrated symbol of the 
transformed subject, the pearl of H.D.’s poetic theory. The alchemy H.D. describes 
begins with language, moves to the holy and generative Mother, and ends as a jewel 
representing the subject as the process of transformation. It is important for H.D. that one 
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conceive of this jewel as a process rather than an object that ultimately might be 
apprehended. She gradually describes the jewel’s ineffability, the difficulty of defining or 
describing its qualities, rather than the object itself. She suggests that “it lives, it breathes, 
/ it gives off—fragrance” (II.13.7-8). Later she attempts to describe the process as music, 
but then clarifies “O, what I meant / by music when I said music, was— // music sets up 
ladders, / it makes us invisible” (II.22.17-20). The alchemical process simultaneously 
reduces and creates the self. But this is not something that language can explain. For 
H.D., the struggle is not to put the alchemical process back into language but simply to 
experience the process itself: “I do not want to name it, / I want to watch its faint // heart-
beat, pulse-beat / as it quivers” (II.14.7-10). She works to translate the experience by 
imitating the heartbeat in the falling duple rhythms “héart-beat, púlse-beat,” so noticeable 
after the rising iambics that precede them: “I dó not wánt to náme it, / I wánt to wátch its 
fáint.” The jewel never becomes an object of desire in a traditional sense. It is valued 
instead because it symbolizes the process of transformation and includes the one who 
experiences it: 
I want to minimize thought, 
 
concentrate on it 
till I shrink, 
 
dematerialize 
and am drawn into it. (II.14.12-16) 
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The jewel represents integration into an Absolute after dematerializing the self. H.D. 
replaces object-desire with the experience of spiritual release. Rather than conceiving of a 
transcendence available to the romantic subject in sublime nature, H.D. sees the act of 
transformation in the occult process of alchemy. 
Alongside the alchemical narrative runs an invocation of the angels that gives the 
poem its name. The first angel is Azrael, associated with death, which pervades the 
bombed-out landscape in the wake of the bombing of London. But H.D. is less interested 
in death than she is in the context within which death might have meaning. She elaborates 
this interest in a complex mythical structure: 
Raphael, Gabriel, Azrael, 
three of seven—what is War 
 
to Birth, to Change, to Death? 
yet he, red-fire is one of seven fires, 
 
judgement and will of God, 
God’s very breath—Uriel. (II.5.11-16) 
Birth, change, and death (represented by Raphael, Gabriel, and Azrael) only make sense 
for H.D. when tempered by the judgment of God, represented by Uriel. Uriel is the fire of 
God, the fire that carries out the alchemical process, the fire that creates and moves the 
dynamic subject. Speaking of the people of London, H.D. describes the fire that inhabits 
those who survive 
but with unbroken will, 
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with unbowed head, watched 
and though unaware, worshipped 
 
and knew not that they worshipped 
and that they were 
 
that which they worshipped, 
had they known the fire 
 
of strength, endurance, anger 
in their hearts, 
 
was part of that same fire 
that in a candle on a candle-stick 
 
or in a star, 
is known as one of seven, 
 
is named among the seven Angels, 
Uriel. (II.6.14-28) 
Through her elaborate mythology, H.D. conceives of subjectivity as equivalent to divinity 
itself. God’s breath suggests of human strength but not because it has been given to us by 
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God. Instead, the subject passes through the fire of destruction and is part of the divine 
fire. Like the alchemical process, the fire of Uriel produces and refines what it touches 
rather than destroying it.  
After Uriel comes Anneal, “one to contrast the other” (II.17.2). The two form a 
joint fire that represents spring, rebirth, and the potential for growth. H.D. symbolizes this 
new fire in the form of the half-burned, “charred tree before us” (II.19.12). Rather than an 
object from the natural world that inspires a sense of transcendence, as in romantic 
poetry, the tree is an emblematic object; the tree suffers the savage acts of humankind and 
paradoxically symbolizes human resilience. These fires reform the subject, who becomes, 
from this perspective, both the damage and the potential of human activity: “We are part 
of it; / we admit the transubstantiation” (II.23.1-2). Through this transubstantiation, H.D. 
achieves the union of nature and humankind in the symbol of the charred tree. The human 
and the divine fold together in death and life: 
it was a sign, 
 
it was the Angel which redeemed me, 
it was the Holy Ghost— 
 
a half-burnt-out apple-tree 
blossoming; 
 
this is the flowering of the rood, 
this is the flowering of the wood, 
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where Anneal, we pause to give 
thanks that we rise again from death and live. (II.23.10-18) 
Each subject sustains some damage and rises from that diminished state. The judgment of 
God destroys and redeems us at the same time. This section ends with a line repeated 
three times over the 43 sections: “we pause to give / thanks that we rise again from death 
and live.”2 H.D. repeatedly joins transcendence to death this way, but she does so through 
a melodious, rhythmic line and the reassuring structure of a refrain. The subject, for H.D., 
is something always rising from the potential of death, a flowering against the necessity 
of destruction. The rood, the cross upon which Christ was crucified, gives rise to a new 
and meaningful doctrine by which to understand the world. The wood, the tree half-
destroyed in war, gives rise to flowers. Both of these examples show the passing of an 
earlier mode of life, paralleling the butterfly metaphor she used earlier, so that a higher 
form can emerge. 
 H.D. conceives of ideal forms of human possibility that mirror George 
Santayana’s conception of the function of poetry. Santayana distinguishes between two 
basic desires attributed to humankind: one level for the base things that attend our lives in 
the world, the sensuous things that divert us from a more enlightened possibility; a 
second is for a greater outcome, which Santayana conceives of as excellence, an ideal, or 
a moral understanding. In “The Poetry of Barbarism,” he offers a moral perspective on 
the work of Walt Whitman and Robert Browning. The former poet is arrested at the level 
of the worldly and sensual, while the latter advances a meager step to the experience of 
subjective emotions. Santayana argues that the world, for Whitman, “has no inside; it is a 
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phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous and hard to 
distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea or the decorations of some barbarous 
temple, sublime only by the infinite aggregation of parts” (180). There is no underlying 
ideal that structures this sensual material. By contrast, Browning crafts soliloquies from 
the perspective of poetic speakers “in the moment of intensest passion” (211), but the 
reader is left without an ideal to shape a moral vision. Santayana criticizes romanticism’s 
conception of human nature as essentially good, along the same lines as Hulme later: 
“Here is the root of all romanticism: the man, the individual, is an infinite reservoir of 
possibilities; and if you can so rearrange society by the destruction of oppressive order 
then the possibilities will have a chance and you will get Progress” (Hulme, 
“Romanticism” 116). Hulme and Santayana each demand that experience must be 
disciplined in order to clarify or elevate it above everyday sensual impressions, but 
Hulme’s sense of discipline is based on the clear perception of real objects, while 
Santayana’s involves an ideal extracted from the real. Santayana’s sense of discipline 
provides insight into H.D.’s attempt to construct new spiritual symbols. Santayana 
defines aesthetic discipline as the search for an example of perfection: 
Discipline is indispensable to art. Work from which these qualities are absent 
must be barbaric; it can have no ideal form and must appeal to us only through the 
sensuousness and profusion of its materials. We are invited by it to lapse into a 
miscellaneous appreciativeness, into a subservience to every detached impression. 
And yet, if we would only reflect even on these disordered beauties, we should 
see that the principle by which they delight us is a principle by which an ideal, an 
image of perfection, is inevitably evoked. We can have no pleasure or pain, nor 
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any preference whatsoever, without implicitly setting up a standard of excellence, 
an ideal of what would satisfy us there. (“Barbarism” 209-10). 
For Santayana, the artist’s task is to raise moral consciousness above the merely 
sensuous, to organize the material of the world into a meaningful whole, to construct an 
ideal. Santayana’s remark takes an important step beyond merely a call for ideals; he 
insists that this ideal is not imposed but is, rather, desired. Art, properly conceived, 
satisfies a higher desire, a craving for “new structures, richer, finer, fitter to the primary 
tendencies of our nature” (“Poetry and Religion” 270). One of the defining features of 
modernist poetry is the drive to create rather than merely reference moral visions. 
Santayana himself recognized this desire retroactively in the historical development of 
Christian dogma: “The idea of Christ himself had to be constructed by the imagination in 
response to moral demands [. . . .] The facts were nothing until they became symbols; and 
nothing could turn them into symbols except an eager imagination on the watch for all 
that might embody its dreams” (“Dogma” 92-93). Santayana argues that Christ and the 
crucifixion were meaningful only because they satisfied a deep moral need.  
H.D. focuses this symbolic desire, finding in the symbol of the burned-out tree an 
ideal that parallels the crucifixion. Her allusion to the death of Christ establishes a 
standard of excellence that satisfies this higher desire, placing it in the context of a moral 
system. The survivors of war “ríse agáin from déath and líve,” that rhythmic mantra that 
unites Tribute to the Angels. The task in reading the rest of the poem is to understand how 
her symbols create an ideal that satisfies the moral needs of the modernist subject. One of 
these symbols is the Lady who inhabits the rest of Tribute to the Angels. H.D. introduces 
her in an ambiguous territory between presence and absence: 
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when the Lady knocked; 
 
I was talking casually  
with friends in the other room, 
 
when we saw the outer hall 
grow lighter—then we saw where the door was, 
 
there was no door 
(this was a dream, of course), 
 
and she was standing there, 
actually, at the turn of the stair. (II.25.6-14) 
It is uncertain whether the Lady is there or not, and in this way H.D. is able to situate her 
in the same symbolic space as Christ in Santayana’s essay. That is, she is the 
manifestation of the poet’s “eager imagination” and structures H.D.’s notion of purity and 
perfection. This is not epistemological confusion as much as it is an attempt to seek out 
the level on which such a process works. This level is concisely enacted in the word 
“actually,” to exist in act, as opposed to merely existing in a conceptual or abstract way. 
The Lady as spiritual symbol acts upon the poet. H.D. repeats the word two lines later, 
“she is actually standing there” (II.26.2), in order to emphasize this higher level of 
interaction. 
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 The act that occurs in H.D.’s poem is a transformation of the subject in light of 
the transformation of the symbol. H.D. first describes the Lady as she is already known. 
She reminds us “We have seen her / the world over” (II.29.1-2). She describes the 
religious images of Mary throughout history, repeating the phrase “We have seen her” 
over and over. And yet, for H.D., this perpetuity of always-having-seen the Lady prevents 
us from seeing her “actually.” After this extended litany of guises, she insists “none of 
these / suggest her as I saw her” (II.31.1-2). The Lady cannot be what we have seen of 
her in the other representations; she cannot be what one receives from a religious 
tradition; she must be conceived, recreated, rather than received. All these images go into 
the crucible, and the white heat of human experience transforms them. 
 H.D. selects one of the images of the Lady that emphasizes whiteness: “Maria 
von dem Schnee, / Our Lady of the Snow” (II.31.11-12). The Lady’s whiteness 
symbolizes her ideal purity and perfection but also, for H.D., the overwhelming fact of 
unity and potential. Whiteness represents the blankness of the page, the fresh beginning 
upon which the writer or artist creates. H.D. presents this moral vision with the image of 
a book in which the new can be written: 
So she must have been pleased with us, 
who did not forgo our heritage 
 
at the grave-edge; 
she must have been pleased 
 
with the straggling company of the brush and quill 
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who did not deny their birthright; 
 
she must have been pleased with us, 
for she looked so kindly at us 
 
under her drift of veils, 
and she carried a book (II.35.1-10) 
H.D. celebrates creativity, the effort of “brush and quill.” The “struggling company” of 
artists views the destroyed world yet sees the possibility of creation. H.D. further 
emphasizes the proximity of death and new life by rhyming “heritage” and “grave-edge”; 
at the edge of death, one assumes the powerful birthright of art as well as alchemical 
transformation.  
The first important new creation to emerge is the transformed image of the Lady 
herself. Friedman argues that “[r]evisionist alchemy is necessary, indeed so central, to the 
poet’s quest because centuries of religious tradition have so systematically repressed or 
denigrated the female form” (253). H.D. reforms the image of woman found in the frozen 
paintings of the Virgin Mary and the damning story of Eve’s sin. Instead, she is the 
whiteness of all possibility: 
She carries a book but it is not 
the tome of ancient wisdom, 
 
the pages, I imagine, are the blank pages 
of the unwritten volume of the new. (II.38.9-12) 
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This metaphor of the blank pages requires the subject’s activity to create meaning. Her 
use of occult material does not reveal a reliance on an ancient and mysterious wisdom but 
instead arises from the transformation of those materials into active and contemporary 
symbols. The Lady is not the gift of an ancient tradition but is the union of all possibility 
into a creative transformation. This is the subject’s transformation, which H.D. explicitly 
references in her return to the butterfly image: “she is Psyche, the butterfly / out of the 
cocoon” (II.38.19-20). 
 H.D. closes Tribute to the Angels by joining together all of her metaphors, starting 
with the color white as the union of all colors: 
And the point in the spectrum 
where all lights become one, 
 
is white and white is not no-colour, 
as we were told as children, 
 
but all-colour; 
where the flames mingle 
 
and the wings meet, when we gain 
the arc of perfection, 
 
we are satisfied [. . .] (II.43.1-9) 
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H.D. succeeds in creating an ideal that satisfies a higher need, that fashions an 
iconography giving structure to our moral desire, that restores the flowering of life after 
the destruction of war, and that reclaims the image of woman from the reductive or 
debased depths of prior traditions. 
  
If The Walls Do Not Fall describes the subject’s hard, skeletal exterior and 
Tribute to the Angels recognizes the bombed-out tree as a symbol of life growing out of 
death, the third section, The Flowering of the Rod, considers that resurrection. Like the 
other poems, it grows out of H.D.’s reflection on the violence of modern war, but here 
she attempts to distance herself from that history: 
leave the smouldering cities below 
(we have done all we could), 
 
we have given until we have no more to give; 
alas, it was pity, rather than love, we gave; 
 
now having given all, let us leave all; 
above all, let us leave pity 
 
and mount higher 
to love—resurrection (III.1.23-30) 
Some commentators respond to this section, and Trilogy more generally, in term of its 
immediate social and political contexts, reading The Flowering of the Rod as an effort to 
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distance the book from war and the city. Vincent Quinn, for example, criticizes H.D. for 
focusing on solitary spiritual enlightenment at the expense of a more communitarian 
impulse. He describes a social dynamic in which the poet turns away from the world: 
“Convinced of the omnipresence of a benevolent Spirit, she plans to turn her back on 
human affairs and to devote herself to achieving a transcendental union with God” (123-
24). For Quinn, this turning toward religious or occult interests is ultimately barren, an 
abdication of one’s moral obligation to reflect upon the repercussions of war. Carolyn 
Forché also allows a hint of her disapprobation to emerge through her commendation; she 
suggests that H.D. struggles “with the insurmountable difficulty of writing her way 
toward restoration while conceiving a poetic form that would somehow display the ruin” 
(264). Quinn and Forché wish for a poetics of witness that runs counter to H.D.’s vision 
of spiritual realism and redemption. 
 H.D. does not turn away from the war but rather insists that we “mount higher,” 
rising above it. This spatial distinction is important because elevation here evokes growth 
or development rather than departure. The image suggests moving above or beyond the 
war, a development that occurs because of (rather than in spite of) the war. Rather than a 
denial or dismissal of war, H.D. insists on a complex dynamic between the subject and 
the social environment. Specifically, she describes the act of giving that occurs as she 
walks through London witnessing the destruction. This interaction between self and 
society finds the subject giving “until we have no more to give.” The subject is depleted, 
reduced to the hard and resistant core portrayed in The Walls Do Not Fall. But when she 
sees the half bombed-out tree and recognizes it as the image of renewal in the city, she is 
finally able to approach resurrection.  
 151 
H.D. stresses the letter “v,” which appears in all but one of these lines, in order to 
symbolize transformation, both by its shape and its historical signification. The words 
“leave,” “have,” “given,” “gave,” and “love” repeat and contrast each other, creating a 
number of provocative tensions. In particular, “give” and “gave” oppose each other, but 
they do so in a temporal rather than semantic way. “Give” comes first, followed by 
“gave.” The poem advances beyond, or after, the war. The letter “v” itself embodies 
transformation, a vertical movement between point and pair, between unity and 
dispersion. The singularity of the bottom rises to the growth and expansion of the top. 
The letter “v” in this context also suggests victory, as in VE day, the end of hostilities in 
Europe. Considering these spatial, temporal, and historical distinctions, Trilogy is less a 
war poem than a survivor’s poem, a poem about what follows, exceeds, or transcends 
war. In Trilogy, a dynamic transformation occurs, taking the subject through destruction, 
symbolic renewal, and into a future in which one is free to “mount higher.”  
The space into which the subject rises, however, is particularly ambiguous. H.D. 
describes two possible outcomes, either a destination one can reach or an ever-receding, 
impossible goal. On one hand, the flight of the “first wild-goose” is a journey to a 
promised land, “to the Carolinas or to Florida” (III.3.19). On the other hand, it signals a 
hopeless attempt to return to an unreachable place: 
[. . .] like those migratory flocks 
 
who still (they say) hover 
over the lost island, Atlantis; 
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seeking what we once knew, 
we know ultimately we will find 
 
happiness; to-day shalt thou be 
with me in Paradise (III.3.20-26) 
Atlantis, the lost island, can never be regained and represents a mythical goal. H.D. 
portrays this search in terms of perpetually deferred desire, the impossibility of 
satisfaction. She initially values this tragic journey that has no end save drowning. From 
this perspective, the culmination of spiritual growth is the maintenance of a permanent 
distance between desire and its goal. H.D. describes this as a “desperate urge”: 
but who knows the desperate urge 
 
of those others—actual or perhaps now 
mythical birds—who seek but find no rest 
 
till they drop from the highest point of the spiral 
or fall from the innermost centre of the ever-narrowing circle? 
 
for they remember, they remember, as they sway and hover, 
what once was—they remember, they remember— 
 
they will not swerve—they have known bliss, 
the fruit that satisfies—they have come back— 
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what if they islands are lost? (III.5.12-21) 
The birds remember a prior bliss and seek without fulfillment a resumption of that bliss. 
H.D. employs contrasting spatial metaphors to heighten the tension of impossibility. The 
birds drop from the “highest point” but also fall from their “innermost centre.” One gets 
the sense that this journey, with its impossible destination, is the transcendence of the 
self, the paradoxical realization and shedding of the self. Despite the heroic effort, 
however, they cannot succeed. They fall from the sky before reaching their destination, 
and H.D. equates this to “certain ecstasy // for theirs is the hunger / for Paradise” 
(III.5.26-28). Ecstasy is not the achievement of an object of desire but is rather the 
ultimate deferral or impossibility of achieving an object of desire. 
H.D. values this tragic journey, but she nonetheless counsels against it. Though 
she “would rather drown, remembering” (III.6.1), she reverses course, explaining that 
“resurrection is a bee-line, // straight to the horde and plunder, / the treasure, the store-
room” (III.7.2-4). Resurrection and ecstasy are, in this sense, opposite outcomes. 
Resurrection is a step back into life after transformative experience while ecstasy is an 
unsatisfied hunger. She insists that “resurrection is remuneration” (III.7.6), a reward for 
coming back to life rather than surrendering to death, even as noble and heroic a death as 
seeking Paradise. Section 8 rejoices in the return to life, consisting largely of “I am” 
statements, starting with “I am so happy” (III.8.1). This is one of the most direct and 
untroubled lines in the poem, marked by a distinctive frankness about her rebirth: 
No poetic phantasy 
but a biological reality, 
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a fact: I am an entity 
like bird, insect, plant 
 
or sea-plant cell; 
I live; I am alive; 
 
take care, do not know me, 
deny me, do not recognize me, 
 
shun me; for this reality 
is infectious—ecstasy (III.9.1-10) 
H.D. revises her earlier definition of ecstasy. Rather than the high spiral to an 
unrecoverable bliss, ecstasy is now the simple act of living, now recast as resurrection, 
the return to life. It is biology, not phantasy. It goes right down to the cellular level, as in 
the sea-plant cell that concisely exemplifies the subject. She continues the biological 
metaphor by pointing out that “this reality” of pure life, is “infectious”; it can spread 
organically through the population. She eschews fantastic language and instead employs 
biological terms. The image of the cell reiterates H.D.’s focus on the discrete and limited 
subject, recalling Hulme’s rejection of romanticism’s expansive or infinite subject. 
Again, however, H.D. uses this finite subject in a constructive way: it is not enough to 
limit the subject; one must conceive of the spiritual growth resulting from such limits. 
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The purity of this image, shorn of “poetic phantasy,” allows for a new growth that may 
spread and institute a new “reality.”  
As in Tribute to the Angels, this new reality constructs a new and positive image 
of women. The remainder of The Flowering of the Rod, from section 12 to 43, tells an 
extended narrative of Mary Magdalene and Kaspar, one of the three Magi drawn to 
Bethlehem to give gifts to the newborn Jesus. This narrative at first appears to disrupt the 
more emphatically lyrical elements of the rest of Trilogy, which moved freely between 
different symbolic foci. H.D. offers a consistent frame of reference in these thirty 
sections, all retelling a familiar New Testament story. On closer examination, however, 
this narrative is made of a complex layering of images as well as a challenging temporal 
tension that purifies the image of women and places value on the power to renew and 
anoint human life. 
 H.D. builds an extended narrative that it is iterative rather than linear in order to 
suggest the possibility of a spiritual awakening. She presents certain occurrences several 
times, emphasizing events such as Mary Magdalene’s fallen scarf by repeating them with 
important variations. The first time Mary’s scarf falls, Kaspar considers it unseemly: 
[. . .] he had known many women— 
it was her hair—un-maidenly— 
 
It was hardly decent of her to stand there, 
unveiled, in the house of a stranger. (III.15.15-18) 
With this first unveiling, Kaspar perceives Mary’s impertinence and inappropriateness. 
He is outraged. H.D. conveys Kaspar’s shock and distaste with the word “un-maidenly.” 
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H.D.’s hyphen suggests that there is no word for unbecoming behavior in a woman; the 
“un-” must be affixed to it to make the inelegant word. But she questions the notion of 
what is unmaidenly by replaying the unveiling in such a way that Kaspar reorients his 
perspective. 
she was discretion itself 
in her dark robe and head-dress; 
 
Kaspar did not recognize her 
until her scarf slipped to the floor, 
 
and then, not only did he recognise Mary 
as they stars had told [. . .] 
 
[. . .] 
 
but when he saw the light on her hair 
like moonlight on a lost river, 
 
Kaspar 
remembered. (III.27.9-14; 17-20) 
The unveiling becomes an opportunity to recognize reality, a chance to see beneath the 
obfuscations of cultural attitudes. Dropping the veil allows Kaspar to see the “light on her 
hair” and the “moonlight.” In this new light, Kaspar is able to see the transformation of 
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Woman. H.D. reprises the biblical tale of Mary Magdalene as the woman purified of 
demons by Jesus: “in her were forgiven / the sins of the seven / daemons cast out of her” 
(III.28.3-5). Despite the many aspersions that history would later cast on the character of 
Mary Magdalene, such as that she was a prostitute, this reference to daemons is the only 
negative description in the text of the Bible. Whatever the nature of her sins, Mary 
Magdalene is, for H.D., a symbol of purity and redemption and, by extension, is a figure 
for divine revelation. The light in her hair is a circlet of jewels that transforms Kaspar: 
he saw as in a mirror, clearly, O very clearly, 
a circlet of square-cut stones on the head of a lady, 
 
and what he saw made his heart so glad 
that it was as if he suffered, 
 
his heart laboured so 
with his ecstasy. (III.28.34-39) 
H.D employs the language of sexual desire to refer to Kaspar’s spiritual vision. The lady 
is adorned with jewels that set off a physical reaction that paradoxically makes him 
“glad” and makes him “suffer.” Ecstasy is new vision, like the infectious reality of 
section 9. H.D. suggests that Kaspar’s vision of Mary Magdalene’s crown offers a pure, 
reclaimed view of humankind. It was not beauty but “discovery that exalted him / for he 
knew the old tradition, the old, old legend” (III.29.3-4). H.D. insists that physical desire 
must be translated to spiritual desire, and beauty must yield to discovery. For H.D., the 
value of discovery is to understand “the whole scope and plan // of our and his 
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civilization on this, / his and our earth, before Adam” (III.31.22-24). In short, this vision 
would allow us to see and perhaps reclaim the world God intended. That H.D. 
characterizes this as “before Adam” suggests that men (and perhaps patriarchy, more 
systemically) perverted the original intent of creation. For H.D., one of the primary 
perversions was the blame heaped upon women through Eve and Lilith. The spiritual 
vision of The Flowering of the Rod purifies the image of woman by introducing Kaspar 
to an ancient pre-history: 
Lilith born before Eve 
and one born before Lilith, 
and Eve; we three are forgiven, 
we are three of the seven 
daemons cast out of her. (III.33.21-25) 
The seven demons that Jesus purges from Mary Magdalene are the misbegotten female 
figures of Judeo-Christian tradition. For H.D., the true spirit of religion is freedom from 
cultural constructions that demonize one’s gender. She emphasizes the importance of this 
purification of history by setting aside the couplet form used through most of the poem in 
favor of one italicized block of text suggesting a heightened, immediate revelation. 
H.D.’s also dislocates temporal flow; her retelling of the Magi’s visit to the newborn 
Christ includes Mary Magdalene, who was the first to see Jesus after his resurrection. 
Here, she witnesses the birth as well as the rebirth. H.D. overlays the two events in order 
to stress the continuity of beginnings. 
 The final section of H.D.’s epic presents the birth of Jesus as a recurrence of his 
resurrection or rebirth and argues for possibility and potential in the smallest things. 
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But she spoke so he looked at her, 
she was shy and simple and young; 
 
she said, Sir, it is a most beautiful fragrance, 
as of all flowering things together; 
 
but Kaspar knew the seal of the jar was unbroken. 
he did not know whether she knew 
 
the fragrance came from the bundle of myrrh 
she held in her arms. (III.43.1-8) 
After focusing on Mary Magdalene throughout the poem, H.D. introduces Mary, the 
mother of Jesus. She again employs a temporal reversal, replacing the later Mary at the 
poem’s close with the earlier Mary. After the spiritual journey, H.D. ends with a “shy and 
simple and young” Mary, one who brings new life into the world. The bundle she holds is 
not Jesus, however, but rather a “bundle of myrrh.” She holds a new power to anoint and 
consecrate, a fragrance of “all flowering things together.” The image of the bundle of 
myrrh overlays the image of the newly born Jesus, who becomes, in concentrated form, 
all flowering things. The most powerful image, because it is the ultimate and unifying 
image, is myrrh, the condensed symbol of growth, synonymous with a human and divine 
child. The human subject is like this child: human and divine, discrete and expansive. 
Unlike H.D.’s imagist poetry, which focused on the inevitable death of all things in 
nature, Trilogy culminates in an image of limitless potential for life. The long poem form 
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allows H.D. to offer a more sustained examination of human experience than was 
available in the short imagist lyric. She only begins with destruction and develops, 
through the succeeding books, the symbolic transformation of humanity. H.D. uses the 
long form to accumulate images and build toward a transformative conclusion. Coming 
as it does in a time of total war, H.D.’s poem embodies a redemptive vision of humanity 
that first reduces and then purifies the subject.  
 
Notes 
 1 Quotations from H.D.’s poetry are from Collected Poems, 1912-1944 unless 
otherwise noted and will be cited by line number parenthetically in my text. These are 
lines 11-19 of “Evening.” Quotations from Trilogy will be cited using a Roman numeral 
for the book followed by a period, then an Arabic numeral for the section, and finally 
Arabic numerals for the line numbers. 
 2 The others are II.7.11-12 and II.43.25-26. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“IF YOU SHOULD DIP YOUR HAND IN”: 
DESIRE AND THE DIVIDED SUBJECT IN THE POETRY OF ELIZABETH BISHOP 
The preceding chapters provide a view of modernism based on the way subjects 
organize desire, arguing that modernists typically freeze or separate desire from the 
external world, creating an isolated and protected self. In different ways, Pound, Stevens, 
Eliot, and H.D. withhold desire from the world and redirect it into aesthetic or spiritual 
experience. These poets differ from the romantics, who employ a concept of the subject 
as infinite rather than discrete and isolated. Elizabeth Bishop, however, begins to 
conceive of a self who is imbricated in the world and cannot fully commit the rejection 
enacted by Eliot and H.D. Bishop’s subject is not transcendent as in the romantic model, 
nor is she enclosed in the self-protective imaginative or symbolic realm of her immediate 
predecessors. Instead, she constructs an immanent subject, one who is awash in the 
world, dissolved and disseminated among external objects. Desire, from Bishop’s 
perspective, cannot be withheld but must be released into the natural world yet without 
assuming the sublime powers of nature. 
In Bishop, the impulse to withhold desire from the external world is strong, but 
she is conscious of the world’s inescapability. From Bishop’s perspective, desire marks 
the world rather than creating or rejecting it. Bishop’s construction of the subject is 
unlike that of Stevens, Eliot, and H.D., but rather than a radical break, it is a hairline 
fracture, a small yet crucial difference. Bishop does not reject the poetic achievements of 
these earlier poets.1 Instead, she rejects the underlying assumption about how the subject 
is formed and the way desire integrates with the world. On one hand, the earlier 
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generation of American poets such as Pound, Eliot, and H.D. reveal (in emotionally 
significant ways) just what the subject is giving up by sublimating desire. Tiresias is the 
exemplary figure of the agony inherent in retracting desire from the world. H.D.’s poetic 
speaker who roams the streets of London and sees ancient Karnak overlaying it is 
another. The gulf between their capacity for feeling and the world from which they seek 
refuge intensifies each poem’s emotional range. At the same time, however, there were 
poets who shared these concerns but found more certain ways to maintain a gulf between 
self and world. John Crowe Ransom is the paradigmatic poet of the tendency to construct 
cool and formal solutions to desire. Ransom often presents death as a satisfactory 
conclusion to the heat of desire. “Here Lies a Lady,” for instance, offers death as an end 
to the “fever and chills” of the title character: 
Here lies a lady of beauty and high degree, 
Of chills and fever she died, of fever and chills, 
The delight of her husband, and aunt, an infant of three 
And medicos marveling sweetly on her ills. (141) 
The “lady” of the poem is caught between “chills and fever,” the two extremes of desire 
and restriction. Ultimately, the tension concludes in death: “we bade God rest her soul.” 
Also, the speaker is distanced from these concerns because he is not the one at risk. He is 
separated by an ironic distance from the subject plagued by fever and chills. Ransom’s 
end-stopped rhymes, regular meter, and strict quatrains contribute to the poem’s easy 
quiescence. The poem shares with “Bells for John Whiteside’s Daughter,” “Janet 
Waking,” and “Dead Boy” an answer to the question of whether to consummate or 
 163 
sublimate desire: death intervenes before a more complicated balance needs to be 
constructed.2 
 Against the offer of death, Bishop insists that the subject is immanent, always 
moving through the world. Her poetry, therefore, is more concerned with the role of 
objects. She has long been recognized as a great observer. Randall Jarrell, for instance, 
famously wrote that “all her poems have written underneath I have seen it” (qtd. in 
Travisano 19). But frequently Bishop is interested in conflict or tension rather than 
objective observation. That is, although the world offers material—many objects, each 
with innumerable details—Bishop focuses on objects that reflect human passions and 
their conflict with the world. In a 1952 review of Wallace Fowlie’s Pantomime, for 
instance, she complains that Fowlie’s reminiscences are too smooth and ideal. She 
contrasts Fowlie’s account of his first ride in one of Boston’s swan boats with her own: 
My own first ride on a swan boat occurred at the age of three and is chiefly 
memorable for the fact that one of the live swans paddling around us bit my 
mother’s finger when she offered it a peanut. I remember the hole in the black kid 
glove and a drop of blood. I do not want to set myself up as a model of facing the 
sterner realities of swan boat rides in order to discredit Mr. Fowlie’s 
idealization,—but there is remarkably little of blood, sweat, or tears in Mr. 
Fowlie’s book. (Poems 692) 
Bishop cites this experience for its dramatic human interest and the failure of Fowlie’s 
book to approach the struggle inherent in these dramas. Fowlie’s narrative is not untrue; 
it is, for Bishop, an uninteresting sort of true. It does not match her view of the purpose of 
art. Although she says she does not wish to “discredit” Fowlie, she still refers to his text 
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in terms of accuracy or factuality: “It would be unfair to infer any lack of conflict in Mr. 
Fowlie himself; he is human and it must be there. However it is fair to criticize that lack 
as the chief literary fault of the book. These twelve episodic, carefully edited chapters 
from the life of a scholar and teacher are interesting and often amusing, but one wants 
more of the facts” (692). Without conflict, we are missing “the facts.” Accuracy, from 
this perspective, is not a clinical list of true but mundane things. Literary truth requires an 
examination of the struggle and discord of human experience. The real is not opposed to 
the inaccurate but rather to the ideal. Bishop’s aesthetic perspective approaches the 
“blood, sweat, or tears” of things. 
 The friction that Bishop searches out and develops in her poetry runs counter to 
the modernist tendency to isolate the self from sensual contact with the world and redirect 
the desiring energies into aesthetic production. In Bishop, the world intrudes. If Pound’s 
poetic images of static leaves represent modernism’s reorganization of desire toward the 
self, Bishop’s “The Weed” provides its antithesis. Rather than presenting a self-
authorizing subject who separates herself from the world, the poem shows desire 
breaking the subject and releasing a subsequent flow into the world. The poem begins 
with a subject protected in a calm purgatory: 
I dreamed that dead, and meditating, 
I lay upon a grave, or bed, 
(at least, some cold and close-built bower). 
In the cold heart, its final thought 
stood frozen, drawn immense and clear, 
stiff and idle as I was there; 
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and we remained unchanged together 
for a year, a minute, an hour.3 
Death is, in the beginning of this poem, a refuge for desire. The heart, as the signifier of 
desire, is cold, “its final thought / stood frozen.” Bishop imagines the heart as the frozen 
center of the dead body, its final thought “immense and clear, / stiff and idle.” Body and 
mind “remained unchanged together.” The speaker is self-contained in the stillness of 
death; body, thought, and desire are motionless in one unchanging moment. Although the 
subject does not resonate with spiritual transcendence that one might expect in Eliot or 
H.D., it is nevertheless in an ideal state.  
For Bishop, however, the isolated and discrete subject is just a starting point for 
the important transformation to come. Bishop disrupts the transcendent image of unity 
with an unexplainable but undeniable occurrence: 
Suddenly there was a motion, 
as startling, there, to every sense 
as an explosion. Then it dropped 
to insistent, cautious creeping 
in the region of the heart, 
prodding me from desperate sleep. 
Bishop offers no explanation for the sudden motion that discomposes the speaker, and 
without an apparent cause, the motion seems external, an event outside the subject’s 
control. Bishop does not provide Pound’s will to power or H.D.’s protected shell-fish 
subject. And yet, the disturbing movement is internal, “in the region of the heart.” Bishop 
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mixes the internal and external so that each is implicated in the other. Desire cannot be 
turned away, and internal desire will always seek the external world: 
The rooted heart began to change 
(not beat) and then it split apart 
and from it broke a flood of water. 
Two rivers glanced off from the sides, 
one to the right, one to the left, 
two rushing, half-clear streams, 
(the ribs made of them two cascades) 
which assuredly, smooth as glass, 
went off through the fine black grains of earth. 
The weed, as Bishop’s new figure for the efflorescence of desire, overtakes the heart, the 
traditional symbol for desire, and breaks it apart. Water emerges, representing the flow 
and dynamism of a new subjectivity. Bishop’s symbol is water rather than blood because 
blood is too much our own and not enough an object of the external world. Here, subjects 
are no longer safe or at rest; instead, they inevitably pass into the external world. The 
water represents the merging of self and world; it cascades through the body and runs 
into the “fine black grains of earth.” The poem’s form, a long stream of lines 
uninterrupted by stanza breaks, reinforces this sense of movement. The unified and 
objective self gives way to a flowing, dynamic interaction with the world. 
 “The Weed” is not, however, a joyous breakthrough narrative; it is far from a 
simple celebration of desire’s release into the world. At times, the poem reads like a 
Gothic horror story. While the poem offers a new vision of the self, it develops a palpable 
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apprehension toward this new formulation. For instance, the poem has a Gothic setting in 
“some cold and close-built bower,” a scene of constriction and claustrophobia. Also, the 
second parenthetical phrase insists that “(All this was in the dark).” The weed’s sudden 
motion is internal to the self but cannot be explained by the speaker, nor can her senses 
capture the events with any certainty. Drops of the flooding water fall in her eyes, and “in 
that black place” she cannot be sure what she sees. Deprived of her senses and very 
literally coming apart, the subject is haunted by the weed. The unified subject is relegated 
to parentheses: the parenthetical statements throughout the poem represent the voice of a 
subject engaged in the attempt to retain unity at all costs. Even the water, for instance, 
might be hoped to contain the self: 
(As if a river should carry all 
the scenes that it had once reflected 
shut in its waters, and not floating 
on momentary surfaces.) 
The parenthetical voice of the subject speaks of continuity and temporal integrity despite 
the passing of the self. Parentheses themselves graphically contain and unify a thought, 
but in a larger sense they disrupt the flow of thought where they are wedged. In this way 
Bishop intensifies conflicting forms of subjectivity—the stable and the flowing. 
 The poem closes with the weed, which has developed the power of speech, 
offering a grim promise: “‘I grow’ it said, / ‘but to divide your heart again.’” The poem 
does not present a new vision of subjectivity; it places competing visions in terrifying 
conflict. On one hand, a new, flowing, decentered self emerges from stasis, but it is 
haunted by the legacy of a self-authorizing, willful subject. The speaker is a stranger to 
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herself. Bishop’s poem carefully develops tension between the inevitability of dissolution 
and the liminal remains of unified subjectivity. Desire, in this context, is potentially free 
and flowing, or it is fused under the authority of the subject. “The Weed” captures a 
middle ground in which the subject is caught up in a struggle concerning her own origins. 
For Bishop, conflict and division are fundamental and ontological aspects of 
being. Rather than a Prufrock who conceives of himself as unified but afflicted by 
evidence of fragmentation, Bishop’s speaker imagines a dispersed subject still plagued by 
thoughts of unity. “The Gentleman of Shalott” is perhaps the clearest expression of 
Bishop’s conception of desire and division. The poem’s protagonist recognizes himself as 
a person made up of one half body and one half mirrored reflection: 
Which eye’s his eye? 
Which limb lies 
next the mirror? 
For neither is clearer 
nor a different color 
than the other, 
nor meets a stranger 
in this arrangement 
of leg and leg and 
arm and so on. (7-8) 
The primary aspect of being in the world, the poem suggests, is the sense that we are not 
fully real. The protagonist feels that a part of himself is unreal, but he cannot distinguish 
which, “[f]or neither is clearer” than the other. Subjectivity is the illusion of being whole. 
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Bishop’s gentleman of Shalott recognizes the rift at the center of being; he is essentially a 
disjunction. The man doubts the wholeness of his own body and recognizes the 
inadmissibility of his own senses. He cannot, in fact, tell exactly what is his true self and 
what is mere reflection. The poem destabilizes any sense of idealized unity and undercuts 
the very notion of a “true” self. In Bishop’s poem, the mirror is now an essential part of 
the protagonist’s subjectivity: 
To his mind 
it’s the indication 
of a mirrored reflection 
somewhere along the line 
of what we call the spine. 
The spine, the structural center of the body, is built upon the uncertainty of a mere 
“indication”; objects are not solid and incontrovertible but are built around a “reflection.” 
The assonance of “mind,” “line,” and “spine” pulls these words together to emphasize the 
construction of selfhood (mind and body) around the less definite, less certain words 
contained between them: “indication” and “reflection.” Furthermore, the physical 
integrity of the self is put under the conceptual authority of the mind, but it is a mind 
plagued by uncertainty. The spine, now made up of indications and reflections, is 
presented “To his mind.” The first stanza ends with the mind’s tentative determinations. 
The next stanza depends on the mind’s effort to make sense of the interaction with the 
mirror but ends by doubting its ability to succeed. It is unclear whether the glass stretches 
“down his middle / or rather down the edge.” If the mirror reflects half his body, then his 
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middle is his edge. Rather than a “middle” or an internal core of being, the man is all 
edge and thus everywhere exposed.  
For Bishop, split subjectivity involves the conflict of the two desires evident in 
“The Weed”: the need for wholeness and the opposing desire for dissolution and 
dissemination into the world. In Bishop’s work, this latter need is not a positive desire as 
much as it is a reaction to the exigencies of the world. It is the need to recognize the 
demands made by reality. Indeed, Bishop’s poetic vision is troubled by the idea that 
external reality overmasters us. The gentleman of Shalott must accept the state of affairs: 
[. . .] The uncertainty 
he says he 
finds exhilarating. He loves 
that sense of constant re-adjustment. 
He wishes to be quoted as saying at present: 
“Half is enough.” 
The subject creates himself by paradoxically conceding his own divisibility and 
diminishment: half is enough. Bishop exposes the irony of the man’s resolution by 
leaving a gap between his statements and his wishes. He “says” he finds the uncertainty 
exhilarating, and he “wishes to be quoted” that he is satisfied. Also, by expecting to be 
quoted, the speaker detaches his feelings from his words as well as his future self from 
his present self. The detachment is formalized in the separate line “he says he,” which is 
itself a mirror, with the subject reflected by his act of speaking—which is actually only a 
wish to be quoted. His subjectivity emerges from his wish rather than his reality. 
Bishop’s rhymes also undercut the plausibility that he is content, for “uncertainty” 
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rhymes with “he,” aligning the self with uncertainty. She also admits the insufficiency of 
his response in the poem’s form. The poem is subtlely unresolved when the final stanza is 
fourteen lines long, one line shorter than each of the first two stanzas, lightly hinting that 
the poem, like the subject, is partial, incomplete, and unfulfilled. The longing for 
completion is not realized but rather is released into a missing fifteenth line as a figure for 
the future into which the man carefully hobbles. The poem is striking for how intensely it 
imagines the problem of split subjectivity and how thoroughly it defers the question of 
desire. Bishop’s most emphatic point is that there is a world to which we are necessarily, 
and perhaps terribly, subject. This concession separates Bishop from the poets who 
preceded her. Pound, Stevens, Eliot, and H.D. imagine themselves achieving ideal spaces, 
whether hermetic, linguistic, or spiritual. Even at their most painful or uncertain, they 
attempt to shore up the fragments they discover. Bishop’s “The Gentleman of Shalott,” 
by contrast, recounts his resignation to the fact that the problem of split subjectivity 
cannot be solved; it can only be accommodated as the new reality. 
Bishop’s poem seems almost to anticipate Jacques Lacan’s theory of the mirror 
stage: Bishop’s subject recognizes that he is the result of a process much like the 
formation of subjectivity Lacan described. Lacan argues that the infant’s act of seeing 
himself in a mirror is a foundational moment that establishes subjectivity based on an 
identification with the object in the mirror. In Lacan’s theory, the child understands 
himself as the apparently whole and self-sufficient being in the mirror. The visual image 
of the self, the imago, unifies what is otherwise a disparate and chaotic collection of 
drives, capabilities, and frustrations. For Lacan, this act of identification is essentially a 
 172 
misrecognition. The “I” the child forms in that moment becomes an Ideal-I always 
discordant with the actual self: 
this form [in the mirror] situates the agency of the ego, before its social 
determination, in a fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for 
the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being (le 
devenir) of the subject asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical 
syntheses by which he must resolve as I his discordance with his own reality. 
(Écrits 2) 
The child’s assumption of wholeness and self-sufficiency is an ideal that provides the 
foundation for his self-conception, but this ideal diverges from the real situation. Lacan 
argues that the imago is fictional because the child is unable to control his body or its 
functions. Subjects are constructed in the moment they are presented with the image of 
their wholeness and mastery, but he contends that we only approach this ideal 
asymptotically, always leaving a rift between physical insufficiency and the image of 
sufficiency that is necessarily fictional. This rift remains at the center of being, founding 
subjects as inevitably alienated. 
 Pound’s self-authorizing subject, Eliot’s sublimating purgatorial subject, and 
H.D.’s cocooned worm are all attempts to retain unity by withdrawing desire from the 
chaotic world and investing it in the self and its symbolic creations; this attempt to retain 
unity is akin to Lacan’s imago. By contrast, Bishop’s subject consciously recognizes the 
falsity of the imago. In “The Weed” and “The Gentleman of Shalott,” the subject cannot 
marshal its desire into a stable and quiescent unity. Rather than a discrete imago, 
Bishop’s subject is immanent, either flowing over the earth or shuffling off into the 
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world. Bishop develops tension between contrasting spatial metaphors. She often 
substitutes back-and-forth horizontal movement, which signifies the immanent subject, 
for stasis or vertical movement. “The Man-Moth,” for example, offers a narrative tension 
between the unified and dispersed models of the self by presenting the subject’s struggle 
for vertical movement and the need to settle for horizontal movement. These axes 
represent, on the one hand, the spiritual transcendence of Eliot and H.D., who ascend out 
of the sensuous world, and, on the other, the new immanent subject who moves 
horizontally through the socially articulated environment. 
 The first half of the poem describes the man-moth’s attempt to reach the moon, 
that is, to achieve a vertical movement of transcendence: 
  But when the Man-Moth 
pays his rare, although occasional, visits to the surface, 
the moon looks rather different to him. He emerges 
from an opening under the edge of one of the sidewalks 
and nervously begins to scale the faces of the buildings. 
He thinks the moon is a small hole at the top of the sky, 
proving the sky quite useless for protection. 
He trembles, but must investigate as high as he can climb. 
 
  Up the facades, 
his shadow dragging like a photographer’s cloth behind him, 
he climbs fearfully, thinking that this time he will manage 
to push his small head through that round clean opening 
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and be forced through, as from a tube, in black scrolls on the light. (10-12) 
For a poet well known for her accurate and evocative descriptions, Bishop leaves her 
protagonist a shadowy figure. She renders him in terms of his actions as well as his 
essential dividedness. He is, after all, a man-moth, a subject of split identity, the 
conjunction of two types of being, human and insect. The only visual description of him 
early in the poem focuses more on his shadow than his identifiable features. He is quite 
like the shadow he drags with him. Without clear qualities of his own, he is reduced to 
his desire to escape. He does not try to reach the moon because it is an object he can 
touch or a new place he can exist; he believes it is an opening in the sky, through which 
he hopes to be “forced through, as from a tube, in black scrolls on the light.” His attempt 
to reach whatever exists beyond the sky represents the desire to achieve a place beyond 
the world where the subject transcends the sullied and debased external world. But this is 
not a very liberating release, being forced through as though from a tube. In fact, the 
proverbial moth to a flame suggests a desperate compulsion to suicide. However, the 
place beyond the moon would protect the man-moth from the world. Like Eliot’s notion 
of poetic experience in lieu of sensual desire, or H.D.’s concept of a spiritually uplifting 
process of symbolization, Bishop imagines for the man-moth a means of withholding 
desire from a corrupted world. In the poem’s narrative, a realm of subjectivity isolated 
from the world is illusory, and so the man-moth inevitably fails to escape the world. 
Unable to attain transcendent sublimation, the man-moth is forced back into the world of 
degraded objects, into horizontal movement.  
The second half of the poem follows the man-moth’s fall by examining his 
movement in (and discomfort with) the world: 
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  Then he returns 
to the pale subways of cement he calls his home. He flits, 
he flutters, and cannot get aboard the silent trains 
fast enough to suit him. The doors close swiftly. 
The Man-Moth always seats himself facing the wrong way 
and the train starts at once at its full, terrible speed, 
without a shift in gears or a gradation of any sort. 
He cannot tell the rate at which he travels backwards. 
 
  Each night he must 
be carried through artificial tunnels and dream recurrent dreams. 
Without the ability to attain a transcendent realm, the man-moth moves not just 
horizontally but backwards on the subway. Though artificial and repetitious, the external 
world cannot be rejected. The new subject must continue moving, though the man-moth 
has trouble committing to this mode of movement: he backs into a new and necessary 
form of subjectivity. He thus also looks backwards, as if toward past unity.  
 Bishop insists on the heavy emotional toll exacted on the subject confronting a 
transition from unity to dispersion, vertical to horizontal. The man-moth, in fact, 
continues to be suicidal; he must fight the urge to touch the third rail: “He has to keep / 
his hands in his pockets.” The contradiction between these two modes of subjectivity, and 
the ambivalent struggle between them, finds its final symbol in the image of the man-
moth’s tear: 
  If you catch him, 
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hold up a flashlight to his eye. It’s all dark pupil, 
an entire night itself, whose haired horizon tightens 
as he stares back, and closes up the eye. Then from the lids 
one tear, his only possession, like the bee’s sting, slips. 
Slyly he palms it, and if you’re not paying attention 
he’ll swallow it. However, if you watch, he’ll hand it over, 
cool as from underground springs and pure enough to drink. 
The man-moth drinks his tear as if emotional pain is a sustaining purity. The drive toward 
transcendence represented by his attempt to reach the moon cannot provide deliverance; 
instead, life is guaranteed only by the emotional price he pays. His pain of being in the 
world sustains him. Despite the apparent sadness of the horizontal and immersed life, it is 
the necessary complement to the compulsion toward the vertical. And though he moves 
back and forth, traveling backward throughout the city, he still gains a measure of unity 
in his “only possession,” the solitary tear. Through the expression of his persistent desire 
to reach the moon and its inevitable failure, he can at least be unified by his pain. 
 “The Weed,” “The Gentleman of Shalott,” and “The Man-Moth” can be grouped 
among Bishop’s “fable” poems. These poems eschew a realistic setting, full of the 
common objects of the real world, for a reduced environment meant only to give enough 
detail for a symbolic narrative. Thomas J. Travisano marks three stages in Bishop’s 
poetic development that begins with these imaginative fable poems and moves toward 
more personal and realistic material: 
Her early phase shows her as a reluctant master of the symbolist’s private world, a 
world that renounces history for the ambiguous pleasures of enclosure. Her 
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middle phase reflected years of travel and observation, through which isolation 
might be at least temporarily bridged. It [. . .] [combines] the precision and 
conciseness of imagism with a liberating dimension of temporal development. 
Her last phase reverses the earliest, engaging with personal and private history. 
The yearning for enclosure is still powerful, but it is controlled by a calm and 
expansive vision. (7) 
Travisano’s term “enclosure” correlates to the tendency I have described early in the 
century to protect the self by retracting desire from the objects of the world. But he 
overlooks the fact that even Bishop’s early poems imagine releases from such enclosures. 
Travisano maintains, for instance, that the gentleman of Shalott has “mastered the art of 
evading experience by inventing an absorbing game; his delusion gives him an excuse to 
watch himself” (29). “The Gentleman of Shalott,” however, does not describe the evasion 
of experience but rather creates an unsettling image of experience in the modern world 
after one ceases to subscribe to the unified imago. Anne Stevenson also dismisses some 
of Bishop’s early poems for their apparent playfulness. She calls “The Gentleman of 
Shalott” a “play on the bilateral symmetry of human anatomy” and “a spoof on 
Tennysonian Romanticism and a satire on modern man’s preoccupation with split 
personality” (64). Stevenson’s view of the poem as a “play,” a “spoof,” and a “satire” 
denies its serious statement of Bishop’s concept of subjectivity in the modern world. 
However, Stevenson relents later in her study when she points out that “Bishop becomes 
so preoccupied with the nature of experience and with the complexity of the questions 
experience provokes that, in the end, she can answer them only provisionally” (112). In 
this sense, Stevenson recognizes that even the fable poems, or the “enclosure” poems, 
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examine important questions about subjectivity and desire. In fact, I argue that they only 
seem provisional because they are delicately balanced between the unified subject and the 
emerging immanent subject. They are not “provisional” for Bishop any more than a bird 
jumping off a branch before flapping its wings is “falling”; instead, they are pivotal, 
representing a transition from the unified imago that retains and willfully directs its desire 
away from the world to a dissolved subject who flows into the world. 
 Viewing Bishop’s early work in terms of the transition to an externally exposed 
subject allows for a reading of her later work that reveals a remarkably consistent concern 
with one’s interactions in a world that cannot be dismissed. Though her materials change, 
she remains focused on the problem of interacting with the world after the breakdown of 
the unified subject. In a late poem such as “The End of March,” for instance, the 
emphasis on horizontal movement in her earlier work recurs. The poem recounts a walk 
along the beach. The speaker wants “to get as far as my proto-dream-house / my crypto-
dream-house, that crooked box,” which is reminiscent of the man-moth’s desire to reach 
the moon (167-69). In both cases, the subject would be outside the world, moving toward 
a self-canceling place. The man-moth would be dissolved into the universe; the speaker 
of “The End of March,” if she can attain the small abandoned house, would do nothing: 
I’d like to retire there and do nothing, 
or nothing much, forever, in two bare rooms: 
look through binoculars, read boring books, 
old, long, long books, and write down useless notes, 
talk to myself, and, foggy days, 
watch the droplets slipping, heavy with light. 
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Bishop signals the refuge of literature, the sublimation of desire into “boring books” and 
“useless notes.” The image echoes the opening section of The Waste Land, whose 
speaker puts behind him the sledding in the mountains for the dull security of “reading 
much of the night.” But from this reserved and protected place, the speaker would “watch 
the droplets slipping,” an image reminiscent of the man-moth’s tear, the sustaining but 
painful product of emotional pain. Like the moon, however, the tiny house is impossible: 
And a light to read by—perfect! But—impossible. 
And that day the wind was much too cold 
even to get that far, 
and of course the house was boarded up. 
Bishop suggests that the protected and unified subject, represented by the boarded-up 
imago, is unattainable. Instead, the world intervenes as the cold wind forces them to turn 
back. Rather than achieving a motionless and protected space, the speaker must continue 
moving horizontally through the world.  
Bishop also rejects an elevating transcendence through the symbol of the kite 
string. As the speaker and an unnamed friend walk along the beach the two come upon 
lengths and lengths, endless, of wet white string, 
looping up to the tide-line, down to the water, 
over and over. Finally, they did end: 
a thick white snarl, man-size, awash, 
rising on every wave, a sodden ghost, 
falling back, sodden, giving up the ghost. . . . 
A kite string?—But no kite. 
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The string represents the “endless” horizontal path upon which the immanent subject 
moves, looping back and forth from water to beach. Rather than a string that leads to a 
transcendent kite high above the complicated world, the string loops along the coastline 
and does, in fact, end in a clotted mass.  This “man-size” collection of string symbolizes 
Bishop’s concept of the subject: a string of horizontality awash in the tides of a world that 
sends it in and out, back and forth, without a transcendent possibility. Bishop’s subject 
has no hope of encompassing the sensual world in its view and no ability to withdraw 
itself. Bishop ends the poem by imagining a power that ensures the human subject’s 
participation in the world. The sun is deified as a “lion sun” with the power to affect 
objects: “—a sun who’d walked the beach the last low tide, / making those big, majestic 
paw-prints, / who perhaps had batted a kite out of the sky to play with.” The lion bats 
down the kite that might have risen above the world, symbolizing the difficulty of 
transcending immersion in the world or escaping the everyday reality of our 
surroundings. The end of the dream to reach the protected house is followed by the end of 
the dream of transcendence, concluding with a cold and necessary immanence.  
Throughout her work, Bishop portrays the intrusion of nature into human 
experience rather than calling for a purer, more direct experience of nature. She marvels 
at nature’s tendency to interrupt what would otherwise be a thoroughly human 
experience. In “View of the Capitol from The Library of Congress,” for example, the 
music of the Air Force band playing in Washington, DC cannot make its way to her 
untrammeled by nature: 
On the east steps the Air Force Band 
in uniforms of Air Force blue 
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is playing hard and loud, but—queer— 
the music doesn’t quite come through. 
 
It comes in snatches, dim then keen, 
then mute, and yet there is no breeze. 
The giant trees stand in between. 
I think the trees must intervene. (52-53) 
Human activity is muted by the environment in which it must act. The world is something 
one must fight through. Bishop contrasts human and natural worlds, finding that the latter 
thwarts rather than facilitates human transcendence. Thus, she contradicts the romantic 
view in which nature is a source of human strength, but she also refuses the modernist 
strategy in which the subject’s creative authority might construct a symbolic realm that 
achieves sublimation. Instead, Bishop puts the two forces into tense conflict; they 
complicate each other in a way that cannot be transcended. Without either a view of 
nature as a force that can elevate human endeavors or a view in which human control 
surmounts nature, Bishop can only politely request space for expression: 
Great shades, edge over, 
give the music room. 
The gathered brasses want to go 
boom—boom. 
The yearning of the brass band is a playful image, especially in the ironic distance 
between the “Air Force” and the obvious lack of force the band can project through the 
air. But the threatening “boom” is serious. The boom is not the consummation of desire 
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in the external world; it represents the lingering wish for desire’s authority over the 
world. Bishop’s subject, now immanent, cannot relinquish the desire for separation and 
protection. Therefore, the external world often appears as looming, dangerous, or hostile.  
The intrusion of nature is a persistent theme in Bishop’s work, often playing out 
in the extreme ways her poetic speakers perceive their physical surroundings. For 
instance, an unpublished poem titled “Rainy Day, Rio,” transforms natural objects into 
invasive and threatening intruders: 
Mountains should really not protrude 
In city streets and brandish trees 
At skyscrapers, nor should the seas 
Roar at the business-man. So rude 
Of Nature not to go away 
But hang around the wondrous bay. (247) 
The features of nature take on exaggerated form, disquieting the speaker. Though the 
image of mountains brandishing the trees is playful, it reveals Bishop’s significant 
departure from romantic nature imagery, which often refers to nature as harmonious and 
transporting. She also diverges from an earlier modernist view of nature: Pound’s nature 
is flat and limp, Eliot’s urban imagery leaves nature ruined and wasted, and H.D.’s 
natural processes are often deadly. Wallace Stevens’ sensibility is perhaps closest to 
Bishop’s in terms of the imagination’s ability to transform nature, and one can picture 
Stevens using the image of a mountain brandishing trees. But notwithstanding that 
Bishop has often been compared to Stevens, there is a crucial difference: whereas 
Bishop’s subject must react to nature, Stevens’ subject inverts the relationship so that 
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nature is secondary. In “Anecdote of the Jar,” for instance, the jar placed on the hill tames 
nature: 
It made the slovenly wilderness 
Surround that hill. 
 
The wilderness rose up to it, 
And sprawled around, no longer wild. (Collected Poems 76) 
The jar is a figure for the human imagination, and the world only emerges through it. It 
takes “dominion everywhere.” Stevens contends that the world is made through the 
imagination, and his poetry is a catalog of its manifestations. In his later poems, Stevens 
carries out his argument in more overtly philosophical discourse, dispensing with the 
need to portray the world at all. He subordinates the external world to a theory of 
language—a human system of representation—that brings things into being: 
Thus the theory of description matters most. 
It is the theory of the world for those 
 
For whom the word is the making of the world, 
The buzzing world and lisping firmament. 
 
It is a world of words to the end of it, 
In which nothing solid is its solid self. (301) 
Stevens contrasts word and world, privileging the former as endlessly productive. The 
world of objects does not intrude or impose; it emerges in the malleable forms extruded 
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through the human mind. For Stevens, description without place is a power of the 
imagination, which he calls “the power of the mind over the possibility of things” 
(“Imagination as Value” 726). Bishop makes no such argument for the power of 
language. Instead, language and imagination must contend with a world that invades the 
human realm. 
For Bishop, imagination is a means for reacting to a world that cannot be denied 
or created. This is true even in the poems about sleep and dreams where the imagination 
is thought to have free reign by various literary movements, including surrealism. 
Especially in her early poems, Bishop was influenced by the startling relationships 
created by surrealist writers. Many of her early poems explore the strange state of sleep, 
employing dream-like imagery to defamiliarize the natural world. However, in these 
poems, dreams do not distance one from meaning and causality; instead, they provoke 
danger, discomfort, and anxiety. The speaker of “The Unbeliever,” for instance, sleeps on 
the top of a mast and thinks: “I must not fall. / The spangled sea below wants me to fall. / 
It is hard as diamonds; it wants to destroy us all” (17). He remains frozen in a nightmare, 
frightfully balanced high above the sea. Sleep is not a protected state or a realm where the 
subject is the artificer of the world that Stevens imagines. Rather than an imaginative 
power that creates or transforms reality, Bishop’s dreams merely turn “ninety dark 
degrees”: 
As we lie down to sleep the world turns half away 
   through ninety dark degrees; 
      the bureau lies on the wall 
and thoughts that were recumbent in the day  
 185 
      rise as others fall, 
   stand up and make a forest of thick-set trees. (“Sleeping Sanding Up” 22-23) 
Sleep allows a different perspective, at right angles from our waking lives, but turning 
away does not leave reality behind. In fact, the underlying thoughts of daytime are 
intensified and rise up at night. The dream, however, is not a source of fresh, valid 
insights about these thoughts that unleash the unconscious as it is for surrealists. Instead, 
daytime thoughts stand up at night as obstacles around which dreams must move to reach 
destinations they cannot find. Dreams cannot construct their worlds, they can only try to 
smash through them: 
The armored cars of dreams, contrived to let us do 
   so many a dangerous thing, 
      are chugging at its edge 
all camouflaged, and ready to go through 
      the swiftest streams, or up a ledge 
   of crumbling shale, while plates and trappings ring. 
The dream world threatens to crumble, while the dream itself, an armored car, jolts and 
rings out. The dream is in peril, either because the armored car may come apart or 
because the “ringing” is an alarm that wakes the sleeper. In either case, the dream is no 
longer a radical, striking flash of knowledge; it is a loss of focus or direction. Richard 
Mullen points out that Bishop’s artistc method is unlike surrealism in that she “prefers to 
investigate natural displacement” that comes from closely observing the world and 
recognizing its peculiarities (78). Mullen suggests that Bishop exaggerates proportion, 
incongruity, contiguity, and sensuality in order to “accentuate the odd confrontation of 
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internal and external worlds” (79). In “Sleeping Standing Up,” Bishop emphasizes the 
contrast between reality and dream, poking fun at the willfulness and insularity of 
dreams, which are just attempts to crash through the issues of being in the world. Bishop, 
therefore, warns us away from dreams as a refuge or a new world and instead insists on 
immanence, our necessary existence in the real world. The poem ends with a complex 
and ambivalent retelling of the Hansel and Gretel fairy tale: 
—Through turret-slits we saw the crumbs or pebbles that lay 
   below the riveted flanks 
      on the green forest floor, 
like those the clever children placed by day 
      and followed to their door 
   one night, at least; and in the ugly tanks 
 
we tracked them all the night. Sometimes they disappeared, 
   dissolving in the moss, 
      sometimes we went too fast 
and ground them underneath. How stupidly we steered 
      until the night was past 
   and never found out where the cottage was. 
On one level the trail represents the desire for a safe and secluded cottage away from the 
world, and the poem is a journey through a dark land toward a final and protective rest. 
Therefore the poem achieves an emotional tenor of loss accomplished by the loss of the 
trail. Whether through over-excitement (“we went too fast / and ground them 
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underneath”) or factors related to the instability of the dream world (“dissolving in the 
moss”), the failure to reach the cottage is the moving anti-climax of the poem. 
On another level, however, the return to reality is the necessary resolution to the 
problem of dreams the poem addresses; although reality is an anti-climax, it is inevitable. 
Bishop critiques the self-authorizing, creative power of the human mind and works 
toward a poetic culmination that reintegrates the self back into the world. The poem 
operates on both of these levels, the desire for sleep and seclusion as well as the 
recognition of inexorable morning. The longing for the cottage represents the wish for 
withdrawal from the world, like the man-moth’s moon, the tomb in “The Weed,” or the 
dream-house in “The End of March.” But, as it is in the other poems, withdrawal is given 
up for movement and immanence. The poem rejects dreams for their insularity, revealing 
how they tread over their own trails; the dream abrogates itself, and the dreamer must 
always awaken.  
In other early poems, the speakers evaluate contrasting symbols of immanence 
and withdrawal and ultimately recognize the need to interact with the world. In “Cirque 
d’Hiver,” for example, Bishop dismisses the toy dancer who twirls on the back of the toy 
horse. The dancer simply “turns and turns,” while the horse “canters three steps, then he 
makes a bow, / canters again, bows on one knee, / canters, then clicks and stops, and 
looks at me” (23-24). The horse and dancer are described in terms of their movements, 
with the horse cantering horizontally forward while the dancer spins round and round on 
the horse’s back. Although his progress is by fits and starts, the horse moves through the 
world while the dancer revolves upon her own center, a motion suggesting inwardness: 
The dancer, by this time, has turned her back. 
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[The horse] is the more intelligent by far. 
Facing each other rather desperately— 
his eye is like a star— 
we stare and say, “Well, we have come this far.” 
The dancer’s spinning movement is characterized as a continual turning of her back in a 
self-made oblivion. Bishop contends that the horse is “more intelligent” because he does 
not shrink from his external environment. Although, as in “The Weed,” there is a certain 
amount of desperation in the full acceptance of the external world, the desire for reality 
has genuine force in Bishop’s work. “Chemin de Fer” reiterates this desire. Bishop 
describes a hermit who shouts across his pond “Love should be put into action!” (7). But 
the poem ends as he waits for an echo to confirm his call. He is caught in the gap between 
wanting to enter the sensual world and needing to hang back from it. Bishop ultimately 
condemns the man, described as “the dirty hermit,” who remains isolated by his pond, 
which is “like an old tear / holding onto its injuries / lucidly year after year.” Like the 
man-moth, the hermit lives by his tears, surviving alongside the pond containing his 
emotions. He receives Bishop’s censure because he rejects the world. He represents one 
who has achieved the lost cottage or the impossible dream-house, but he is locked in an 
emotionally barren stasis. The hermit may shout about love, but he continues to withhold 
it. 
 
 Bishop’s poems are driven by two ideas. First, the subject is split and immanent. 
Second, and related to the first, the mind is not the ultimate authority in one’s experience 
of the world. Bishop’s perspective is anti-Cartesian, anti-subjectivist, and, in the end, 
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anti-transcendent. Her fundamental aesthetic principle is to express the imposition of the 
reality principle. Reality surrounds the subject, and there is no way to make it conform to 
her or his wishes. In Freudian terms, one must give up the pleasure principle in the face 
of reality. Although subjects naturally aim to satisfy their instincts, they contend with an 
external environment that frustrates their aims. The drama of this frustration is the 
cornerstone of Bishop’s poetry. The poems discussed so far reveal how Bishop 
establishes these concerns. The next step in coming to an understanding of her work is to 
see what paths forward she makes available. She offers a series of responses along a 
continuum from bleak acceptance of the external reality to the subject’s ability to 
represent the world. The observers in Bishop’s most descriptive poems acquiesce to the 
external world. In these poems, the world dictates to the subject and can appear stark and 
uncharitable. On the other end of the spectrum, the subject understands the objects of the 
world through desire, the imagination’s conception of how self and world interrelate. For 
Bishop, art has the power to put the subject’s desire into a new mode. The power to 
represent the world becomes a means of communication, integration, and fellow feeling. 
 Bishop’s descriptive poems such as “Cape Breton,” “A Cold Spring,” and “The 
Bight” dramatize the subject’s acceptance of an objective environment. The poems are 
filled with careful observations of nature and feature speakers who note the details 
surrounding them. Bishop often deprecates her descriptive poems. When sending “Cape 
Breton” to The New Yorker, she writes “I don’t know whether you could possibly be 
interested in another plain description from me, but I am sending it along” (New Yorker 
38). A cursory reading of the poem supports the impression of it as “plain description,” a 
graceful and glowing tribute to the world’s strange beauty and presence. 
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Out on the high “bird islands,” Ciboux and Hertford, 
the razorbill auks and the silly-looking puffins all stand 
with their backs to the mainland 
in solemn, uneven lines along the cliff’s brown grass-frayed edge, 
while the few sheep pastured there go “Baa, baa.” (48-50) 
In many ways, the poem is a description of nature with no claims beyond its careful and 
patient attention to the natural environment. The poem provides accurate contextual 
details including place names that help develop a keen sense of location. The description 
is precise and minute, such as the specific “brown grass-frayed edge” of the cliff. But a 
parenthetical remark follows that disrupts the direct presentation of nature. Bishop often 
uses parentheses to complicate the foregoing surface meaning. In this case, the natural 
environment is suddenly invested with dangerous implications: “(Sometimes, frightened 
by aeroplanes, they stampede / and fall over into the sea or onto the rocks.)” This 
disturbing observation exceeds objective description, first by temporally interjecting a 
fact that is not presently being observed, and second by its off-handed gruesomeness. The 
lively, vibrant, and innocent islands are suddenly dangerous; the activity of life is shaded 
with the possibility of death.4 
For Bishop, the observer’s ability to perceive objects is a way to explore how the 
subject interacts with the external world: 
The silken water is weaving and weaving, 
disappearing under the mist equally in all directions, 
lifted and penetrated now and then 
by one shag’s dripping serpent-neck, 
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and somewhere the mist incorporates the pulse, 
rapid but unurgent, of a motorboat. 
The water is metaphorically “silken,” suggesting that it is not a unified and already-
existing object; it is woven together to form her perception of the ocean. In other words, 
the speaker begins with threads and sees them woven together to form the sea. The 
viewer is surrounded by hints of the world and has only moments of cohesive totality; the 
mist is “lifted and penetrated now and then.” The viewer can only see the ocean when it 
drips off the rocks perceived as a “serpent-neck.” Perception involves the interplay of 
imagination and reality. The world “incorporates the pulse” of the human activities in it. 
This bit of “plain description” is incredibly complex in how it imbricates the subject into 
an autonomous world that cannot be perceived objectively. The poem reveals a synthesis 
of subjective impression and objective reality. After establishing the viewer as one who 
both perceives reality and shapes a response to it, Bishop describes the world that 
emerges. The primary feature of nature is its miserliness; it is reputed to have so much to 
offer, but the speaker cannot reach it. The poem evokes a sense of concealment: 
The road appears to have been abandoned. 
Whatever the landscape had of meaning appears to have been abandoned, 
unless the road is holding it back, in the interior, 
where we cannot see, 
where deep lakes are reputed to be, 
and disused trails and mountains of rock 
and miles of burnt forests standing in gray scratches. 
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The world can be described, but it only reveals lack and absence. The speaker searches 
the world carefully only to find things “abandoned,” “disused,” “closed,” and “burnt.” Its 
meaning is held back “where we cannot see.” Though the speaker is inevitably forced to 
contend with the natural environment, she is not able to apprehend it. Bishop describes a 
world where everything is closed and “today no flag is flying.” When the bus stops and 
the speaker watches a man carrying a baby get off, there is a momentary possibility of a 
human world rather than an unyielding and inadequate realm of nature, but he disappears 
into the distance toward a home she cannot see. Human contact is ephemeral and, like the 
serpent neck, more imagined than achieved. The poem’s final verse paragraph begins 
with a return to the constant activity of the world: “The birds keep on singing, a calf 
bawls, the bus starts.” Though it cannot be fully apprehended, and in fact seems to 
withhold so much, the world continues. At the same time, however, Bishop undercuts its 
presence by returning to the image of mist: “The thin mist follows / the white mutations 
of its dream; / an ancient chill is rippling the dark brooks.” The world is both undeniably 
real and somehow made of mist. The subject must travel through a domain of nature that 
refuses to coalesce. Though the “dark brooks” may be objective facts of nature, the 
viewer perceives the “ancient chill” in them, perceiving an imagined world within a real 
world both dark and unsustaining. 
 Bishop’s most pronounced example of the disparity between the real world and 
imaginative possibility is “Sandpiper,” where the capacity to articulate a response to the 
world is missing. From the sandpiper’s perspective, the entire world alternates between 
moments of clarity and moments of utter confusion: 
The roaring alongside he takes for granted 
 193 
and that every so often the world is bound to shake. 
He runs, he runs to the south, finical, awkward, 
in a state of controlled panic, a student of Blake. 
 
The beach hisses like fat. On his left, a sheet 
of interrupting water comes and goes 
and glazes over his dark and brittle feet. 
He runs, he runs straight through it, watching his toes. (125-26) 
The sandpiper tries to go about his business without paying attention to his environment; 
he only knows it will shake when the waves come in and the surf splashes into mist. And 
yet every move he makes is, in some sense, a response to his physical environment. The 
sea forces him to run, a desperate activity doubled in the first stanza and repeated later. 
He is frenzied in response to a world that roars, shakes, hisses, and interrupts. The bird, 
like the immanent subject, represents subjectivity that must move back and forth 
horizontally in a world he cannot deny or transcend. In this poem, however, the physical 
objects surrounding the subject are breaking down into ever smaller parts. The world of 
absence and concealment in “Cape Breton” begins to disintegrate in “Sandpiper,” as the 
waves dissolve the world to tiny grains of sand: 
 [. . .] As he runs, 
he stares at the dragging grains. 
 
The world is a mist. And then the world is 
minute and vast and clear. The tide 
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is higher or lower. He couldn’t tell you which. 
His beak is focussed; he is preoccupied, 
 
looking for something, something, something. 
Poor bird, he is obsessed! 
The millions of grains are black, white, tan, and gray, 
mixed with quartz grains, rose and amethyst. 
The grains are dragged away, pulling the world away from him, becoming a “mist” once 
again. His physical environment works against him to the point that it falls apart. The 
bird is driven by instinct to search; he is “focussed,” “preoccupied,” and “obsessed” in a 
harsh and incomprehensible world. He represents pure desire, the instinctual searching 
impulse, made more extreme by the fact that the speaker does not name the object of his 
desire. But the world’s disintegration alternates with the fact that it is also “minute and 
vast and clear,” creating an ambivalent relation to the world. In this clarity, the individual 
grains are revealed in all their variety and beauty. Even as the world dissolves, an 
aesthetic relation to it becomes available. The speaker’s chief criticism of the sandpiper is 
that he does not consider this relation. For instance, he does not known whether the tide is 
higher or lower. The poem ends with a stark juxtaposition of the “poor” bird’s obsession 
and the image of “rose and amethyst” grains of sand. In this sense, he disregards the 
world at the same time he demands something from it. The bird rejects the world while 
simultaneously pursuing his desire, too strong willed, too desiring to construct a more 
meaningful relation to his environment. The same dynamic, unrewarded birds too blindly 
driven, appears in “The Bight”: 
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The birds are outsize. Pelicans crash 
into this peculiar gas unnecessarily hard, 
it seems to me, like pickaxes, 
rarely coming up with anything to show for it, 
and going off with humorous elbowings. (46-47) 
The pelicans desperately crash into the sea looking for food, “pickaxes” that cut into the 
sea for little reward. Bishop emphasizes the physical force of this crashing by speeding 
up their flight, using the word “unnecessarily,” with its six syllables and slippery 
sibilance, leading to the abrupt closure of the “d” in the one-syllable, line-ending word 
“hard.” After this impact, the language slows as the disoriented pelicans get caught in the 
clicking “k” sounds of “like pickaxes.” The speaker watches the “humorous elbowings” 
of the birds as they fly off, their clumsiness a sign they are either too stunned by their 
hard impact with the water or that they are creatures ill-suited to their world. In either 
case, their meager rewards are not proportional to their painful efforts. They remain 
unsatisfied, though they are able to go on searching. 
 And yet, at the same time the poem recounts episodes of unsatisfied desire, it 
offers a more positive vision of persistent activity. Travisano sees the poem as evidence 
of Bishop’s “tough, cheerful resignation to metaphysical uncertainty that allows her to 
see through all kinds of pretentions” (106). The image of the dredge at the end of the 
poem is often read as the simple activity of non-transcendent, grounded human life: 
Click. Click. Goes the dredge, 
and brings up a dripping jawful of marl. 
All the untidy activity continues, 
 196 
awful but cheerful. 
According to Travisano, Bishop is interested in presenting objective descriptions of a 
world that may be lonely or unfulfilling but nevertheless is dynamic and participatory. In 
other words, Bishop refuses to add a transcendent meaning to the natural world as the 
romantics may have done. She presents the marl of a mundane beach rather than 
landscapes of sublimity or intellectual beauty. Travisano suggests that Bishop “savors a 
place rife with crude energy” (108). Laurel Kornhiser also emphasizes Bishop’s 
unromanticized depiction: “Bishop resists drawing any spiritual inferences. Instead, like 
the ‘Click. Click’ of the dredge as it takes a bite of the bight ‘and brings up a dripping 
jawful of marl,’ the poem offers snapshots of what the poet sees. The images are 
absorbing, but [. . .] are not themselves absorbed and transcended” (230). These readings 
point to Bishop’s valuation of the simple operations of the world, her recognition that, as 
fruitless as our actions sometimes are, they reveal themselves as inexorable.  
Beyond the activity of the objective scene, however, Bishop suggests that the 
observer’s imagined relation to the world plays an important role in how it is perceived, 
specifically by using similes that join objects to the speaker’s feelings. For example, the 
blue of the water is like a blue flame, reflecting the dryness she perceives in the scene 
(“the boats are dry, the pilings dry as matches”). The boats are like letters that correspond 
to the speaker’s life: 
Some of the little white boats are still piled up 
against each other, or lie on their sides, stove in, 
and not yet salvaged, if they ever will be, from the last bad storm, 
like torn-open, unanswered letters. 
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The bight is littered with old correspondences. 
For Bishop, it is not enough to observe and describe the world. The poet must recognized 
“correspondences” between the physical environment and human emotion that are as 
emotionally vexed as “correspondences”—letters—between people can be. Bishop 
articulates the link between a person and the world she observes. She briefly describes 
the experience along the bight that gave rise to the poem in a letter to Robert Lowell: 
“The water looks like blue gas—the harbor is always a mess, here, junky little boats all 
piled up, some hung with spongers and always a few half sunk or splintered up from the 
most recent hurricane. It reminds me a little of my desk” (Words in Air 23). What gives 
the poem its energy is the scene’s connection to the observer. In a sense, all the objects 
she sees are “letters” that communicate in a human language, “correspondences” between 
what the observer sees and how the observers sees. Bishop’s reference to the littered 
surface of her desk also points to the act of writing, the attempt to represent the objects of 
the world in terms of how we relate to them. The poem’s subtitle, “On my birthday,” 
organizes the scene from the meaningful perspective of a viewer on a special day, the 
anniversary of the moment one first came into the world. That these observations were 
not on her birthday but were recorded in her letter to Lowell the previous month 
emphasizes the importance of poetic accuracy and meaning rather than flat and factual 
information. As she insisted in her review of Fowlie’s Pantomime, art must capture the 
conflict of the subject in the world. 
 This conflict often emerges in Bishop’s work when she scrutinizes objects of 
representation themselves. A poem like “The Map,” for example, portrays the speaker’s 
act of interpreting a cartographic representation of the world, examining how subjects 
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perceive the external environment and make a place for themselves within it. For Bishop, 
representation is the act of recording the interest, desire, and interaction at work in the 
relationships of the world. For instance, the speaker ponders the reciprocity between land 
and sea as they come into contact: 
Land lies in water; it is shadowed green. 
Shadows, or are they shallows, at its edges 
showing the line of long sea-weeded ledges 
where weeds hang to the simple blue from green. 
Or does the land lean down to lift the sea from under, 
drawing it unperturbed around itself? 
Along the fine tan sandy shelf 
is the land tugging at the sea from under? (3) 
The speaker sees the world as something more than a set of mechanistic processes that 
exclude or damage the subject. Instead, it is dynamic and depends on desire. The viewer 
imagines that the land and the sea are themselves engaged in an interplay. To perceive 
them is not to accept them as incontrovertible objects, immobile and quiescent, but to 
consider how they relate. Instead of the sea resting upon the land, the land might “lean 
down to lift the sea from under.” The image of lifting replaces a passive relationship with 
an active one, emphasizing depth rather than surface: the land is “tugging” from under. 
From this perspective, surfaces merely conceal the activity going on underneath. 
Representation, for Bishop, involves recognizing and depicting our dynamic interaction 
with the world: 
[. . .] We can stroke these lovely bays 
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under a glass as if they were expected to blossom, 
or as if to provide a clean cage for invisible fish. 
The names of seashore towns run out to sea, 
the names of cities cross the neighboring mountains 
—the printer here experiencing the same excitement 
as when emotion too far exceeds its cause. 
These peninsulas take the water between thumb and forefingers 
like women feeling for the smoothness of yard-goods. 
The represented landscape is made up of various examples of touching: the speaker 
imagines stroking the glass and wishing for the world to blossom; the printer of the map 
experiences excessive excitement, writing names all over the map, crossing boundaries, 
covering the landscape. The represented landscape unveils the subject’s role in perceiving 
the external environment. Bishop explores how representations of the world involve the 
subject’s perspective and emotion. The world as we see it is not just a collection of 
objects; it includes the subject’s connection to them. Thus, she ends the poem with the 
contention: “More delicate than the historians’ are the map-makers’ colors.” In this poem, 
the historian is one who collects events, whereas the map-maker considers their 
relationships. Travisano points out that this single statement has been over-emphasized as 
the key to Bishop’s poetic project because it comes down too heavily on the side of 
abstraction, whereas, he argues, “[“The Map” is] poised ambivalently between the 
attractions of the abstracting, fiction-making functions of the map-maker and the more 
matter-of-fact observation and judgment of the historian” (40). In being positioned 
between these “attractions,” however, Bishop actually constructs a dialectical process in 
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which abstraction and description merge in synthesis like the land and sea. The map-
maker must try to delimit physical dimensions and interactions; but questions of 
touching, feeling, crossing, exceeding, and running out to sea are visible in the map-
maker’s art. Bishop seeks to understand how one’s desire marks the world rather than to 
understand the world as it is. 
 Bishop’s task differs from earlier poets such as Eliot because she makes space for 
the subject to interact with the world. Eliot, by contrast, substitutes poetic expression for 
immanence. By withholding desire from the world and creating expressions of 
divergence between self and world—that is, by creating purgatories—Eliot maintains that 
the subject may be refined; his subject suffers the fires of purgatory expressly for 
purgation. Bishop sympathizes with the balance between the contending forces at work in 
Eliot, but she ultimately believes that one cannot keep the world at a distance. Desire 
must go into the world where it will inevitably shape one’s perception of external reality, 
which is expressed through representation. But, for Bishop, representation must embrace 
our interaction with the world rather than our separation from it. Large-scale attempts to 
impose order on the world are misguided because they overlook our necessary commerce 
with our environment. “Large Bad Picture” balances upon this question. The speaker’s 
great-uncle paints a “big picture,” suggesting the impulse to capture the world and place 
it under the artist’s authority. Bishop develops tension between the profusion of chaos 
that makes up the natural world and the painter’s attempt to order it: 
Receding for miles on either side 
into a flushed, still sky 
are overhanging pale blue cliffs 
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hundreds of feet high, 
 
their bases fretted by little arches, 
the entrances to caves 
running in along the level of a bay 
masked by perfect waves. 
 
On the middle of that quiet floor 
sits a fleet of small black ships, 
square-rigged, sails furled, motionless, 
their spars like burnt match-sticks. 
 
And high above them, over the tall cliffs’ 
semi-translucent ranks, 
are scribbled hundreds of fine black birds 
hanging in n’s in banks. (8-9) 
The painter tries to represent a landscape that is full, complex, and variable. It recedes for 
“miles,” the cliffs are “hundreds” of feet high, they are “fretted” by arches; there is a 
“fleet” of ships, and there are “hundreds” of birds. Against this abundance and variety, 
the artist arrays his energies to still or reduce the world. He paints a “still” sky, “perfect” 
waves, a “quiet” floor, “motionless” sails, and “ranks” of birds. These two forces, the rich 
profusion of the world and the desire to distance it through quiescent representation, act 
simultaneously, each of them contending and alternating. The two become wrapped in 
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one, a tense and conflicted standoff. The sixth stanza exposes the intensity of this 
struggle. The visual representation suddenly leaps into the auditory realm: 
One can hear their crying, crying, 
the only sound there is 
except for occasional sighing 
as a large aquatic animal breathes. 
The speaker imagines two sounds emerging from the painting: crying and sighing, 
audible expressions of intense emotion. It is as if the painter’s attempt to make the world 
motionless and perfect has created only a stiff mask, but the reality behind this mask 
protests. The speaker can hear the plaintive crying and recognize that the world is 
undeniable. Despite her great uncle’s effort to freeze or suspend the world, she hears it 
protest. 
 In many ways, “Large Bad Picture” is an argument against representation. We see 
the painter’s efforts through the lens of the poetic speaker, who sees behind the painter’s 
desire for stillness. But the poem presents the speaker’s perspective and not the painter’s. 
It reveals the painter’s desire for a sublimation and control we have come to associate 
with modernism, as well as the speaker’s dismissal of the painter’s vision. And yet, the 
poem ends on a particularly contemplative note that does not quite reject the painter: 
Apparently they have reached their destination. 
It would be hard to say what brought them there, 
commerce or contemplation. 
We might say that the poem creates an ambivalent stasis between “commerce,” the 
immanent subject who is relentlessly in the world, and “contemplation,” the modernist 
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subject who attempts to retain a unified imago in the face of challenges that threaten to 
fragment it. The final image and the question it raises suggest that, at some level, the 
painting is not an utter failure. The painter’s desire to capture the world comes into 
conflict with the world’s ability to escape being captured. The poem considers the 
speaker’s desire to comprehend the collision of these desires, which creates a narrative 
itself. Both the painter’s narrative and the poet’s end by achieving the same fine balance 
between commerce and contemplation. The act of representation, therefore, reveals or 
communicates desire. Like “The Map,” “Large Bad Picture” is partly interested in how 
the act of portraying the world communicates desire. In a sense, Bishop explores 
representation as a way of being in the world rather than a way of rejecting it. 
 Bishop’s late poem entitled “Poem” makes an even greater claim for the value of 
representation. Though the poem appears modest and minute, it reveals a capacity to 
communicate human emotion by portraying the natural environment. Here, the speaker 
considers another painting by her great-uncle. This time, however, she marvels at the 
power of painting to represent everyday objects he has painted “In the foreground / a 
water meadow with some tiny cows, / two brushstrokes each, but confidently cows” 
(164-66). Bishop is interested in how art transfers information from painter to viewer. 
Though they are just brushstrokes, the paint is able to suggest cows “confidently.” But 
much of the responsibility for painting’s dynamic capabilities rests on the viewer, whose 
mind must be open to the image. For instance, the speaker notices that “A specklike bird 
is flying to the left,” but she is open to the possibility that she might be mistaken: “Or is it 
a flyspeck looking like a bird?”  Representation is not something that an artist produces 
alone; it is an ongoing dynamic and collaborative act. Likewise, a viewer does not 
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passively accept the images as the painter conceives of them; she constructs or completes 
them. Desire enters the painting through the artist but also through the viewer. This 
becomes especially clear when the speaker recognizes the landscape: 
Heavens, I recognize the place, I know it! 
It’s behind—I can almost remember the farmer’s name. 
His barn backed on that meadow. There it is, 
titanium white, one dab. The hint of steeple, 
filaments of brush-hairs, barely there, 
must be the Presbyterian church. 
The speaker has a personal connection to the landscape the painter has represented, and 
so the viewer and painter share the experience of a certain place. But it is more accurate 
to say that they share the representation of a place. Bishop insists on calling attention to 
the painter’s technique. The barn is not a barn but rather the painter’s attempt to represent 
it: “titanium white, one dab.” The steeple is the representation of a steeple accomplished 
by “filaments of brush-hairs.” For Bishop, the painting cannot achieve the objective 
existence of what it represents; it is always paint that might call forth experience. She 
reiterates the power of art to transform external objects into human emotion. 
Representation is intersubjective, involving communication between people. The painter 
and the viewer communicate by representing and perceiving their external environment. 
Life and the memory of it cramped, 
dim, on a piece of Bristol board, 
dim, but how live, how touching in detail 
—the little that we get for free, 
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the little of our earthly trust. Not much. 
About the size of our abidance 
along with theirs: the munching cows, 
the iris, crisp and shivering, the water 
still standing from spring freshets, 
the yet-to-be-dismantled elms, the geese. 
Bishop sets up a spatial difference between “life,” the unalloyed experience of the 
external world, and the “memory of it cramped, / dim, on a piece of Bristol board.” Life 
is large and all-encompassing, while representations are necessarily small. But these 
small portrayals succeed where “large bad pictures” fail because they contain “the little 
of our earthly trust,” involving the small and individual self rather than gesturing at an 
expansiveness that exceeds us. Her interest in maps and geography involves reducing the 
largeness of our world to a human scale, small but full of drama, memory, and desire.5 In 
a sense, the world can only be experienced and valued through small representations that 
expose their techniques, allowing viewers into them, rather than large images of stillness 
that reject them; representation is where desire meets the world. It is, for Bishop, alive. 
Though subjects do not construct the world, they perceive space in it for themselves, 
allowing for our small abidance. The poem’s title, “Poem,” is itself small thing that 
makes a limited claim, and it also exposes itself as a representation 
In light of Bishop’s view of representation, a poem like “The Bight” is both an act 
of observation and communication, a representation of the natural world like the artist’s 
painting in “Poem.” The desire that Bishop puts into the world by describing her 
surroundings is an urge to communicate that matches the artist’s. “The Bight,” in 
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portraying a devastating world of “awful” activity, provides, in a few brushstrokes, a 
world we might recognize. Bishop paints a landscape where water evaporates to gas and 
pelicans crash without reward. Anyone who has suffered loneliness is meant to say, 
“Heavens, I know the place.” Like the interplay of her view with the painter’s in “Poem,” 
the speaker’s experience in “The Bight” relates to the reader’s. From Bishop’s 
perspective, this is what poetry does. In the poems about representation, Bishop suggests 
that desire enters the world, shaping the way we perceive it and ultimately allowing for 
the transfer of human emotion. It is fitting that the poem most concerned with how 
emotion is conveyed is titled “Poem,” for it reveals Bishop’s idea of what poetry does. 
Bishop frequently gets at the same sense of “abidance” by portraying solitary 
animals in worlds that endanger them. “The Fish, “The Armadillo,” “Sandpiper,” and 
“The Moose” present animals that signify a natural immanence that manages to retain 
unity in the midst of dispersion. “The Moose” considers how the modern subject might 
conceive of itself in the world. Bishop presents two narratives, one through space and the 
other through time. The poem begins by describing the confluence of waters as a river 
empties into a bay. From these waters, a bus carrying the speaker makes its way west. 
The first fourteen stanzas describe the physical details of the bus, its path through the 
small towns, and the surrounding environment. These stanzas present the immanent 
subject moving through the world. The next seven stanzas develop a life story, a human 
historical narrative that parallels the physical trip. An old couple on the bus reviews the 
life events that have touched them: 
names being mentioned, 
things cleared up finally; 
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what he said, what she said, 
who got pensioned; 
 
deaths, deaths and sicknesses 
the year he remarried; 
the year (something) happened. 
She died in childbirth. 
That was the son lost 
when the schooner foundered. (158-62) 
The old man and woman hurtle through their history, a collection of events that are 
primarily losses, occasions in which things have been taken from them. Immanence is, in 
many cases, a history of bereavement. Things are “cleared up,” but they resolve 
themselves into a string of “deaths, deaths and sicknesses.” The final seven stanzas 
recount the sudden appearance of the moose, a figure that affords an opportunity to step 
outside the flow of human life, of horizontal travel through the world. All the riders on 
the bus are transported by the encounter with the moose in the middle of the road: 
Taking her time, 
she looks the bus over, 
grand, otherworldly. 
Why, why do we feel 
(we all feel) this sweet 
sensation of joy? 
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One possible reason for their joy is the moose’s “otherworldliness,” its massiveness and 
solidity, especially as it follows the list of losses that comprise life. In Bishop’s work, the 
solitary animal is a symbol of immanence that allows subjects to imagine themselves 
whole within the sometimes dangerous world that threatens to dissolve them. Though the 
moose was endangered by the moving bus, it represents the ability to abide the 
degradations of the human world. When the bus pulls away, the moose is left behind at 
the intersection of two worlds: 
the moose can be seen 
on the moonlit macadam; 
then there’s a dim 
smell of moose, an acrid 
smell of gasoline. 
The moose represents a unified form of immanence, an unexplainable cohesiveness of 
feeling that can resist the divisions that plague the subject. It is “Towering, antlerless, / 
high as a church.” Through its sheer size, it retains a solid, indivisible, and, indeed, 
sacred self. Bishop ends the poem with the smell of both moose and gasoline, a mixture 
of animal and human worlds. The intersection of these two realms provides the speaker a 
moment to consider how one might abide in the modern world. Bishop employs the same 
combination of worlds in “The Armadillo,” whose titular creature must flee fire balloons 
released by humans: “Hastily, all alone, / the glistening armadillo left the scene, / rose-
flecked, head down, tail down” (83-84). The armadillo glistens, reflecting the fires started 
by human beings. In his armor, he abides within the world. In “The Fish,” the final image 
of “rainbow, rainbow, rainbow” is caused by the oil that has escaped the motor and 
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sloshes in the water at the bottom of the boat. Bishop brings the human subject, 
immanent, uncertain, and divided, into contact with whole and otherworldly animal who 
can withstand the world. 
“At the Fishhouses” takes the intersection of the human and animal worlds as its 
primary concern, reflecting on the painful possibility of entering an immanent realm. The 
poem has three sections, the first focusing on the human realm, describing the fishhouses 
and the speaker’s interaction with an old man who scales and cleans the fish. Bishop is 
interested in the paradoxical beauty that his scraping creates: 
The big fish tubs are completely lined 
with layers of beautiful herring scales 
and the wheelbarrows are similarly plastered 
with creamy iridescent coats of mail 
[. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
There are sequins on his vest and on this thumb. 
He has scraped the scales, the principle beauty, 
from unnumbered fish with that black old knife, 
the blade of which is almost worn away. (50-52) 
The old fisherman signifies an ambivalent articulation to the world. Though he destroys 
the fish, he sustains a traditional way of life that the speaker notes with sadness is 
diminishing. For Bishop, the scales are not the disgusting detritus of a severe process; 
they are “sequins,” flakes of beauty like the rose and amethyst grains of sand in the 
dissolved world of “Sandpiper.” Still, this beauty only appears in points of light that he 
has scraped from the fish. Beauty is broken into little pieces. Bishop creates an emotional 
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tone of sadness, reinforced by images such as “melancholy” stains and “rusted” ironwork. 
Beauty and vitality are qualities that came before but have now declined, and life in the 
human world inevitably entails this decay. 
 The second stanza moves away from the human world and down to the water’s 
edge, the balance point between realms. The shoreline represents the boundary between 
land and sea as well as between human and animal. The stanza contains a number of 
conflicting directionalities that signal the speaker’s ambiguous relation to these two 
worlds: 
Down at the water’s edge, at the place 
where they haul up the boats, up the long ramp 
descending into the water, thin silver 
tree trunks are laid horizontally 
across the gray stones, down and down 
at intervals of four or five feet. 
In this brief stanza, the speaker notes the opposition of various movements: down, up, up, 
descending, horizontally, across, down, down. Bishop portrays the tension and 
contradiction inherent in the intersection of earth and sea, implying the difficulty of 
entering a new element. Rather than contrasting vertical and horizontal movement, 
Bishop combines them in a complex and contradictory trajectory, suggesting that life is a 
mixture of immanence and transcendence, dispersed and unified subjectivity, and desire 
and rejection. The speaker’s description of the calm but declining human realm gives way 
to her consideration of the painful but enthralling sea. If the human world represents 
paradoxical dissolution and beauty, the animal world of the sea represents the tension 
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between freezing darkness and the seal’s playful curiosity. Bishop considers the 
complexity of communication between these realms: 
Cold dark deep and absolutely clear, 
element bearable to no mortal, 
to fish and to seals . . . One seal particularly 
I have seen here evening after evening. 
He was curious about me. He was interested in music; 
like me a believer in total immersion, 
so I used to sing him Baptist hymns. 
I also sang “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God.” 
The seal is another solitary animal, but unlike the moose, he contemplates the speaker 
and therefore possesses some degree of agency or understanding. The seal is an 
ambiguous symbol, a reflection of the speaker’s conflicted concerns. Bishop’s biographer 
Brett C. Millier points out that the notes in Bishop’s journals that became “At the 
Fishhouses” were marked with the notation “GM” for “Geographical Mirror,” suggesting 
that they were “part of an attempt to find herself reflected in the land and sea” (182). In 
this way, the seal is a reflection of herself in an alien and unfamiliar world. Her interest in 
the seal is an exploration of a new subjectivity, a view of herself in a cold and watery 
realm rather than the human world. The seal inhabits a flowing world rather than a stable 
one. She remarks that the water is bearable to no mortal, and yet the seal paradoxically 
appears “evening after evening,” suggesting that she repeats this juxtaposition of worlds 
again and again as if it is inevitable. It must be noted, however, that the seal considers her 
in return. In this way, the speaker views herself and her own motivations through the eyes 
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of a different type of subjectivity. They are drawn to each other because they think of 
what the opposite realm offers, though the seal, in particular, is skeptical. The speaker 
communicates by singing “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God,” which offers the stillness and 
protection of the Christian God, but the seal is dubious. Though they are both believers in 
“total immersion,” this phrase has a double meaning. For the seal, it means the fluidity of 
“Cold dark deep and absolutely clear” water; for the speaker it is a reference to the 
Christian sacrament of baptism and purification. But each of these immersions has a dark 
side. In Bishop’s early short story “The Baptism,” the protagonist “believed ardently in 
the use of total immersion as practiced by the Baptists” and dies after eagerly getting 
baptized in a cold stream in early spring (Poems 166). Bishop suggests that this sort of 
immersion, representing the search for purity, is a tragedy leading to an unnecessary 
death.  
The seal’s immersion is just as ambivalent. On the one hand, it is an introduction 
to knowledge, but in order to attain it, one must survive an initiation of pain: 
It is like what we imagine knowledge to be: 
dark, salt, clear, moving, utterly free, 
drawn from the cold hard mouth 
of the world, derived from the rocky breasts 
forever, flowing and drawn, and since 
our knowledge is historical, flowing, and flown. 
The water suggests an imbricated life, “flowing, and flown,” immersed in the knowledge 
distilled from the environment. The speaker cannot withdraw from the world. Bishop 
does not offer forms of transcendence that elevate the soul above the operations of our 
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everyday surroundings, nor is she convinced that one may reject the world and 
aesthetically imagine a place apart from it. In these ways, her poetry begins to differ from 
the forms of modernism developed by poets such as Pound, Eliot, and H.D. She 
emphasizes the immanent subject who, although yearning for some sort of protected and 
discrete self, is awash in the world. The purpose of poetry, from Bishop’s perspective, is 
to portray the ways we interact with the things that surround us, from our frustration with 
a world of absence and concealment to the libidinal growth in representation. Bishop’s 
poetry strikes a balance between the dissolution of the subject in the flows of external 
reality and the unification of a discrete and isolated self. In her poetry, she is chiefly 
concerned with what happens as we dip our hands into experience both flowing and 
flown, imagining a transformation from the fortress of the imago to the dissolved and 
flowing self. 
One of the tensions of the poem, however, is that the speaker never enters the 
water. She is drawn to it but only describes its postulated, conditional, suppositional 
effects: 
If you should dip your hand in, 
your wrist would ache immediately, 
your bones would begin to ache and your hand would burn 
as if the water were a transmutation of fire 
that feeds on stones and burns with a dark gray flame. 
The water would produce painfully intense sensations, both freezing and burning. To dip 
one’s hand into this dark element, therefore, is a fearful proposition. The speaker holds 
back from such pain and yet desires the interaction rather than withdrawal. Bishop’s 
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subject, though balanced between these two environments, is ready to imagine passing 
beyond the boundary. 
 
Notes 
1 In fact, Bishop prides herself on appreciating Eliot’s work despite her 
disagreement with his social values: “Politically I considered myself a socialist, but I 
disliked ‘social conscious’ writing. I stood up for T. S. Eliot when everybody else was 
talking about James T. Farrell” (qtd. in Brown 293).  
2 Another poem,“The Equilibrists,” is more complicated than the others because it 
intensifies the desire between the two lovers. It tears them apart and leads them to their 
grave, but the desire itself never seems to perish. In this particular poem, Ransom 
imagines desire transcending death, and the poem does not approach the formal 
quiescence of the others. 
3 Quotations from Bishop’s poetry are from Poems, Prose, and Letters unless 
otherwise noted and will be cited by page numbers parenthetically in my text. “The 
Weed” is on pages 15 and 16. 
4 Willard Spiegelman notes that “Cape Breton” is more than just factual 
observation, claiming, in fact, that the poem is “a glimpse into a heart of darkness” (161). 
His careful analysis of Bishop’s word choices and images makes it clear that the poem 
advances beyond what Bishop calls “plain description” into loss and meaninglessness, 
but, for Spiegelman, the result is an epistemological breakdown: “Both the landscape and 
its meaning have been abandoned in a cinematic sleight-of-hand that calls into question 
the very grounds of our knowing” (163). Rather than enacting such abandonment, 
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however, the poem communicates the experience of abandonment, finding a resonant 
convergence of the natural world and the human feeling of loss. 
5 Commenting on “The Map,” Sybil P. Estess points out that “[t]he issue at stake 
is that the images on maps are by definition construction of the mind, as the mind 
attempts to plot the landscape in order to find its way” (221). Estess argues that Bishop 
moves from solid natural surroundings toward representations of them that have 
something at stake for the speaker, who must “find [her] way.” In other words, the world 
and its representation are not purely epistemological questions but are questions of 
motivation, desire, and self-interest. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation is built on the idea that poets explore and construct models of 
desire and subjectivity. In the preceding chapters, I have examined these models as they 
develop in the works of several modernist American poets. Despite significant variety 
among them, they share a general inclination to withdraw desire from the external world 
and redirect it toward the self. This development starts to recede in the poetry of 
Elizabeth Bishop, who conceives of the subject as inherently divided and imbricated in 
the world. Looking forward, it is possible to extend this perspective to analyze the poetry 
that follows modernism, which responds to a much different cultural and historical 
context. Specifically, post-World War II poets experienced a social environment 
characterized by modes of unity rather than fragmentation. On one level, this unity was 
driven by the common defense required by World War II. The shock of Pearl Harbor 
quickly galvanized into a desire to defeat the nation’s enemies that lasted through the war 
and into the Cold War with the Soviet Union. On another level, the economic forces that 
had been stagnant during the 1930s sprang to life during World War Two, driving the 
production of war materiel, including the atomic bomb. This resurgent capitalism, in turn, 
fueled the hyper-consumerism that followed the war. Unlike industrial capitalism, which 
restricts desire in order to enforce modes of production, consumer capitalism operates by 
eliciting desire, directing it toward fetishized commodities and modes of consumption. 
Herbert Marcuse, Fredric Jameson, Guy Debord, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
chart the historical development of this reorganization of desire.1 The seeming 
evaporation of authority and restriction obscures the emergence of more insidious forms 
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of control. In One-Dimensional Man, for instance, Marcuse points out that new forms of 
desire serve the interests of the prevailing social order: “This mobilization and 
administration of libido may account for much of the voluntary compliance, the absence 
of terror, the pre-established harmony between individual needs and socially-required 
desires, goals, and aspirations” (75). The harmony Marcuse describes was also ensured 
by the rise of broadcast television, which could project and idealize images of conformity 
at the same time it stimulated the desire for glamorized consumer products.  
Postwar society is marked by the freedom to pursue satisfaction, but such pursuit 
is paradoxically accompanied by conformity, the movement in unison with everyone, as 
in a school of fish. In From Modern to Contemporary, James Breslin refers to the rise of 
a “new rear guard” of writers who relied on dense symbolism as well as rigid rhyming 
and stanza forms (23-53). Breslin’s study discusses the revolt against this staid and 
resolved poetry primarily in formal terms, but the formal breakthrough was accompanied 
by shifting models of desire and subjectivity. Poets in postwar America struggled against 
unity much as the modernists struggled against fragmentation, though the forms of this 
struggle are necessarily different. Allen Ginsberg, for instance, pushes for extremes of 
sensuality that offend the social order but at the same time reveals its underlying logic of 
authority. He inherits Walt Whitman’s sensualist perspective, especially when expressing 
sexual desire, but his frankness begins to reveal new challenges and present different 
resolutions. Ginsberg, like Whitman, gravitates toward all objects of the world, but he 
insists that this reality must include unpleasant and unfortunate things: 
Here we’re overwhelmed 
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with such unpleasant detail 
we dream again of Heaven. 
For the world is a mountain 
 
of shit: if it’s going to 
be moved at all, it’s got 
to be taken by handfuls. (50-51) 
For Ginsberg, the world is a mountain, grand and majestic, but also, quite bluntly, a pile 
of shit. The figure of human excrement signifies throughout his work how broad and 
inclusive his model of desire is, how it admits everything, grasping the entire range of our 
surroundings. Though he is sometimes disgusted with what he finds, he nevertheless 
takes it with both hands.  
Ginsberg’s expansive desire, like Whitman’s, moves out toward the world, but it 
is sensitive to forces that limit or restrict desire. The model of subjectivity that emerges 
from his concept of desire is characterized by a struggle against constriction. Ginsberg’s 
subject is inevitably pushing for the freedom to contain multitudes, to expand further into 
the world. For this reason, Ginsberg’s poetry is intrinsically political; his subjects are 
hemmed in by capitalism, restrictive social morals, and the abuses of government. The 
forces of social restriction are hostile, and the struggle leads to devastating consequences 
for those who fight against them. “Howl” is an angry lament for those lost in the struggle: 
“I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked, 
/ dragging themselves through negro streets at dawn looking for an angry fix” (126). For 
Ginsberg, the effort to pursue sensual satisfaction can lead to madness when the social 
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order is arrayed against it. Like Whitman, he constructs a dispersive model of the self, but 
desire for the world runs into forces that try to contain it. Ginsberg’s speakers are 
shadowed by the FBI and threatened by the laws of a repressive state. In this 
environment, poets are those who “howled on their knees in the subway and were 
dragged off the roof waving genitals and manuscripts” (128). Sexual organs are bared in 
order to interact with the world, but so, too, are manuscripts. Poets must expose their 
desire through language, though they live in a world where the social order could drag 
them off to mental institutions or prisons.  
Ginsberg explicitly acknowledges his debt to Whitman by imagining the bearded 
old poet in “A Supermarket in California,” an emblematic location of contemporary 
American culture for its gratuitous display of food in the land of stylized Hollywood 
cinematic landscapes. Whitman looks through rows and rows of products, attempting to 
touch and taste everything. But this is a supermarket rather than the natural world; 
therefore, it is driven by capitalist modes of production and consumption. Though 
Ginsberg visualizes himself walking with Whitman through the corridors, “tasting 
artichokes, possessing every frozen delicacy, and never passing the cashier,” they are 
nevertheless hemmed in by the fact that “[t]he doors close in an hour” (136). For 
Ginsberg, the opportunity to act on pure desire occurs on terms set by the overarching 
social order. His transgressive desire struggles perpetually against restrictive authority, 
resulting in a subject always more discrete and circumscribed than he wishes. 
While Ginsberg pursues sensualist models of desire, Robert Lowell follows 
Dickinson in exploring the impossibility of satisfaction. Lowell constructs a model of 
desire in which the bonds that might join us to the world cannot be recovered. In 
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Lowell’s poetry, these bonds exhibit two primary characteristics. First, the subject’s 
relation to the world is almost entirely figured as a relation to people rather than objects. 
Lowell is not interested in the objects of the natural world except, perhaps, as symbols for 
human relationships. Furthermore, the bonds he considers are usually oedipal, either in 
terms of the mother-father-child dynamism or in terms of the transition from the oedipal 
family to romantic desire. Second, Lowell often situates the subject at a temporal point 
when it is impossible to recover or exercise the bonds to other people. In Lowell’s poetry, 
speakers do not pursue objects of desire but, instead, desire moments when satisfaction 
was possible. The subject experiences desire as a gnawing and dissolving regret, whether 
in terms of parental or romantic relations. In the postwar context, paternal restriction is 
eroded; Lowell’s subject loses the ability to connect with his father and wonders where 
he can turn for guidance. The paradigmatic poem of oedipal loss and resulting stasis and 
uncertainty is “Middle Age,” in which Lowell contemplates the pressures of past and 
future: 
Now the midwinter grind 
is on me, New York 
drills through my nerves, 
as I walk 
the chewed-up streets. 
 
At forty-five, 
what next, what next? 
At every corner, 
 221 
I meet my Father, 
my age, still alive. (325) 
Lowell’s speaker is crushed between an unrecoverable past and an unknowable future, 
physically experiencing the dissolving grind that “drills” his nerves in the “chewed-up 
streets.” He cannot recover the father he has lost, nor does he know how to proceed now 
that he has reached the same age as his father. He is caught in the “midwinter” of “middle 
age,” a stasis between an irretrievable past and an uncertain future. Lowell’s speaker 
recognizes the insufficiency of the present, trapping him within narrow temporal 
boundaries. The speaker first looks forward, asking “what next, what next?” Yet the 
repetition stresses his uncertainty and the fact that knowledge of the future is necessarily 
unavailable. The question is insistent rather than answerable, revealing how interminable 
the present is. The time that elapses between the first query and its repetition provides no 
answer; the speaker is left in a series of identical nows. The poem ends with the speaker’s 
recognition that he must walk in the degraded present, the fallen New York rather than 
Mount Sion: 
You never climbed 
Mount Sion, yet left 
dinosaur 
death-steps on the crust, 
where I must walk. 
Rather than connecting to the actual father who preceded him or the spiritual father from 
whom he asks forgiveness (“Father, forgive me / my injuries / as I forgive / those I / have 
injured!”), the speaker is caught repeating the question “what’s next?” Despite the lack of 
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an answer, the final line insists that he must move. Though the speaker cannot reclaim the 
past, he must inevitably walk into the future. Critics such as Christian Sisack have 
attempted to claim subversive power for Lowell’s poetics, arguing that Lowell’s 
“marginalizations and shifting subjectivities can subvert the ability of the powerful to 
completely manage and discipline the subject of a confession” (279).2 On the other hand, 
critics like Charles Altieri see Lowell as a poet who cannot find a way to embrace the 
complexities of contemporary American life. After the loss of modernism’s urge to order 
and stability, Altieri argues, Lowell cannot find a means to express the varieties of 
experience authentically. For instance, Altieri calls Lowell’s Notebook “a deliberate 
justification for and explanation of the condition of passive self-pity” (71). However, 
Lowell understands the loss of this organizing principle as a valid and, indeed, formative 
experience. Lowell’s poetry dramatizes the fact that contemporary experience is made up 
of impossible desire and gnawing pauses. Lowell attests to our immobilization in a 
moment of time, the static and unsatisfying present. In “Water,” the speaker laments a 
missed opportunity at romance while watching the sea upon the rocks that “kept tearing 
away / flake after flake” (321). The speaker sees slow dissolution in an undesired present. 
In “The Old Flame,” the speaker contemplates a failed relationship that can never be 
rectified; a new couple moves into their old house and restores it, but the speaker is not 
able to return to his own past and correct his problems. In these and other poems, Lowell 
offers subjects who fruitlessly desire alternate moments of time in the hopes of 
recovering a family unit that no longer gives order to the world. 
Like Lowell, John Ashbery focuses on the subject in the present moment, but for 
Ashbery the subject luxuriates in this moment rather than lamenting lost opportunities. In 
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“Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” Ashbery dismisses the idea of a stable and unified 
self. He contends that “the soul is not a soul, / Has no secret, is small, and it fits / Its 
hallow perfectly: its room, our moment of attention” (475). In this way, Ashbery rejects 
the idea of a temporal unity across time, the sort of discrete and isolated subject 
conceived by Pound, Stevens, Eliot, and H.D. Instead, we are our own “moment of 
attention.” For Ashbery, however, this is not a loss; he celebrates the dynamism and 
activity of the present. For example, he criticizes Parmigianino’s portrait because it 
immobilizes the self. In the portrait, “[t]he soul has to stay where it is, / Even though 
restless” (474). Ashbery argues that the search for a temporally unified self is misguided 
because it is “[i]mpossible now / To restore those properties in the silver blur” (477). The 
present moment is always emerging and provides a truth that is not available to the past 
or future. He argues that the present is all encompassing: “Today has no margins, the 
event arrives / Flush with its edges” (484). The present is all we can ever inhabit. We are 
comprised of our own restlessness and activity rather than being a static and unified 
subject. In other words, Ashbery distinguishes between being and doing. The former 
suggests unity across time, but the latter must always occur in the present. 
As the self dissolves into only the moment of experience for Ashbery, desire is 
diffused, neither directed to the self nor finding any other objects. Desire does not 
underlie the subject’s creative powers, as it does in Pound, nor does it alight on sublime 
natural objects of experience as it does in Shelley. Instead, Ashbery constructs a model in 
which desire is unattached, atomized, and free of properties: 
Love once 
Tipped the scales but now is shadowed, invisible, 
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Though mysteriously present, around somewhere. 
But we know it cannot be sandwiched 
Between two adjacent moments, that its windings 
Lead nowhere except to further tributaries 
And that these empty themselves into a vague 
Sense of something that can never be known. (482) 
Love, for Ashbery, is not directed by a subject or isolated into an identifiable object. 
Instead, love is a general background; we are awash in the nebulous and indistinct 
possibility that satisfaction might occur. Love cannot be known, though it vaguely 
“seems likely that each of us / Knows what it is” (483). To act upon desire, however, is to 
“Push forward ignoring the apparent / Naïveté of the attempt” (483). To avoid this, 
Ashbery again returns to the model of the dispersed self separated from temporal unity 
rather than pursuing sensual interaction with objects: “But this confusion drains away as 
one / Is always cresting into one’s present” (483). Ashbery’s present is shorn of any 
particularity. It is not Ginsberg’s present, which is marked by the intimate—even 
disgusting—contact with the objects of the world. Instead, it is a conceptual moment, 
“the present,” empty. Ashbery’s focus on purely conceptual content is a repudiation of 
the reality of his surroundings, such as the California supermarket of Ginsberg’s 1950s. 
And in some ways it is also an extension of the underlying logic of postmodernism which 
seeks to separate events from their material causes and effects. Fredric Jameson 
diagnoses postmodernism by suggesting that the new emphasis on presentness rejects the 
history or teleology that characterized modernist texts: “the breakdown of temporality 
suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and intentionalities that might 
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focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the 
subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming” 
(27). Ashbery’s poetry exhibits the temporal disjunction Jameson describes except that 
the subsequent vividness is, rather, an intensity of vagueness. The subject who cannot be 
unified in time must also accept a directionless, indefinite desire. 
Ashbery, however, subtly questions his model of desire, evincing a gentle longing 
for things that might outlast the present. Art itself is one such thing. Though it is an 
expression of the artist’s present, it is also able to step outside of its moment and cause a 
reaction in the viewer: 
[. . .] This past 
Is now here: the painter’s 
Reflected face, in which we linger, receiving 
Dreams and inspirations on an unassigned 
Frequency. (486) 
The portrait is a physical object that can transcend the artist’s present and communicate 
across time. Though Ashbery suggests that its brightness begins to diminish, it offers the 
subject an opportunity to renew itself. Like Bishop, Ashbery is still affected by a sense of 
past unity. The poem ends with the ambiguous image of the contemporary subject in the 
act of making himself while simultaneously falling apart: 
[. . .] One feels too confined, 
Sifting the April sunlight for clues, 
In the mere stillness of the ease of its 
Parameter. The hand holds no chalk 
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And each part of the whole falls off 
And cannot know it knew, except 
Here and there, in cold pockets 
Of remembrance, whispers out of time. (487) 
Ashbery suggests that we must not commit Parmigianino’s error by trying to draw a 
stable and unified self. We cannot be the same self across time; he argues that “one” 
static being is “too confined” and that we exist in the flux of today only. But this urge 
toward unity, so prevalent in modernist poets and yet so challenged by their fragmenting 
social and historical circumstances, remains active in Ashbery’s poetic vision, where the 
quiet voice of wholeness still speaks with compelling force. Despite Ashbery’s rejection, 
the self-portrait in a convex mirror suggests an apt figure of postmodern poetry, 
containing a lasting wish for a stable self now distorted by an over-emphasis on the 
present. The mirror offers an image of the self, but it is only a representation, produced in 
a convex way that absurdly alters what it finds: selves that are shifting and contingent. 
For all their differences, Ginsberg, Lowell, and Ashbery share a postmodern model of 
subjectivity based on the flux of circumstances. Selves are temporary, existing through 
connections and disjunctions that form or deteriorate instantaneously. It is no coincidence 
that the postmodern movements these poets represent—the Beats, confessionalism, and 
the New York School—participate in new forms of desire unmoored from a concrete self. 
In the work of these poets, the recognition of an inexorable present overcomes the sense 
that we have discrete selves that can withhold desire from the world.  
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Notes 
 1 See Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, Jameson’s Postmodernism, or The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Debord’s Society of the Spectacle, and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. 
 2 Other critics who contend that Lowell politically destabilizes the prevailing 
social order include Steven Gould Axelrod and James Breslin. 
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